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The purpose of this study is to determine which factors affect an ethnona­
tional group's decision to utilize terrorism to obtain their desired outcomes. 
Current theories have reached an answer, but theoretical underpinnings of 
those answers are disparate and weak. Thus, in answering this question, a 
new model of terrorism is necessary - one which spans the four primary 
levels of analysis. I do this using a weak rational choice model as a cross­
level link, and using psychological models as a basis for the individual-level 
actions. 
While the model is not unequivocally and universally supported by the 
tests, it is able to explain several previous findings in the literature and to 
explain the counter-intuitive findings regarding democracies. 
The model is then applied to two real-life examples, the Ulster Catholics 
and the Scots, to determine what light it can shed on the differences in 
outcomes for those not too dissimilar groups. These findings reveal that the 
1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was doomed to failure because the underlying 
terrorism action pressure was too great, while the 1998 Good Friday Accord 
had a much greater probability of success because the terrorism action 
pressure acting on the Ulster Catholics was significantly lower in the mid-
1990s. 
Finally, several suggestions are made to reduce the probability of an 
outbreak of terrorism among a state's ethnonational minorities. W hile past 
use of terrorism is, by far, the best indicator of future use, other factors 
show importance as indicators. The percent of youth in the state, economic 
vii 
differentials, level of democracy in the state, and globalization all increase 
the probability that the group will become a terrorist group. These results 
are especially important, especially given the current trends in the world. 
These trends, namely globalization, increased economic differences within 
and among states, and the increased number of adolescents in the world, 
are coming together to create an opportunity to either avert a catastrophic 
increase in terrorist events, or to allow it to occur. 
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Bygone battles, like old sins, 
cast long shadows. 
Proverb 
EvER since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, 
terrorism has occupied the minds of many Americans, for those attacks 
were different - fundamentally different - from earlier ones. Earlier at­
tacks on America either were by American citizens (e.g., Timothy McVeigh, 
the Weathermen, and the Earth Liberation Front) or were perpetrated 
overseas (e.g., East African Embassy bombings, the USS Cole, and the 
Berlin Discotheque). 
The importance of terrorism as an issue facing individual states is not 
simply limited to the United States. In the European Union as a whole, 
terrorism ranks as the fourth most important issue at 10%. However, in 
1 
Spain, it ranks as number one at 46% (Figure 1. 1) (European Commission 
2005: 26). This may be due to the great number of terror-related deaths 
in Spain as compared to the European Union as a whole over the last four 
decades (Figure 1. 2). 
The media, politicians, and academics have each said much and written 
even more about terrorism and America's reaction to it over the past three 
years. Because of this, several pre-existing difficulties have made them­
selves quite apparent. First, there is no universally agreed-upon definition 
of terrorism. The US government itself employs four separate definitions for 
the one word. 1 Each definition reflects the needs and views of that individ­
ual agency. But more importantly, even in academic literature, terrorism 
lacks a universal definition. While researchers have written chapters upon 
chapters and volumes upon volumes trying to pin down a satisfactory def­
inition for terrorism, 2 no single definition has gained common acceptance 
(Bantekas 2003). Is this a factor of the inherent 'fuzziness' of the concept 
and lingering cultural myopia, is this indicative of trying to cover too much 
with one definition, or is this yet another case of reification? 
Tied in to this second question is a second difficulty made obvious by 
recent writings - rationale differs among terrorist groups. This means 
more than just that the ETA has a different mandate than does al Qaeda 
1The four definitions are found in the State Department, the Defense Department, 
the FBI, and the Homeland Security Department. 
2See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Tenvrism, (Columbia University Press, 
1998); David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and In­
ternational Tem,rism, (Praeger, 1997); Charles Kegley, The New Global Tenvrism: 
Chamcteristics, Causes, Controls, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003); and Peter C. 
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Figure 1.1: Percent of respondents who considered terrorism as one of the 
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Figure 1. 2: Terrorism events, fatalities, and injuries for Western European 
states, 1968-2005. 
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because they are in different regions of the world. It means that they are fundamentally different, because the terrorists and their aims are funda­mentally different. The ETA seeks independence from Madrid, whereas al Qaeda seeks, among other things, a pan-Islamic caliphate. 3 Do these differences really matter in the study of terrorism? Can the conclusions reached f or one type of terrorism be applied to a second? 
Neither of these questions has received its due attention until now. In past studies, researchers have tended to group all terrorists together. Recently, however, research has begun focusing either on a specific variety of terrorists or on the individuals themselves. This dissertation seeks to place itself in this ever-expanding field. Instead of examining the causes of the creation of all terrorist groups, it specifically limits itself to a specific limited type in a specific limited geographical location - ethnonational minorities in Western European states. 
Does restricting this research to a limited type of terrorism in a limited area of the globe severely restrict is usefulness? No. As Figure 1.3 shows, nationalist and separatist groups constitute the highest proportion of ter­rorist groups in the world, and of all regions, Western Europe is second only to the Middle East in terms of the number of nationalist and sepa­ratist groups using terrorism (Figure 1.4), and the number of ethnonational 
3Specifically, they seek "to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by 
working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems 'non-Islamic' 
and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries" (TerrorismFiles.org 
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Figure 1. 3: The distribution of terror groups in the world by classification. 
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Figure 1 .4: Global distribution of nationalist and separatist terror groups 
in the world. 
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groups is far from zero (see Figure 1. 5) .4 As such, circumscribing the uni­
verse in this manner arguably limits the applicability of the research little. 
And, should the results not be generalizable to the world, then a further 
finding would be that the factors affecting terrorism in one region is funda­
mentally different than the factors affecting it in another, that civilization 
does matter, to use Huntington's ( 1996) term. 
A framework developed by Martha Crenshaw (1981), but adapted and 
adopted by both Jeffrey Ian Ross ( 1993) and Ernst Haas ( 1997), serves as 
the inspiration for this study. However, instead of using the framework to 
examine and explain progress in terms of nationalism, as did Haas, I use it 
in the same vein as did Crenshaw and Ross - to examine and explain why 
groups take that step from simple civil disobedience to genuine terrorism. 
In short, I ask what factors increase the propensity of a group to commit 
terrorism. 
1 . 1  Theory and Model 
Before briefing the research design, certain terms must be defined. These 
terms refer to both the action and the people investigated. Once the terms 
are defined, a brief examination of the four levels of analysis is undertaken. 
After that, a logical categorization of conditions is explored. Finally, the 
research design, including statistical models, is briefly examined. 
4It is also interesting to note, and I further expound on this point, that Western 
Europe is far from immune to terrorist groups, even with its history of liberal democracy 
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Figure 1.6: The total number of terrorist groups in Western Europe, 1945-
2005. 
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1 . 1 . 1  Terror, Terrorism, and Terrorists 
As discussed earlier, researchers have spent many hours and much ink fer­
reting out a satisfying definition of terrorism. Four definitions are quickly 
sketched in this section. This section does not attempt to definitively define 
terrorism in a universal sense; it merely seeks to set the stage for further 
examination of what such a definition would entail. 
The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as, "the unlawful use 
of - or threatened use of - force or violence against individuals or prop­
erty to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve politi­
cal, religious, or ideological objectives" (Hoffman 2004: 19). This definition 
places an emphasis on coercion. A person is a terrorist based upon his/her 
purposes, not just the methods he/she uses. The definition used by the 
FBI is similar in emphasis, but adds a clause about the legality of actions. 5 
The only major difference between these two definitions is the emphasis 
on the illegality of actions. The US State Department includes a third as­
pect in its definition, that of the noncombatant. 6 Here, " 'noncombatant' 
is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who 
at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty" (Hull 2001) . The 
Department of Homeland Security uses the most comprehensive definition 
of terrorism of these four (see, for example, The Homeland Security Act of 
2002, §2  11 5). 
5This is the definition created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 
50 U.S.C. §1801 ,  (c) ( 1 )  and (2), 1982. 
622 u.s.c. §2656, (f)(d). 
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Each definition emphasizes certain aspec�s of terrorism. The State De­partment emphasizes the targets of terrorism, but precludes the ability of a state to be a terrorist. The Department of Defense emphasizes the goals. The Federal Bureau of Investigation emphasizes legality. The Department of Homeland Security attempts to create an all-inclusive definition of ter­rorism, focusing on both the individual and their rationale. 
The second chapter explores in greater detail the search for a working definition of terrorism. While all four US definitions do have commonali­ties, they also have important deficiencies covered by the other definitions. Furthermore, even in academic literature, differences between terrorism definitions are legion. The definition used in this research needs to cover the important aspects of terrorism and needs to deal with the uniqueness of ethnonational minorities. Chapter Two ends with a working definition of ethnonational terrorism, based heavily on Schmid (1983).  
1 . 1 . 2  Four Levels of Analysis 
Now that the actions under consideration have been sketched, let us briefly consider the four levels of analysis and the insights each can give to the study of terrorist groups. Chapter Three explores these and the relevant theories in greater detail. 
Many of the theories f or the individual level of analysis center on psy­chology and what causes a person to become violent. Is the answer just some psychological deformity or defect? No. The desire to kill, like the desire to live and to love, is deep inside each of us, a part of our very 
12 
being. Thanatos, the death instinct, working in concert with our inborn 
survival instinct, pushes us to commit acts destined to grant us immor­
tality, whether those acts are of great creation or of great destruction 
( G uggenbiihl-Craig 2002). 
Beyond the inborn drive for immortality, there are a number of external 
factors which encourage us to act in certain ways - even violent ways. 
Gurr (1970) referred to these factors in his rendition of the theory of relative 
deprivation. They include any form of differential between one person and 
the next. As seen later, when these differentials are based on in-group/out­
group dynamics, they become even more potent. 
At the group level, four broad theories of conflict present themselves: 
Ethnic Competition Theory, Ethnic Segregation Theory, Uneven Develo1r 
ment Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory. The first of the four, Ethnic 
Competition Theory, asserts that ethnic conflict comes from groups com­
peting for the state's resources (Medrano 1995). With limited resources 
available, the competition breaks out along ethnic lines. One result of this 
is that conflict between ethnic groups should occur more frequently when 
the groups interact than when they are separate (Belanger and Pinard 
1991 ;  Tilly 1991) .  Ethnic competition may also result from occupational 
desegregation, as the ethnic groups would then be competing for the same 
employment positions. Susan Olzak (1 992) showed that such economic 
desegregation did lead to a greater level of ethnic conflict, at least in the 
United States between the years 1 880 and 1 920. 
Ethnic Segregation Theory asserts the opposite - ethnic conflict comes 
from one group segregating itself from the others (Medrano 1995) .  This 
13 
segregation can be physical ( movement to ghettoes) or economic ( one eth­nonation inhabiting only one employment sector). In either case, both eth­nic cohesion and an increased probability of ethnic conflict result from lim­itations on upward mobility, either real or perceived (Gellner 1983; Hechter 1999). 
The third, Uneven Development Theory, specifies that when an eth­nonation is regionally concentrated, as are the Basque in northern Spain, then there is a greater chance for them to display ethnonational sentiment, as that region will probably be either economically advanced or econom­ically retarded when compared to the rest of the state (da Silva 1975). Economically advanced groups will see the rest of the state as pulling them down, whereas economically regressed groups will see the rest of the state as retarding their possible growth - often to the point of internal colonization. This leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that agitating groups may, in fact, be richer than the rest of the state {Medrano 1995). 
F inally, Gurr built on previous relative deprivation theories. He com­bined economic and political repression in a general explanation of why certain groups rebel against the authority of the central government. For Gurr, the basic reason is relative deprivation; i.e., there exists a gap be­tween value capabilities and value expectations. Gap growth is vital to Gurr's theory. As long as groups do not have expectations too far above what they receive, there is no great impetus to rebel. However, when the group sees the gap grow greater, they resolve into action (Gurr 1970). 
Theories at the state level_ of analysis involve the effects of regime type and strength on the behavior of groups. Crenshaw (1981) concluded that 
14 
democracies should have a higher probability of experiencing domestic ter­
rorism than should non-democracies. She bases this counter-intuitive find­
ing on the fact that democracies are less willing and less able to exert 
the controls necessary to control their citizens in a way that effectively 
eliminates the ability of terrorist groups to operate freely. The empirical 
evidence supports these contentions ( see Chapter Three). Moreover, free 
states have a free media, which is an important, if not necessary, compo­
nent to successful terror campaigns, for the knowledge of the terrorist event 
must be transmitted before the terror can spread amongst the citizenry. 
Furthermore, such results are magnified in the presence of international 
news media (Burton 1985; Nash 1995). 
Finally, the system level examines the effects of the increased interac­
tions between the states, the increased levels of media penetration, and 
the increased rates of change in the employment sectors. Globalization 
theories suggest that increased interaction between the states and lower 
transportation costs should result in a sometimes catastrophic change in 
employment. That is, as transportation costs drop, states tend to special­
ize in what they pPoduce. As a result, those who worked in sectors not 
related to the specialization are at a greater risk of unemployment (Kellner 
2002; Krugman and Venables 1 995) .  
1 .2 Framework for Analysis 
Now that the action is defined as well as some background for the causes 
of ethnic conflict provided, the framework for this study can be erected. 
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Martha Crenshaw ( 1981) developed a framework for examining the condi­
tions that led to outbreaks of terrorism in a state. Later, Ian Ross (1993) 
expanded upon that framework, and Ernst Haas (1997) recast it to exam­
ine the conditions necessary for progress to occur in social collectivities, 
especially vis-a-vis nationalism. In each of these works, the researcher 
posited that there existed necessary and trigger conditions crucial for the 
event under study to take place ( terrorism for Crenshaw and Ross, social 
evolution for Haas) .  It is upon this scaffolding that I begin my search for 
an effective theory of terrorism. 
A necessary condition is one that must be in place for the result to 
occur. Contrast this with sufficient conditions that cause the result by 
themselves. An example should demonstrate the differences between the 
two. In terms of current terrorism models, necessary conditions include 
those conditions that must be in place for terrorism to occur. Crenshaw 
(1981) referred to them as permissive conditions. In this category, she 
included such items as weak central state and modernization. In addition to 
these two, Ross {1993} includes geographical location. All of these factors 
must be in place before terrorism can occur. They are necessary for the 
commission of terrorist acts. 
Trigger conditions are a subset of the necessary conditions. They be­
come sufficient when certain other necessary conditions are met. How­
ever, there is a fundamental difference between necessary and trigger con­
ditions. Necessary conditions are steady-state, background conditions, 
whereas trigger conditions are events. For instance, a high crime rate 
is a background condition, whereas the assassination of a popular leader 
16 
is a trigger event. The existence of an ethnonational group is a necessary 
condition, but a split in the representative body of that group is a trigger 
event. (Crenshaw 1981, Ross 1993) 
As necessary conditions are those steady-state conditions existing prior 
to the effect, they will tend to be living conditions, historical conditions, 
and other 'background' conditions that do not rapidly (or often) change. 
But what conditions should be examined? The model of terrorism proposed 
in this paper produces several expected indicators of increased terrorism 
risk. Among these are ethnic differences, the level of democracy in the 
state, and the percent of youth in the state. 
Chapter Four lays out the actual theory of terrorism - the Pressure 
Model of Terrorism - based on the concepts of action pressure and a 
weak rational choice model. Creating this model forced a re-examination 
of trigger conditions as conceptualized by Crenshaw (1981) , Ross (1993) , 
and Haas (1997) . It is quite clear that the trigger conditions cited for 
causing terrorism campaigns are triggers only because terrorism followed 
and not because of any inherent properties of the event itself. In fact, to 
support theories based on trigger conditions, much selective parsing of the 
historical record had to take place. 
For instance, which of the following was a trigger event in the history of 
the South Tyroleans? Was it separation from Austria (and the North and 
East Tyroleans) at the end of World War I; legislation designed to elimi­
nate the South Tyrolean nation in Italy in the 1920s; attacks on the South 
Tyroleans by Italian Fascists during the 1930s; refusal of Hitler to annex 
South Tyrol into the German state after the Anschlufi; refusal of the United 
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States to recognize South Tyrolean claims to national self-determination 
after both World Wars ; or the failure of the United Nations to force Italy 
into granting them more autonomy? Apparently, at least according to cur­
rent 'trigger' theories, the answer is the last; "The Bombings" occurred 
shortly after Austria, Italy, and the UN failed to reach agreement on Ty­
rolean autonomy. In other words, the last is the trigger condition because 
the terror campaign shortly followed it. 
1 .3 Methods 
This study examines the ethnic minorities in Western Europe to determine 
what factors encourage ( and discourage) ethnonations to make the move 
to the use of terrorist tactics in their attempt to attain what they feel 
they should have. This reduction of the universe of discourse is done for 
several reasons. First, the ethnic minorities examined (indigenous people, 
ethnonational minorities, and national minorities) constitute what this au­
thor considers one fundamental grouping of proto-terrorists. 7 That is, this 
group seems to have a different motive for terrorism than the universal 
group as a whole. Second, the choice of Western Europe was made for two 
primary reasons. In the spirit of Przweorski and Teune, and Huntington, 
Western Europe has a shared tradition; hence many of fundamentals that 
70ther fundamental groupings include groupings based primarily on religion (e.g. , 
Palestinians in Israel and Kashmiri in Pakistan and India) and ethnic groupings among 
displaced peoples (e.g. , Turks in Germany and the foreign workers in Switzerland). 
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define a civilization are similar. Also, these countries, a subset of Hunt­
ington's Western Civilization, arguably constitute a most�similar system 
(Huntington 1996; Przweorski, Teune 1970). 
Finally, this study is only the first step in the process of discovering 
the underlying causes of terrorism. In the scientific process, the first step 
to a generalized theory is to simplify the problem. Instead of finding a 
theory to cover all types of terrorism in all of the world, this initiates the 
process by examining a small piece of the picture - the piece that includes 
ethnonational groups in Western Europe. 
Chapter Five sets the stage for a statistical analysis of the available 
data, exploring the statistical models to be used, along with their strengths 
and weaknesses. In the end, while the data appear to be survival-time data, 
and thus best analyzed using survival time techniques, they are not - at 
least in their current form.8 In lieu of survival-time analysis, population­
averaged cross sectional time series general estimating equations were used, 
with the appropriate corrections for the expected autoregressive correlation 
structure. As binary dependent variables require appropriate models, logit, 
probit, and complementary log-log models are used. 
Chapter Six concludes with a discussion of the results as they relate 
to the PMT model and the hypotheses. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes 
this magnum opus by offering suggestions for policy changes designed to 
reduce the fundamental risk of terrorism breaking out in states and in 
groups prone to using it. 
8When, and if, a working theory of trigger events is created, then event history 
analysis can be utilized in the study of what affects terrorism. Until that point, unless 
one assumes that only global factors matter, event history analysis cannot be performed. 
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Let us end this chapter at the beginning - with ethnonational terror­
ism and its primary impetus - national self-determination. Nationalist 
struggles have existed from the beginning, but it was not until the early 
twentieth century that national self-determination became the watchword. 
The end of World War I saw Wilson's Fourteen Points express to the world 
its importance. As a minor member of Wilson's cabinet, future-president 
Franklin Roosevelt never forgot the idealism Wilson represented, the vision 
that he saw for the future of the world. As such, the Atlantic Charter, a 
description of what the post-World War II world should look like, drawn 
up between Churchill and Roosevelt, reiterated and reclarified Wilson's 
sentiments. The United Nations charter, written less than a decade later, 
further echoed it. Ethnic groups around the world have heard and re­
sponded to it, dreaming of national self-determination. And yet, when the 
final decisions have been made, self-determination was sacrificed to power 
politics and expediency (Moynihan 1993). 
In fact, the idealism of the Fourteen Points did not even survive the end 
of the Great War. The ninth point stated, "A readjustment of the frontiers 
of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." 
The end of the war did see an adjustment in the borders of Italy and 
Austria - the Tyrolean Alps south of the Brenner, the upper Adige River 
basin - became Italian land, even though the inhabitants were not Italian. 
They were Tyrolean and Ladin. In dismembering the Austria-Hungarian 
Empire, the victors of the War to end all Wars sacrificed the Tyroleans on 
the altar of security (Alcock 1970; Steininger 2003) . 
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On the other hand, historic borders have also served as the primary 
rationale for denying many nations their autonomy. 9 This is as true of the 
Jurassiens and the Bretons as it is of the Basques of Spain and France. 
While the Basque kingdom of Navarre prospered for much of the Middle 
Ages and, in fact, gave to France their King Henry IV (the first of the 
Bourbon dynasty), that did not keep France and Spain from dividing the 
Basque homeland ( Euskal H erria) between the two states. The recent 
Basque calls for autonomy went largely unheeded because the Basque lands 
have been traditionally divided between the two states, and, although the 
Basques do have a large measure of autonomy in Spain today, they lack any 
in France - the three Basque provinces in France ( lparralde) are merely 
a part of the French department of Pyrenees Atlantiques (Collins 1990; 
Medrano 1995) .  
History casts a slightly different light on the Irish difficulties. The 
Irish have their own troubles and have had "The Troubles" since 196 9  
when the civil rights movement for Roman Catholics turned violent. The 
English first invaded Ireland before England spoke English - in 1160. 
During the next seven and a half centuries, England ruled the island with 
9The drawing of the borders in Europe at the close of both the Napoleonic era and of 
World War I created several ethnic minorities without self-determination. The number 
of groups at risk has varied since the close of World War II due to population fluctua­
tions and internal achievement of autonomy. Compare the number of groups operating 
in democratic states (Figure 1. 7) to the number of groups using terrorism (Figure 1.8} 
in the post-World War II era. These support Crenshaw's contention that democracy is 
a necessary condition for terrorism (1981 ) .  
Furthermore, comparing Figure 1.8 to the smoothed survival-time non-parametric base­
line hazard function in Chapter Six demonstrates the strengths of the other variables in 
the model through the differences in the graphs. Thus, during the early 1980s, when the 
hazard function was near zero, the other covariates were at their highest, thus creating 
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Figure 1. 7 :  The number of ethnonational groups operating in Western 
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Figure 1.8: The annual prevalence of number of ethnonational groups using terrorism, 1945-2000. 
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varying degrees of ability. The plantations created by King James VI/I, 
and Queens Mary Tudor and Elizabeth further Anglicized Ireland. And 
yet, even with this incredibly long history of subjection to England, the 
Irish were able to recreate their national identity and begin their 19th 
century fight for independence. The regions of the island that were heavily 
ethnic Irish ( and therefore Roman Catholic) received independence at the 
urgings of Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera - if a terrorist campaign 
can euphemistically be called urging. The northern six counties of Ireland 
remained with the United Kingdom after the partition of 1921, as they 
were the most heavily Protestant and most heavily Scot due to James 
VI/I, who encouraged Scottish Presbyterians to settle in Ireland and run 
the plantations. (Brennan and Gillespie 1996 ; Ellis 2004; Gray 1995) 
Thus did the landscape of Ireland exist at the start of the civil rights 
movement in the late 1960s. Thus does it exist today after the Good Friday 
accords of 1998, which instituted a ceasefire between the Provisional IRA 
and the British government. And thus will it exist into the foreseeable 
future. For those who remain unhappy with the overlordship of the British 
on Northern Ireland, the violent - yet patriotic - examples of Collins 
and de Valera remain. For those unhappy with the incursion of Roman 
Catholics into a Protestant region, or Protestants onto a Roman Catholic 
island, the actions of the Normans and Tudors, and every Parliament since, 
still haunts. 
These are just four of the groups used in this research. The others are 
the Bretons and Corsican of France, the Scots of the United Kingdom, 
the Catalans of Spain, the Jurassiens of Switzerland, and the Sardinians 
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of Italy. All ten groups have their own story, their own history. It  is this history that sets the backdrop to their actions, that gives a purpose to it. While Smith (1988) denies the reality of the nation, he does not deny its effects on the people. The sins of the past truly are visited on the sons of today in the form of grievances against the state by the nations and in the form of terrorist actions. 





We need to know what causes 
terrorism and how to stop it. 
Eqbal Ahmad 
AcRES upon acres of trees have died to furnish the paper used in the 
search for a single, universal definition of terrorism. While the League 
of Nations proffered the first official definition of terrorism in 1937, no 
universally-accepted United Nations definition currently exists (UNODC 
2000) . Furthermore, no single universally-accepted definition exists in the 
American government - it utilizes no fewer than four different definitions. 
Academics are just as inconsistent when it comes to defining terrorism; 
each researcher tends to use his or her own definition, emphasizing the 
aspects of terrorism that particular researcher desires to emphasize. Is a 
cursory tackling of its current definitions yet more intellectual onanism, or 
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is there genuine value to the undertaking? While there are several superior surveys of definitional problems inherent in the term (see for example Cren­shaw 1981; Gambill 1998; Gibbs 1989; Schmid 1983; Thomas and Standley 1988), I find myself engaging in this enterprise for the simple purpose of creating and presenting a theoretically sound definition of a specific subset of terrorism - ethnonational terrorism - and showing how it fits in with other definition. As such, necessity forces me to first discuss the difficulties inherent in science pilfering a highly-politicized word for its own, especially vis-a-vis the problem of the freedom fighter. 
2 .0 . 1 Freedom Fighters? 
Whenever discussing terrorism, a priority should be given to defining what the author means by terrorism, since political scientists, sociologists, politi­cians, and journalists have all proposed, and employed, a whole host of starkly different definitions. There is little agreement within the disci­plines, even less among them. 
Politicians and the media are known for using language as a tool to evoke predictable emotions and produce desired responses among the pop­ulace. In doing this, they delineate and shape the arena of discussion about a topic. They may even be able to completely eliminate any realistic pos­sibility of rational public discussion about it. Today, no one in public life debates the relative merits of terrorism and terrorist activities. Anything labeled 'terrorism' in the West is automatically equated with anti-Good, 
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anti-Americanism, and anti-Western civilization - a sort of political de­
monizing (Thomas and Standley 1988) .  Were the United States and its 
allies not sponsors of terrorism, or what some may define as terrorism, 
there would be few problems with this - at least within the American 
system. However, with her history, America is susceptible to the charge 
of hypocrisy, as American foreign policy did ( and perhaps does) encour­
age rebels fighting against governments unfriendly to the United States 
- rebels often termed terrorists by those very states. 1 Without changing 
the 'public' definition of terrorism, the American leaders, notably Ronald 
Reagan, have given tacit approval to terrorism when it helps a friend or 
hurts a foe. One of the more famous of aphorisms is, "One man's terrorist 
is another man's freedom fighter." Used by politicians to give credibility 
to both covert and overt military action, this maxim speaks to the Amer­
ican vision of the embattled revolutionary trying desperately to cast off 
the yoke of a tyrannical government. Unfortunately, all rational debate 
seems to be lost once you axiomatically exclude freedom fighters from the 
definition of terrorists. Further, any discussion quickly reduces to a mere 
'point of view' argument (Sederberg 1995). Fortunately, social scientists do 
continue studying terrorism, its causes, and its effects. Unfortunately, cre­
ating a universally-accepted definition for such a politicized term is hardly 
painless. 
Why should the time and effort be expended to create a definition 
of terrorism? Could it simply be that terrorism is like Justice Stewart's 
pornography - indefinable, except on an I-�now-it-when-1-see-it level? 
1 Examples include the Contras in Nicaragua, the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, and 
UNITA in Angola. 
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This might explain why no single definition of terrorism has gained wide­
spread use. However, finding a single, universal definition of terrorism is 
important. I would argue that it is the most important thing we can do. 
The battles waged over what to include and what to exclude in the def­
inition, and the effort undertaken to defend those boundaries, demonstrate 
its paramount importance. Authorities at the highest levels wrangle over 
the definition. Government responses are all but dictated by the definition. 
World leaders block summits because of the definition. 
A case in point: When Senator Lieberman and a representative of the 
PLO discussed the possibility of talks between the two countries, 
Liebermann [sic) invoked the "terrorist" acts of the PLO leader 
as a block to talks; the PLO representative stressed Israeli mili­
tary violence against "women and children." He wanted this vi­
olence categorized as "terrorism," which Liebermann [sic) con­
sistently resisted. (Paletz and Boiney 1 992: 24) 
Both sides understood the primary importance of that definition, of its 
implicit and often explicit moral connotations, and automatic moral re­
pugnance and condemnation. 
2 . 1  Terrorism, Towards a Definition 
While it is true that there is a moral connotation to the term 'terrorism', 
especially as we now use it in public forums, we cannot allow that fact to 
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stop us from creating an appropriate definition. Yes, the term terrorism has been use to instill hostility, hatred, and fear, and to elicit predictable re­sponses from the citizens of various states. Regardless, we can still achieve a definition for terrorism in accord with social science practices and require­ments, while leaving the political definition to our elected (and unelected) authorities (Schmid 1983; Thomas and Standley 1988). 
To give the reader a point of reference, let me present my working defi­nition of terrorism so that one can compare it to other definitions used and to other definitions discussed in this chapter. Here, I define ethnonational terrorism as: 
An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, em­ployed by groups, for the expressed purpose of increased auton­omy for their historical homeland, whereby the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from a selected target population, and serve as message gener­ators. Threat-based and violence-based communication travels between the terrorist organizations, its victims, and its main targets, thus turning the target into a target of terror, a tar­get of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. 
This definition is a minor reworking of Schmid's (1983) effort on creating a universal definition. The only changes are those that restrict the defi­nition to ethnonational groups and aims and to include the possibility of 
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symbolic inanimate objects, like the World Trade Center in New York, as 
legitimate targets of terrorist events. How does this definition compare to 
other definitions used in the literature? Perhaps more importantly, how 
does this definition compare to those used by the US government? 
2 . 1 . 1  The Law 
Two criticisms of the legal definitions of terrorism center on their great 
variations and their egocentric motivations. A recent book discussing the 
effort of the United Nations and other international bodies to create an 
acceptable definition of terrorism lasts three volumes and over 1, 800 pages 
- without reaching a conclusion. The United Nations has passed several 
resolutions against terrorism, but it has yet to define what it is resolving 
against (Whitaker 2001). 
During the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 13 73, which required states to 
take steps to combat terrorism. Unfortunately, what is and what is not 
terrorism has yet to be defined by the UN. Even more interesting, thirty­
two years have passed since the time that the United Nations first stated 
that finding a definition for terrorism was crucial (Thomas and Standley 
1988). Why has the United Nations failed in defining terrorism? Perhaps it 
is the knowledge that the United States has vetoed every Security Council 
resolution condemning the actions of Israel and that any usable definition of 
terrorism would most likely include some actions of the Israeli government. 
For example, are the Palestinian suicide bombers terrorists? Or, was the 
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assassination of Muslim religious leader Sheik Ahmed Y assin by Israel a 
terrorist act? According to the definition I use, the answer to each is Yes. 
While the United Nations has yet to formulate any definition of terror­
ism, the United States has no fewer than four official, legal definitions of 
terrorism, each including and each emphasizing different aspects of terror­
ism. The US Department of Defense, as stated in the Field Manual of the 
US Army, defines terrorism as, "the unlawful use of - or threatened use of 
- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate 
governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological 
objectives" (Hoffman 2004: 19) .  The definition used by the FBI is sim­
ilar in emphasis, but adds a clause about the legality of the individual's 
actions: terrorism is any 
. . .  violent or dangerous acts that would be crimes if commit­
ted in the United States and that appear to be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the 
policy or conduct of a government or political subdivision of a 
government by intimidation or coercion. 2 
The US State Department defines terrorism as, "premeditated, politi­
cally motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sulr 
national or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" 
(Tucker 2000: 10).3 Finally, created in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland Security defines terror as 
2 This is the definition created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
as amended in 1982, 50 U.S.C. §1801, (c) (1) and (2), 1982. 
3 This is the definition found in Section 140 (d) (2) of the Foreign Relations Autho­
rization Act, 1988, and also found in 22 U.S.C. §2656 f (d) (2). 
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. . .  any activity that: (A) involves an act that - (i) is dangerous 
to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure 
or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United 
States; and (B) appears to be intended - (i) to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping. (Homeland Security Act of 2002, §2 ,15) 
Why so many definitions? Why do they differ so much? Each definition 
conforms both to the needs of the agency and to the conditions of the 
world at that time. The two earliest definitions are unsophisticated and 
simple because those definitions were most clear and concise, and because 
the shades of meaning were unimportant to those agencies. The State 
Department definition shows greater complexity due to its need to deal 
with other countries from their perspectives. Oddly enough, however, the 
State Department definition is the only one that stipulates that terrorist 
acts must be carried out by non-state actors. In other words, terrorism 
cannot, by the State Department's definition, be performed by a state. 
The definition from the Department of Homeland Security is the most 
extensive, yet it is also the most US-centric; an act that would not break 
a· US law cannot be termed terrorism. However, it is encouraging to note 
that state-sponsored terrorism is once again included in the definition. 
The policy objectives in the Department of Defense definition, the focus 
on the legality in the FBI definition, the aspect of noncombatants in the 
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State Department definition, and the re-inclusion of the state as a possible 
terrorist in the Homeland Security definition are all important characteris­
tics of terrorism. Even the proposed United Nations definition of terrorism 
includes these four aspects . 
. . . reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to pro­
voke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons 
or particular persons for political purposes are in any circum­
stance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other na­
ture that may be invoked to justify them. (GA Res. 51/210, 
1996)4 
Thus, it appears that the leaders of the world are beginning to find that 
elusive definition, after these long decades. 5 However, as with most things 
political, compromises must take place. Add to this the alleged inherent 
immorality of the terrorist action, and those world leaders with the power 
to do so will ensure that their actions are not labeled terror. Thus, it falls 
to the social scientist to create a definition of terrorism that lacks moral 
imperatives, one that applies to both allies and enemies. 
4 An interesting aside here is that this definition would agree ( at least at prima facie) 
that both the Palestinian suicide bombers and the assMSination of Sheik Ahmed Y ass in 
by Israel were terrorist acts. 
5 Alternatively, the convergence may never be reached because policy space is ef­
fectively infinitely divisible and subject to the constraints of Zeno's Paradox of the 
Dichotomy. 
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2 . 1 .2 The Social Scientists 
Social science definitions for terrorism are not infrequent. While not the 
first political scientist to make an attempt at defining terrorism, Schmid 
(1983) offered one of the best early analyses of the myriad definitions. After 
examining over 100 definitions in use, reaching back to 1936, he discovered 
they contained more than twenty-two separate elements. Synthesizing six­
teen of those elements, Schmid then fashioned his own definition from that 
list, emphasizing the five most important aspects of terrorism (Kushner 
1998). Terrorism is 
. . .  an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, em­
ployed by secret clandestine individuals, groups, or state ac­
tors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby 
- in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence 
are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of 
violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from a 
target population, and serve as message generators .  Threat­
and violence-based communication processes between terrorist 
organizations, victims, and main targets, turning it into a tar­
get of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, 
depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is 
primarily sought. (Schmid 1983: 2 8) 
There are several interesting facets of this definition that need to be 
mentioned, especially as Schmid's definition serves as the basis of my own 
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definition. First, this definition requires that the action be repeated. In other words, an act is a terrorist act only if it is a part of a campaign. This makes logical sense, as terror may be induced by one act, but it takes a repeat, or a credible threat of a repeat, before goals can be achieved. 
Second, according to this definition, states may be guilty of using ter­rorism; that is, they are not automatically excluded from being designated terrorist. The State Department definition did not include state terrorism in their definition. Schmid's definition does. Furthermore, Schmid's defi­nition includes both individuals and collectives. Thus, there is less focus on who does it and more focus on what was done and why. This is impor­tant; focusing on the act allows people to negotiate with the actors, thus allowing for a non-military solution. Focusing solely on the actors restricts allowable options (Sederberg 1995). 
Third, the range of defined terrorist actions is quite large. They include reasons beyond just the political. Again, Schmid emphasizes the act and how it affects the targets. Terrorists can have any of a number of reasons. For Schmid, the act of terrorism is defined more by the results than by the ultimate goals. 
Fourth, Schmid acknowledges the difference between direct, indirect, and main targets. Direct targets are those immediately affected by the terrorist act. Indirect targets are those who are supposed to feel the terror from the event. The main targets are those who have the power to grant the goal sought by the actor( s). Thus, the al Qaeda attack on the Ameri­can embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had the embassy workers in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as the direct targets. The American embassy employees 
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working in vulnerable embassies were the indirect targets. President Clin­
ton was the ultimate target, who al Qaeda hoped would remove American 
forces from Saudi Arabia. 
Finally, as a result, the immediate targets are chosen for what they 
represent rather than what they do. From within the representative cate­
gories, the targets may be chosen randomly or selectively. Either specific 
members of that representative group are targeted, or the terrorist attacks 
whoever is there. In other words, the immediate targets are chosen for the 
message the action creates. This message comes from the choice of direct 
target, their place within the population of the indirect target, and their 
relationship to the ultimate target. 
While Schmid has created an acceptable working definition of terrorism, 
there are some weaknesses involved that others have pointed out, and with 
which I concur. Schmid specifies that the acts are perpetrated against 
persons, not things. Thus, blowing up the Statue of Liberty or destroying 
the Pentagon would not be a terrorist act for Schmid, per se, even if all 
other aspects were present. As all actions of the Animal Liberation Front 
and the Weather Underground were against property, they would not be 
considered terrorist groups by Schmid 's definition. And yet their actions 
created a feeling of terror in those affected. Inclusion of symbolic objects 
would increase the accuracy and applicability of this definition (Ross and 
Gurr 1989). 
Moreover, Schmid allows for the direct targets to be chosen either 
specifically or randomly. I suggest that the targets are both specific and 
random. Returning to the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings, these 
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embassy workers were both selected and random. Al Qaeda selected them 
from the total pool of all humans because American embassy worker deaths 
would cause terror among other American embassy workers. Thus, the in­
direct targets were also selected. Once the general category was chosen, 
Nairobi was selected because al Qaeda felt they could successfully accom­
plish the undertaking. Finally, the workers who were killed were random 
members of that endangered, selected community. 
Beyond these few changes, Schmid's definition of terrorism stands. 
However, it adds things that are irrelevant to ethnonational terrorism. To 
see this, let us first define what is meant by ethnonational and then con­
clude this chapter with the working definition of ethnonational terrorism. 
2 .2  Ethnonational 
The previous section dealt with creating a substantively acceptable defini­
tion of terrorism, the action examined. This section deals with the actors. 
As this research uses the Minorities at Risk dataset, the definitions used 
for these groups mirrors those used by the Minorities at Risk project.6 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, I am using the term "eth­
nonational" in a way that is slightly different from how the Minorities at 
Risk Project defines it. In this research, "ethnonational" will be used as 
6 All definitions come from "Types of Minorities at Risk Groups" (Minoritie,s at Risk 
2004). All examples come from the MAR dataset, version 1 .03 {2002 data), which was 
retrieved using the MARGene program, which can be downloaded from the Minorities 
at Risk Project homepage: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/. 
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an umbrella term that includes all indigenous peoples, ethnonationals, and 
national minorities as defined by the Minorities at Risk Project. 
Using the Minorities at Risk dataset offers one level of constraints even 
before analysis can begin. The groups listed are 'at risk' in their states. 
That is, to be at risk, the minority "collectively suffers or benefits from, 
systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; 
and/ or collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of its self-defined in­
terests" (Davenport 2003: 5) . Furthermore, the groups must have a popu­
lation of either 100,000 or 1 % of the population of the state. Thus, small 
repressed groups are not included, nor are large unrepressed groups. Thus, 
the Sarni of Scandinavia is not included as it does not reach the population 
requirements, nor are the Cornish included as they are not systematically 
discriminated against. 
As mentioned earlier, I unite three of these categories - ethnonationals, 
ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples - into one. I contend this is 
appropriate, as these three groups share a similarity at a fundamental 
level - their primary motivation. Thus, it makes sense to speak of the 
three Minorities at Risk categories as merely three aspects of the same 
underlying category. 
The first subgroup of ethnonationals is the indigenous peoples. Accord­
ing to the Minorities at Risk project, indigenous people are "conquered de­
scendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity 
with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply 
distinct from those of dominant groups" (Minorities at Risk 2004) . West­
ern Europe has few remaining indigenous groups, and none of these groups 
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is considered a minority at risk. Examples include the Sarni of Lapland 
and the Nentsy of Siberia. On the other hand, the Spanish and French 
Basques, while they are "conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a 
region" are not indigenous peoples by this definition because they do not 
currently live traditional lives; they live much as do their neighbors - the 
modern Spanish and the modern French. As such, they are classified as 
ethnonationalists, the second subgroup. 
Ethnonationalists are "regionally concentrated peoples with a history 
of organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or 
regional government, who have supported political movements for auton­
omy at some time since 1945" (Minorities at Risk 2004) .  Some examples of 
Western European ethnonational populations are the Basques (Euskadi) 
of France and Spain, the Corsicans and Bretons of France, and the Scots 
in the United Kingdom. The Minorities at Risk project includes the Ulster 
Catholics in this group, but not without controversy. While fitting other 
aspects of the definition, the Catholics in Northern Ireland have not had 
political autonomy, traditional ruler, or regional government in Northern 
Ireland. They are a segment of the Irish nation who have held little, if any, 
real power in Northern Ireland. They are better classified as a national 
minority. 
The third category is national minority. National minorities are "seg­
ments of a trans-state people with a history of organized political autonomy 
whose kindred control an adjacent state, but who now constitute a minor­
ity in the state in which they reside" (Minorities at Risk 2004) .  National 
minorities in Western Europe include the South Tyroleans of Italy, and 
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the Jurassiens of Switzerland. The South Tyroleans share ethnic culture 
with Austria, just across the Brenner Pass. The Jurassiens were French­
speaking Roman Catholics in the German-speaking Protestant canton of 
Berne. They are kindred with the French-speaking Roman Catholic state 
across the border, France. 
Why classify these three different groups together? Because they have 
a tripartite commonality: they are minorities living on their historic land 
not currently able to rule themselves. Because of this commonality, the 
fundamental raison d'etre for each is evidently the same - to obtain a 
significant measure of autonomy, if not independence. 
2 .3 Ethnonational Terrorism 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to define the term "ethnonational 
terrorism" . Thus far, we have explored several different definitions of ter­
rorism and thoroughly defined the term "ethnonational". All that remains 
is for us to combine them. Liberally pulling from Schmid's definition, ad­
justing some of his wording, and altering it to meet the particular demands 
of a terrorism definition centering on ethnonational groups, we have: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent 
action, employed by groups, for the expressed purpose of in­
creased autonomy for their historical homeland, whereby the 
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The imme­
diate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
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or selectively from a selected target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-based and violence-based commu­nication travels between the terrorist organizations, its victims, and its main targets, thus turning the target into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. 
The only major differences between this definition and the Schmid defini­tion are the specification of the ultimate goals of the campaign ( increased autonomy for their historical homeland) and the inclusion of inanimate, symbolic tar_gets ( e.g. the Louvre and Big Ben). 
Three of the f our main aspects of terrorism are also retained in accord with the laws: the policy goal of the terrorists, the illegality of the action, and the aspect of the non-combatant. The only missing feature is the exclusion of the state as a possible terrorist actor, and that was done for the obvious reason - the state is not an ethnonation, it is the target of the ethnonational terrorism. 
Not all violent events carried out by an ethnonation can be consid­ered a terrorist event. Some conflicts are more intense than terrorism. The guerilla movements in Nicaragua ( the Contras) ,  Peru ( Sendero Lu­
minoso ), and Nepal (Moaists) are examples of groups utilizing techniques that exceed the definition of terrorism. In each case, rebel armies battle government troops and territory is actually captured. The violent protests in France by the Basques are an example of a group using violence without 
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making the move to terrorism. While riots have taken place and people in­
jured, the movement has, thus far, eschewed the use of planned campaigns 
of indiscriminate violence. Furthermore, the recent (November 2005) riot­
ing in France by the Muslim minority is not terrorism, as the movement 
lacks organization and the level of violence is not great enough. Thus, ter­
rorism fits somewhere between these examples. Territory is not captured 
and armies are not placed in battle formations in terrorism, but there is 
a necessary level of organization and direction given by a leader of the 
movement. 
2 .4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we examined several of the definitions of terrorism for two 
reasons. First, it demonstrated the importance, and difficulty, in finding 
the proper definition of such a politically- and emotionally-charged word. 
Second, it allowed us to see the suitability of my proposed definition of 
ethnonational terrorism. While this chapter was not intended to be a 
complete and thorough survey of definitions, it did serve as a brief glimpse 
into the tortuous intricacies awaiting any scholar in the field of terrorism. 
The definition of ethnonational was also covered, and the rationale for 
merging the three separate categories from the Minorities at Risk project 
into one category for this research was provided. While the final definition 
of ethnonational terrorism was substantially based on the definition pr� 
posed by Schmid (1988), adjustments for two shortcomings (Ross and Gurr 
1989) and for the inherent restrictions of the current topic were made. 
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The next chapter discusses the current competing models of the causes 
of general violence, ethnic violence, and ethnic terrorism. Chapter Four 
creates the model I will be testing in this research. Pulling liberally from 
Chapter Three and making appropriate connections, a causal framework 




Causes of Violence 
The guilty shall be recognized 
by their marks, so they shall be 
seized by the forelocks and the 
feet. 
Qur'an, Sura Al-Rahman: 41 
WHILE this research focuses specifically on ethnonational terrorism, it 
is first necessary to explore causes of ethnic violence in general, as eth­
nonational terrorism may be but a subset of ethnic violence in terms of 
causes. While Ross (1993) makes a good argument regarding the possible 
differences between the causes of ethnic violence and the causes of ethnic 
terrorism, knowledge of what mobilizes ethnic groups to initiate violence 
are fundamental to understanding how they take the step to terrorism. 
One can, and many do, artificially divide the causes of ethnic violence into 
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four levels of analysis: individual, group, state, and system. The division 
is logical in that these four levels speak to a different subset of sources 
of factors. This division is artificial as there is much overlap between the 
levels. For example, globalization is a systemic factor, but its effects are 
on the state, the group and the individual. In this chapter, I will examine 
the four levels of analysis as they pertain to the causes of ethnic violence 
and terrorism. 
3. 1 Individual Level 
Sigmund Freud theorized that in every human, there is a conflict between 
Eros and Thanatos (Guggenbiihl-Craig 2002: 82) .  Eros represents love, 
the love we all have for life and for living. Thanatos represents death, our 
fascination with it, and our death instinct . For Freud, these two aspects 
are two sides of the same coin, two parts of an entire person. Carl Jung 
agreed that the death attraction is the "core of our archetypical shadows" 
(Guggenbiihl-Craig 2002: 82), that each of our ids contains both the sui­
cidal maniac and the murderer. Why else would the major religions of the 
world forbid suicide and killing? The leaders of those religions recognized 
these destructive instincts. 
However, the death instinct is not our sole instinct. We also thirst for 
life. Some have cited the survival instinct as the greatest force in life (Lyng 
1990: 859) . This instinct reaches beyond merely avoiding death. It pushes 
us to become immortal. Modern advances in medicine have expanded life 
greatly, but immortality - true immortality - is well beyond the reach of 
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current medical science. 1 How, then, is immortality gained? First, one can gain it through bearing offspring. These children continue one 's genetic line and are, in effect, pseudo-immortality. The continuance of the species seems to be a constant aspect of biological life (Thiele 1999: 7). 
Second, one can gain immortality through history. People will often work hard to make a name for themselves so that history will remember them. Some rulers keep an eye to how history will judge them (Schlesinger Jr. 1997: 180; Tugwell 1971: 192), whereas others gain immortality for their acts of notoriety. Scholars may create academic works and reputations to survive the generations. 2 The everyman may gain immortality either through extraordinarily great acts or through extraordinarily horrific acts. For instance, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the shooters at Columbine High School, reportedly committed their crime for the fame. According to Dave Cullen, 
One thread running consistently through [their personal jour­nals] is the desire f or glory, the expectation of fame. "Like many of the school shooters, they seem to be expecting some sort of notoriety, in addition to wanting the vengeance." (Cullen 1999) 
A second example is the ancient Greek Herostratus, known solely be­cause he purposely destroyed the Temple of Artemis. The reason he gave for destroying the temple, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, 
1True immortality is also beyond the ken of the laws of physics, as it is a violation 
of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Lightman 2000: 63). 
2Thucydides, the author of The History of the Peloponnesian War accomplished 
this, as did Plato, Galileo, Hobbes, and Einstein. 
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is that he wanted the world to never f orget him (Stirnimann 2002: 91}. Even the Afghan Taliban may have rested their hopes f or eternal fame on the destruction of pagan cultural artifacts. 3 
Finally, eschatology is an important aspect of all religions. For the three major monotheistic world religions, paradise awaits those who follow their god's will,4 while damnation and eternal torment will eventually greet those who live counter to their god's desire.5 Just what constitutes the will of god differs not only between religions, but also within them. Furthermore, certain religions, notably Christianity and Islam, allow those martyred f or their faith to reach heaven automatically. Crusaders and suicide bombers regard themselves as martyrs for the faith, thus enuring themselves ever­lasting paradise (Rapoport 1988: 199}. Nor is the wedding of terror to religion solely a Middle Eastern experience. Millennium cults of the West and the East have perpetrated their own strain of threat (Ranstorp 1996: 125} . 
This is not to suggest that religion is the cause of terrorism. Religion is merely one of the factors, neither necessary nor sufficient, that combines 
3In this case, they decided to destroy the 1000-year-old Buddha statues built by 
Buddhist Afghan ancestors. When faced with offers to purchase the statues, the Taliban 
spokesman reportedly said, "We prefer to be remembered as the destroyers of statues, 
rather than as the sellers of them" (Stirnimann 2002: 89). 
4The three differ on specifics, however. The nature of life in paradise for Muslims 
is Mutahsibir (sensual pleasure in sex with virgins, eating, and happiness) in Janah 
(Sura 55: 46). For Jews, eternal life is enjoying the radiance of the divine presence 
in Gan'eden (Berakhot 17a). Finally, for Christians, fellowship, worship, service, and 
praise await the holiest in Heaven (Revelation 21). 
5 Again, with respect to punishment, the three differ slightly, although all three have 
a version of Hell. Islam has eight levels in their Hell (Sura 4: 56; 55: 46) ,  Judaism 
has Ge'henna (or She'ol) where the damned burn in a fiery pit (Ezekiel 31:16), and 
Christianity has a lake of fire (Revelation 20: 14) .  
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to create the terrorist. The discussion above merely demonstrates that the ability to commit a terrorist act exists in us all. The conflict between Thanatos and Eros, between the death instinct and the drive for immor­tality, are present in us all. Sederberg (1989) points out that the terrorist is often no different than the "guy next door" . So what makes the terrorist take the fatal step? Is it pathology? Is it a result of social ills? Or is it merely normal psychology? Let us look at each of these three reasons in turn. 
3. 1 . 1  Pathology 
The common American view of terrorists is that they are 'suicidal' or amoral psychopaths (McCauley 2002: 5). One can even point to the Re­alist School in International Relations literature as assuming the default action of humans is towards violence. 6 Except for the rare terrorist, pathol­ogy i� not a factor; that is, terrorism is neither a mental disease nor the result of a mental disease (Ruby 2002: 15; Weatherston and Moran 2003: 698). As explained above, the seeds for terrorism are within each of us. The plentiful examples of soldiers and policemen willfully killing noncom­batants and of large organizations carrying out heavily planned attacks, demonstrates that the typical terrorist is not a Theodore Kaczynski holed up in his backwoods cabin spouting manifestoes to the world. The typical terrorist is the typical person (McCauley 2002: 6). In fact, the myth of the pathological terrorist substantially hinders counter-terrorist solutions. 
6This is especially apparent in Hobbes's (1998 [1651)) Leviathan, where man in the 
state of nature is most assuredly violent. 
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When the terrorist is automatically seen as deranged, there is no thought 
of a political solution to the underlying causes. Force is usually the first, 
and quite often the only, method used against terrorists (Sederberg 1989: 
79). 7 
If there is a common subnormal aspect to terrorists, it may be found 
in the type of terrorism used. Cruelty has definite causes. For Sederberg, 
there are five causes of cruelty: absence of love and approval, need for obe­
dience, distance from victims, victimization as a child, and fear (Sederberg 
1989) . Of these, two are most pertinent in the discussion of the causes of 
terrorism: distance from the victim and fear. Those subjected to terrorist 
actions are the "others" , who are automatically different, automatically in­
ferior, and, thus, socially removed from "us" (Stirnimann 2002: 97) .  Fear 
is the stimulus for the fight-flight response, and fear of religious loss is 
doubly so (Crittenden 1 999: 148; Franck 1 997: 626) . 
3. 1 .2 Emotional Expression 
Terrorism can also stem from a need to express an emotion, usually hatred 
or anger, but often merely frustration. Many newspaper headlines after 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks asked, "Why do they hate us?" 
President Bush's response was, "They don't know us" (McCauley 2002: 7). 
Is it that simple, or is there another reason behind the anger? Frank {1988: 
2) argues that anger is an emotional tool that allows the weak to keep 
7T he Madrid Agenda may be the first step in the direction of changing this tendency. 
The March 11 ,  2005 international meeting concluded with recommendations that states 
deal with certain underlying risk factors, including poverty, social inequalities, and 
strengthening democratic institutions. 
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the strong in check. Aristotle held that anger was the reaction to insult. 
Behavioral scientists hold that anger is a reaction to pain, frustration, and 
despair (McCauley 2002; Umberson, Williams, and Anderson 2002) . Thus, 
the extant literature ties anger into violence and terrorism. 
However, even though anger and violence are intimately entwined, an­
gry people do not always resort to violence. They express themselves in 
different ways depending on their resources and experiences. Persons with 
violent experiences are more apt to use violence (Schieman 2000; Throits 
1 990; Umberson, Williams, and Anderson 2002) .8 
3. 1 .3 Normal Psychology 
Finally, terrorism also stems from normal psychology; that is, terrorists 
kill for the same reasons that people have killed throughout time: causes, 
family, friends, love, etc. Causes are especially prone to creating violence, 
as humans must believe in something more important than life, something 
that transcends finite life. According to McCauley (2002: 12), we must be­
lieve, for we are sentient and know that we will die. Causes for which we are 
willing to fight soon become causes for which we are willing to die and kill. 
That is not to say that all people with a cause resort to terrorism. There 
is an aspect of the slippery slope here. Rarely does a terrorist wake up 
one morning and decide to commit an act of terror. The process is usually 
a series of gradual steps, none of which seem fateful, but each caused by 
the failure of the previous. Milgram' s infamous electro-shock experiment 
8This also suggests a mechanism by which violence begets violence. 
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demonstrates the effects of gradualism. Twenty percent of those who were 
allowed a free hand in slightly increasing the voltage of the shock eventu­
ally delivered the maximum amount. They did so because there was no 
sudden jump between a safe shock and a dangerous one (McCauley 2002: 
15). The same gradualism can be seen in the Basque terrorist group, Eu­
skadi Ta_Askatasuna (ETA). Originally, the ETA, composed of members of 
the Basque nationalist party, espoused democratic ideals and protection of 
the Basque language and culture. They gradually shifted to using violence 
to achieve their results. Those simple violent measures became assassina­
tions by 196 8. Finally, they moved on to terror, including car bombings 
shootings, and arson (Shafritz, Gibbons, Jr. , and Scott 1991: 119) .  Each 
individual step is not that great, but the complete journey is disasterous. 
More than 7 50 people have died at the hands of the ETA ( "ETA: Basque 
Homeland and Freedom" 2004) .  
3 .1 .4 Despair 
A man with nothing also has nothing to live for. Perhaps the person driven 
to terrorism sees no other opportunity available to him. Non-violent outlets 
do not exist. Despair reigns. Lack of opportunity comes from two sources: 
economic and political. Modernization and globalization both increase 
the economic levels of states and their citizens. If this is true, then why 
are the most modern states the ones that experience terrorism the most 
( Crenshaw 1981 )? While the effects of modernization and globalization 
will be explained later, one relevant aspect surf aces here - change. In 
societies hit with modernization and globalization, that society is changing 
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rapidly. While economic advancement results, it may not result evenly. 
In fact, it may further exacerbate the rich-poor divide in the country or 
in the world (Malone and Thakur 2003) . H igh unemployment rates may 
result when a traditional-agricultural society is transformed into a modern­
industrial one (Samara 2000: 20) . Those who cannot adapt quickly are 
left behind. When employment is ethnic-based, modernization can also 
exacerbate ethnic tensions (Harrison 1983; Medrano 1984). 
One can also lack opportunity in the political realm. This lack of oppor­
tunity ostensibly increases the rates of despair and of violence. However, 
data does not support this argument at first sight; the United States, ar­
guably the most democratic of states, has the highest level of terrorism 
(Crenshaw 1981). Furthermore, some political parties in Western Europe 
are merely political wings of terrorist groups (Weinberg 1991) . Why do 
these things seem so counter-intuitive? Why do people living in states 
which allow them political expression still resort to violent extra-political 
means? First, other factors may be responsible for the high levels of ter­
rorism in the United States. When we control for those factors, level of 
democracy may become either statistically insignificant or significant as a 
retardant. Also, when examining states transitioning to democracy, while 
violent crime does rise dramatically, it appears to be a product of disrup­
tions in traditional patronage. In other words, significantly altering the 
political system significantly changed the rules; those who were enfran­
chised under the ancien regime became disenfranchised under the nouveau 
(Villarreal 2002) . 
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3. 1 . 5  Adolescents and Adolescence 
The youth, especially the males, are especially prone to violence ( al-Hasan 
1986; Hagan and Foster 2001) . 9 This is true for a variety of reasons. 
Adolescent males are not fully developed, physically, emotionally, or sexu­
ally. Evolutionary pressures encourage adolescent males to be more violent 
(Kanazawa and Still 2000: 444) . Adolescent males are also expected to be 
adult males in their behavior and duties. As such, they are under higher 
levels of stress, and since they lack experience dealing with stress, they 
tend to deal with it through violent means (van Gundy 2002) .  They are 
outside the political process, being unable to vote, so they experience de­
spair in that realm. Finally, they are also most prone to being unemployed 
for a variety of reasons, including lack of work history and low skill levels 
(Caspi, et al. 1998) .  Because of these reasons, they are much more prone 
to stress and to despair than are others. Thus, they are much more prone 
to violence. If the adolescent male is part of an out group, then the proba­
bility for violent actions is even higher (King 1997; Wiltfang and Scarbecz 
1990) . This is especially true in those traditional cultures that impose such 
pressures on the male. However, females are not immune to the siren song 
of terrorism. Females lead terrorist organizations, are members of terrorist 
organizations, and are suicide bombers {Pape 2005) . Thus, adolescence 
should be a greater predictor of terrorism risk than just male adolescence. 
9This observation does not rule out the existence of female terrorists. To say that 
female terrorists do not exist is to ignore the historical record. While it is rare for 
women to actually lead terrorist organizations, they are used extensively in combat. 
Approximately a fifth of the combatants in Peru's Maoist Sendero Luminoso were fe­
male. However, the majority of terrorists ( and terrorist leaders) are male (Foreign Policy 
Association 2005). 
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3. 1 .6 Summary 
As far as the individual level of analysis, we know that a terrorist is a 
normal person. Freud and Jung both point out that the death instinct is a 
part of every person. There is a conflict within us all between love (Eros) 
and death (Thanatos ). The survival instinct quite often fights with the 
death instinct. As a result, we seek both love and death in life. 
The quest for immortality, only achievable in proxy, compels man to 
create both offspring and works survivable through history. Some in the 
past have committed deeds of infamy to last the generations, deeds whose 
apparent purpose was to garner historical attention. Herostratus 's attempt 
at immortality through the destruction of the Temple of Artemis, one of 
the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, was almost thwarted by the 
Greeks who sought to expunge his name from all records. They failed, and 
Herostratus's name survives to this day solely through his malicious act. A 
second source of immortality is religion, for it offers paradise for those who 
follow the will of their god. Many have pointed to religion as the cause 
of terrorism, however it is not religion, per se, that serves as the impetus; 
it is the quest for immortality. Religion serves as a possible vehicle for 
legitimization or justification for the terrorist actions. 
Finally, looking at why normal people take that fatal step into terror­
ism, we are left with the same answers for a related question: What is to 
live for? Those things that make life worthwhile for us, those things most 
important to us, those things for which we are willing to die are also those 
things for which we are willing to kill. 
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In the final analysis, at least at the individual level, the research sug­
gests that the terrorist is no different from the rest of us. In fact, it suggests 
that the ability to commit such acts exists in us all, only waiting for the 
right circumstances to give birth. What might those circumstances be? 
Despair. Any circumstance that instills a sense of despair, of hopelessness, 
or of major stress begets despair. It is this despair that pushes people 
towards violent acts. 
3 .2  Group Level 
If the research on the causes of terrorism in individuals provides us with 
little discernment, it is because we are all capable of resorting to terrorism 
under certain circumstances. The literature on group-level causes is more 
specific. Terrorist groups do seem to exhibit a common pattern in their 
birth. There are two aspects that this section addresses: funding, because 
terrorism is cheap - not free; and preconditions, as most of the political 
science literature focuses on the preconditions of terrorism. 
3.2 . 1  Funding 
Terrorism is relatively inexpensive to commit, at least in terms of resources. 
A van, some fertilizer and kerosene, and maybe some specific knowledge 
that can be found on the Internet, 10 are all that is needed to transform 
10The Animal Liberation Front helpfully provides an online guide on how to commit 
certain acts of terror: ''The A.L.F. Primer: A Guide to Direct Action and the Animal 
Liberation Front, 2nd ed." 
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a willing body into an able one. Sometimes, all it requires is a gun (and 
ammunition) and the will to use it against others. However, money does 
help, and terrorist groups that are able to raise funds are also able to 
continue their existence and to attack better-protected targets (Corsi 1981: 
64). This need for resources is not as great as that of the guerillas during 
a civil war. For a terrorist, money merely allows them to perpetrate more 
costly acts more often. As such, a bankrupt terrorist organization will 
not necessarily cease to exist. Diasporas and irredentas do aid terrorist 
organizations, but they are not a necessary condition for this reason. 
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, financial sources for ter­
rorism have come under intense scrutiny. There are three primary sources: 
the state, private-illicit sources, and private-legal sources. State funding 
of terrorism has dropped off in recent years for two reasons. First, the So­
viet Union, a heavy financer of terrorism, ceased to exist (O'Brien 1996) . 
Second, other states who supported terrorism are trying to join the com­
munity of states (Bantekas 2003). These two factors have greatly reduced 
the amount of money flowing to terror groups from states. 
Private financing by illegal means is a second source of terror fund­
ing, with a primary source being drug traffic (Bantekas 2003; Kay 1 999; 
Miron and Zwiebel 1995). While opium from Afghanistan and cocaine 
from Columbia are the main sources of drugs, drug money comes primarily 
from the United States and Europe (Bantekas 2003) . This drug money 
funds terrorism. N arco-terrorism is not new. The United States has been 
heavily involved in the war against the Colombian drug lords since the 
early George H. W. Bush administration ( Crandall 2001: 100) . 
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A new source of terror funds are charities. In the aftermath of the 
Cold War, long-subsumed ethnic tensions percolated to the surface once 
again. These ethnic and religious groups often formed charities, collecting 
moneys from sympathetic people and giving some of it to terrorist groups. 1 1  
Bantekas {2003) related how some charities operated. "Under the guise of 
a 'charitable' or 'relief' organization, a terrorist group would openly (to 
the particular audience addressed) solicit funding for operations, taking 
advantage of the benefits inherent in the legislation on charities" (Bantekas 
2003: 322). While the charity phenomenon expanded greatly after the 
Cold War, it is hardly new. The Irish have used such tactics for more 
than a century, collecting money from the emigre Irish and sending it back 
to Ireland to fund the struggle against their British overlords (Rapoport 
2002). 
3 .2 .2  Group Preconditions 
While funding is not a necessary component according to the literature, 
there seem to be some conditions that must be in place for a group to 
choose the path of terror. First, there must be a unified group. This group 
can be united based on ideology or on culture. Examples of ideological 
groups that have used terror in the past include anarchists ( e.g. N arodnaya 
1 1  Many of the major world religions either encourage or require giving alms. The 
Baha'i, the Buddhist, and the Hindu encourage charitable giving, but do not specify 
the amount {Phillips 2004). The tithe is the Judeo-Christian form, a mandatory 10% 
donation to the poor (Leviticus 27:30; Malachi 3:S-10). The zakat is the Islamic form, 
a mandatory tax on excess wealth (usually 2.5%) .  The Qur'an designates those who 
can receive the zakat: fakir, miskin, ami� muallaf, riqab, gharmin, ibnus sabil, and 
fisabillillah. The fisabillillah ( also known as sabil Allah) are those who fight for Allah 
(Bantekas 2003; Qur'an Sura Al-Muzzammil:20; Qur'an Sura Al-Tauba: 60) . 
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Volya and the Second of June Movement) , environmentalists (e.g. the 
Animal Liberation Front and Earth First) , and political (e.g. the Red Army 
Faction and the November 17th Revolutionary Organization). However, 
examples of terrorist groups based on culture are more numerous: the 
Basques, the Ulster Catholics, the Corsicans, and the Jurassiens are a 
few European examples. What do all of these groups have in common? 
They identify themselves as being different from others. That is the basic 
requirement of a group, an 'us vs. them' dichotomy (Stirnimann 2003: 
97). 12 
Taking nationalism as an illustrative example, what creates nationalist 
feelings? First of all, to have some sort of nationalist feelings, the peo­
ple must classify themselves as a nation; they must perceive themselves 
to be a nation. According to political geography theorists, several things 
identify a nation. Mellor defines a nation as "comprising people sharing 
the same historical experience, a high level of cultural and linguistic unity, 
and living in a territory they perceive as their homeland by right" (Mellor 
1989: 4) . Anthony Smith, while denying the reality of nations, admits to 
their de facto existence, and defines them as "a named human population 
possessing a myth of common descent, common historical memories, ele­
ments of shared culture, an association with a particular territory, and a 
12The us-them dichotomy was quite explicit in the days following the September 1 1 ,  
2001 attacks on the United States. President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and Osama 
bin Laden all defined the conflict, both past and present, in pairs of social, political, 
moral, and religious dichotomies (Leudar, Marsland, and Nekvapil 2004). 
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sense of solidarity" {Smith 1988: 9) . 13 Thus, nationalism requires a sense 
of separateness from the larger group. 
Next, what increases the strength of this us-them dichotomy? Two 
things: history and repression. For history, the longer a group is together, 
the more they see themselves as being together. For nationalism, as men­
tioned in above, history is extremely important. Crenshaw { 1981) holds 
that members of a nation have a common historical tradition. Smith (1988) 
and many others (Calhoun 1993 ; Feeney 2002; Triandafyllidou 1998) con­
cur in that groups without a common history (real or perceived) cannot 
consider themselves a group; that is, a sense of history is a necessary con­
dition. 
The second factor that increases the strength of the us-them dichotomy 
is repression. There must be some form of repression involved, either real 
or perceived. Terrorists need a cause; they need something to drive their 
actions. Just being different is not sufficient to compel a people to commit 
acts of violence; there must be some sense of repression. This repression 
can be either political or economic. Crenshaw ( 1981: 383) points out that 
political disadvantages both increase the divide between the group and 
the state and increase the sense of grievance against the state. In fact, 
she places political repression as the first cause in her list, even though 
13Smith's position also avoids the primordialism debate. For Smith, it does not really 
matter if the nation is fundamental, only that the people believe it to be. The Irish 
nation is a prime example of a created (or re-created) sense of nationhood. It was not 
until the Irish renaissance of the mid-nineteenth century that Irish was considered a 
nation with its own distinct history and culture separate from that of Great Britain. 
As a result, the creators of the Irish nation could be considered Thomas Davis, Charles 
Gavin Duffy, and John Blake, the founders of the Young Ireland movement (Feeney 
2002: 20). 
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she later admits that such a grievance is neither necessary nor sufficient. 14 
More recently, M urshed ( 2002) found that certain types of grievances can 
result in civil wars. What kinds of grievances are more likely to lead to 
civil wars? 
[Those] which are related to economic factors: systematic eco­
nomic discrimination against groups based on ethnolinguistic 
or religious differences. Extreme poverty and poor social con­
ditions (including refugee camps) also facilitate conflict by pro­
viding more readily available combatants. (M urshed 2002: 3 89) 
Just as political repression both increases the definition of the group 
and provides a concrete grievance against the state, financial differences 
do as well. Medrano ( 1995) lays out two complementing and alternative 
theories to determine the effect of concentration on ethnic violence. The 
first, Ethnic Competition Theory asserts that ethnic conflict comes from 
groups competing for the state's resources (Medrano 1995) . With a limited 
amount of resources available, the competition breaks out along ethnic lines 
if those ethnic lines are apparent. One result of this is that conflict between 
ethnic groups should occur more frequently when the groups interact than 
when they are separate (Belanger and Pinard 1991; Tilly 1991). 
Ethnic competition may also result from occupational desegregation, as 
the ethnic groups would then be competing for the same employment posi­
tions. When one ethnic group has a prominent history of employment in a 
14She does, however, suggest that the perception within the group of such a grievance 
is a necessary condition (Crenshaw 1981: 383). 
63 
certain economic sector, it becomes a part of that ethnic group's identity. 
When that economic sector experiences desegregation, the original groups 
will tend to see the entrants as trespassers and as threats to the group's 
economic identity and vitality. This happened in the United States when 
European immigrants were displaced in their traditional economic niche by 
the internally immigrating African Americans. One result of this economic 
displacement was increased ethnic violence against the African Americans 
by those who would not accept their incursion. (Olzak 1992) 
Ethnic Segregation Theory asserts the opposite - ethnic conflict comes 
from one group segregating itself from the others (Medrano 1995) . This 
segregation can be physical ( movement to ghettoes) or economic ( one eth­
nonation inhabiting only one employment sector) . Economic segregation, 
in itself, does not increase the probability that a group will resort to vio­
lence. It does, however, increase the sense of separateness felt by the group. 
This happens because the group begins to see that employment sector as 
a part of the group's identity. Such ethnic segregation based on economic 
sectors happened dramatically in Germany after 1950, when the German 
state began signing contracts with other states to import labor to drive 
the German economy (Friedrichs 1998) . 
In both of these theories, the conflict arises when the ethnic minority 
sees itself as a group separate from the larger state. Interestingly enough, 
neither theory requires the ethnic minority to be disadvantaged. In both 
cases, the minority may actually be economically advantaged within the 
larger state. In this case, they tend to see themselves as being dragged 
down by the state, as opposed to being repressed by it. However, as we will 
64 
later see, an economically privileged group does have a lower probability 
of resorting to violence, unless that advantage is threatened. 15  
Furthermore, money is a great motivator for action. Seeing hard-earned 
money go to feed 'different' people has the ability to foster a sense of re­
sentment. Similarly, seeing one' s children go hungry while a separate na­
tionality living nearby succeeds can create the same sense of injustice. The 
feelings increase in intensity in the presence of relative deprivation (Gurr 
1970). In either case, economic disparities are causing a radicalization 
within the population. Malone and Thakur (2003) state, 
If anything positive can come out of the horrific 9 / 11 terror 
attacks, it should be the emergence of a concerted approach to 
addressing this bitterness [caused by the North-South dispari­
ties] , one possible root cause for the support that Osama bin 
Laden's advocacy has received on the streets in much of the 
developing world, even outside the Islamic bloc of countries. 
In his influential work, Gurr combines economic and political repression 
in a general explanation of why certain groups rebel against the authority of 
the central government. For Gurr, the basic reason is relative depravation; 
i.e. , the gap between value capabilities and value expectations. For Gurr, 
15 A similar result is found in international conflict literature. When one country 
has their capability advantage threatened by a relative neighbor, the probability of 
them initiating conflict with the challenger increases, especially when that challenger is 
different in some fundamental manner. T hus, there was no conflict between the United 
States and Great Britain when the former overtook the latter, but there was when 
Germany was overtaking France (Houweling and Siccama 1988: 94; Kim and Morrow 
1992: 918). 
65 
gap growth is fundamental. As long as groups do not have expectations too far above what they receive, there is no great impetus to rebel. However, when the group sees the gap between reality and expectations grow greater, they resolve into action (Gurr 1970). 
However, there are conflicting findings in the terrorism literature. Ter­rorists do tend to be middle-class individuals who are neither poorly edu­cated nor poor. Yet, those states in which terrorism thrives contain large numbers of both the poorly educated and the poor (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2005a; Krueger and Maleckova 2002; Russell and Miller 1977). How can we reconcile these differences? 
3.2 .3  Summary 
And so, at the group level, we have that money is not of primary impor­tance as a predictor - conditions are far more important. In terms of resource constraints, it is true that terrorism is inexpensive to execute. However, in terms of reaction, terrorism has some rather severe associ­ated costs. Among these possible costs is loss of life, loss of legitimacy, and loss of support. One class of theorists holds that terrorist groups are rational actors who, in effect, perform cost-benefit analyses to determine the advisability of their actions (Ross 1993: 317; Sederberg 1989: 97-101 ). Thus, terrorists weigh these costs, both actual and probable, to determine whether their actions are beneficial to them in achieving their goals. Ac­cording to the literature, what factors do they weigh? 
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First, the terrorist group must have a raison d'etre, some purpose for 
existing as a group. Ideology, culture, history, and repression all combine, 
either singly or in larger combinations, to create distinct groups. The 
repression, economic or political, also serves as the impetus for action. 
Altering the current order serves as the benefit from action. However, the 
action also has associated costs. These costs come in the form of increased 
repression by the state and of loss of support from the people. 
The terrorists must ensure that they do not make the situation too 
much worse. In Uruguay, at that time a liberal democracy, the Tupa­
maros (1960s) sought concessions from the government. When they did 
not receive them, they began a campaign of terror to bring about their 
requested concessions. As a direct result of this campaign, the people re­
belled against them, the government fell in a military coup d'etat, and the 
military dictatorship effectively and efficiently eliminated the group (Gibbs 
19 89). 
Next, the terrorists need to ensure that the public backlash against 
their actions is minor or non-existent - they must win the long-term 
battle for the hearts and minds of their people. Actually, they only have 
to perceive this to be true. One of the effects of terrorist activities is 
that "their acts antagonize previously neutral and disinterested groups and 
alienate many of the people on behalf of whom they claim to act" (Ross and 
Gurr 1989: 409). Sources of this backlash include government propaganda 
campaigns, natural public aversion to unrest, lack of effective propaganda 
by the terrorist organization, and an unwillingness of the public to bear 
the costs of the terror campaign {Ross and Gurr 1989) . 
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Thus, it seems as though the group is more important than the individ­
ual level of analysis. Not all groups are disadvantaged either economically 
or politically. Not all groups have concrete grievances against the state. 
Thus, not all groups experience an increased probability of resorting to 
terrorism. Later, I will address how this information can be used to keep 
groups from resorting to terrorism, and how it can be used to stop ter­
rorist groups currently existing. However, the group must be placed in a 
larger system. Just as there are certain characteristics of the groups that 
encourage terror, the same is true about certain characteristics of the state. 
3.3 State Level 
Characteristics of the state have also been found to be important in deter­
mining the propensity for terrorist actions (Crenshaw 1981, 1998; Mousseau 
2001; Ross 1993) .  These characteristics fall into two broad categories: 
regime type and state milieu. Regime type refers to the level of democ­
racy and autocracy within the state, including how able the regime is to 
repress terrorism once it begins. State milieu refers to the demographic 
and geographic factors that affect life within the state. 
3.3. 1 Regime Type 
There are conflicting findings on how regime type affects terrorism. The 
theory seems to be as follows. Autocratic regimes are more repressive than 
democratic regimes. Thus, groups have a greater chance of being repressed, 
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either politically or economically, in an autocratic regime (Crenshaw 1981; 
Gurr 1970) .  As a result, autocratic regimes should spawn more terrorist 
groups; they provide their citizens more reasons to come together against 
the government, yet they make available fewer peaceful outlets for them. 
Democratic regimes allow for a greater number of ways for the groups to 
peacefully express their dissatisfaction with the status quo, and they have 
mechanisms that allow for peaceful change (Huntington 1991: 172) .  Thus, 
democracies should have fewer terrorist organizations. 
However, autocracies, being more repressive, are better able to control 
and stop terrorists from reaching a critical number than are democracies 
(Hamilton and Hamilton 1983) . These autocracies reduce the number of 
"closed curtains" and reduce the size of the "active operating space" of the 
dissident groups (Galam 2003:  141, 143) . Structured autocracies are also 
better able to turn the entire apparatus of the state against terror groups 
without compromising principles. Democracies value personal liberty over 
state control. Because of this, they are less able to stop terrorist groups 
from continuing their existence ( Crenshaw 1981) . So, should democracies 
have a higher rate or should autocracies? Current theory unequivocally 
asserts, yes. 
A quick cross tabulation shows that for all minorities at risk in the 
world, democracies have a higher incidence of terrorism in comparison to 
the number of minority groups than either of the other two types of regimes 
(see Table 3. 1) .  Furthermore, this difference is statistically significant (x2 
= 3 7.41; p � 0.001) .  This finding is in accord with Crenshaw's (1981) 
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Table 3.1: Cross tabulation of regime type vs. incidence of terrorism in 
Western Europe, 1945-2000. 
democracy mid-realm autocracy total 
terrorism that year 78 26 23 127 
(4.5) (1.5) (1.7) 
no terrorism that year 1656 1720 1343 4719 
(95.5) (98.5) (98.3) 
total state-years 1734 1746 1366 4846 
Notes : Numbers in parentheses represent column percents. Democracies 
are significantly more prone to out breaks of terrorism than the other two 
types of regimes (x2 = 37.41; dF = 2; p � 0. 001) . The regime type data is 
from Polity IV (v2002) , whereas the terrorism data is from Minorities at 
Risk ( v 1. 03) . Regimes are democracies if they score +6  or higher on the 
POLITY2 variable; autocracies, - 6  or lower; and mid-realm, between -5 and 
5, inclusive. 
assertion that the permissive structure of a democracy is a necessary con­
dition for terrorism (Ross 1993; Weinberg 1991) . This permissive structure 
allows like-minded individuals to come together to form (perhaps violent) 
groups. It allows individuals to pass freely through the territory without 
being automatically subject to police search. It also allows groups to form 
on democratic soil, perhaps to carry out attacks on a neighboring state 
as happened with the exiled Spanish Basques leaders in southern France 
(Kurlansky 1999) . 
Finally, according to current theory, there must be a precipitating event 
before a group makes that fateful step to terrorism (Crenshaw 1981; Ross 
1993). Crenshaw found that this precipitating event quite often was the 
government using unexpected and unusual force to respond to a protest. 
According to Crenshaw {1981},  this unexpected event demonstrates to the 
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group that the state is no longer adhering to the social contract and that a boundary line had been crossed in the battle. 16 The event may also demonstrate that the government is not really as democratic as it purports to be, thus giving weight to the demands of the group (Bonanate 1979: 197). This event may also show a fundamental weakness in the government, thus giving the group more esteem in the battle or giving other opponents of the government an impetus to attempt a coup (Gibbs 1989). 
3.3 .2 State Milieu 
What about demographic and geographic factors? How do they affect the probability of terrorism within the state? There seem to be several demographic variables that contribute to the use of terrorism. Level of urbanization, level of modernization, the pervasiveness of the mass media, and simple demographics all contribute. 
Urbanization. That the level of urbanization is a factor in terrorism is not in question (Crenshaw 1981; Wilkinson 1977) . Cities offer two things that terrorists need: a recruitment base and targets. Large urban centers tend to contain the poor, the downtrodden, and the frustrated (Ehrlich and Liu 2002: 183). These groups of people are prime candidates for recruitment because they already feel the relative deprivation, the economic inequality, and the despair. From buildings to people, urban centers also offer a multitude of targets that the terrorist organizations use ( Grabosky 1979: 76). Urban centers also offer density and anonymity. Density allows 
16For an extensive discussion on the effects of boundary violations, see Schelling 1960. 
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for geometrical and spatial aggregation of both terror-prone persons and 
their silent, passive supporters (Funes 1998; Galam 2003). Anonymity 
allows individuals to move about and plan with relative impunity. That 
urban centers are also centers of conscious anonymity is well-documented 
(Sampson 1991: 57, 58). Urban settings also allow juxtaposition of great 
wealth and great poverty, thus exacerbating the feelings of deprivation and 
despair ( Conley 1999; Peterson 1991). 17 
Modernization. Terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon. 18 Thus, mod­
ernization is not a necessary cause of terrorism. However, it appears to 
be an accelerant. Modernity offers a plethora of targets, weapons, and 
mass media outlets that terrorists use to their advantage (Johnson 1982). 
Modern targets include nuclear power plants. Modern weapons include 
airplanes, car bombs, and RPGs. Modern media outlets include television 
and the Internet (the media is explored in greater depth below) . Further­
more, greater communication, greater mobility, and greater openness, all 
things associated with modernity, associate themselves with higher risks of 
terrorism ( Crenshaw 1981). 
The Mass Media. One requirement for terrorism to work is that the 
people need to be terrorized. To accomplish this, the act must be capable of 
inducing terror and the knowledge of that act must get to the people. The 
17In a separate study, Tittle and Stafford ( 1992) found that, when taking demographic 
variables into consideration, urban residents scored higher than either suburban or rural 
residents on indices of anonymity, alienation, and deviance. 
18The Zealots (Secarii) was a terrorist group in Palestine around the beginning of 
the first millennium. The rulers immediately after the French Revolution of 1789 called 
themselves terrorists, while history calls the time of their rule the Reign of Terror. The 
Narodnaya Volya was a Russian anarchist group at the turn of the twentieth century. 
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first part is the responsibility of the terrorists ; the second is the responsi­
bility of the media. Without advertising the act, terror is quite difficult to 
spread. Thus, the media is, at best, a partial cause of the effectiveness of 
terrorism (Bassiouni 1981; Schmid and De Graaf 1982) . This is known to 
the rulers of the countries hit by terror events. Margaret Thatcher, Prime 
Minister of Great Britain, mentioned the effects of the media on the eff ec­
tiveness of terrorism (Shafritz, Gibbons, and Scott 1991: 257) .  This is also 
well known to terrorism researchers (Crenshaw 1981; Johnson 1982; Ross 
1993) . Some researchers have even posited that a solution to the problem 
of terrorism is to either reduce the freedom of the media (Slone 2000) or 
to encourage the media to police itself through stricter ethics (Held 1997).  
However, both of these solutions, with the first being most blatant, show 
a willingness of some states to reduce the freedom of their citizens in order 
to reduce the effects of terrorism. 
Demography. With the above arguments about the individual level of 
analysis, we already know how certain individual factors affect the like­
lihood of a person resorting to the use of terrorism. The poor, the un­
employed, the adolescent all have higher probabilities of using violence. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that areas with higher concentra­
tions of poverty, unemployment, and adolescents would have higher chances 
of breeding terrorism.  This conclusion is in line with current theory, as well 
(Ehrlich and Liu 2002: 183) . 
One thing not yet explored is the effect of the number of other out­
groups on group terror propensity. There are two lines of thought. The 
first holds that the chance of a state experiencing a terror strike increases 
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when there are more terror-prone groups. This is due to the mathematics of the situation. Mathematics affects the outcomes in two different man­ners, however. First, a greater number of groups in existence reduces the chance that any one of them will be able to get their problem addressed through pluralist political means. In other words, there is a limited amount of resources - time, power, and money - and a greater number of groups vying for the pie will necessarily reduce the average amount any group will attain. This, along with the 'otherness' of the other group, increases the probability of intergroup conflict and violence (Kramer 1994; Krippendorff 1979; Galinski 2002). Second, a greater number of groups necessarily in­creases the number of conflict nexuses between the groups, as the number of possible interactions increases (Dion 1997). 
However, does increasing the number of out-groups always increase the likelihood of a state experiencing terrorism? Or, is there a certain level beyond which increasing the number of out groups actually decreases this probability? Is there a point where there are so many out groups that adding an additional has no effect on terror likelihood? In fact, could adding yet another out-group actually create a fraternity of "out-group­ness" , where the groups begin to work together to achieve their ends within the political system, and thus reducing the probability of a terror strike in the state?19 Interestingly enough, according to research, there is a point beyond which increasing numbers of out-groups actually reduces the level of ethnic violence experienced under certain political conditions, namely 
190r, could this fraternity work together to achieve the goals using violent methods? 
The fact that there is a general increase in pacifism beyond a threshold number of 
out-groups suggests that groups who do work together do so using political means at a 
greater rate than those who use violent means. 
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the state' s level of democracy and economic development (Mousseau 2001; 
Rummel 1997) . 
3.3.3 Summary 
So, what do we really know about which state factors affect the likelihood 
of experiencing terrorism? Autocracies have a greater chance of causing 
terrorism to flourish but also have a better chance of keeping it under 
control. While democracies tend not to spawn their own terrorist groups, 
they do have a greater problem with controlling. terrorism once it begins. 
Furthermore, the openness of the liberal democratic state allows non-native 
terrorist groups to organize within their territory. 
A free press is positively correlated to terrorism for one fundamental 
reason: the press advertises the terror event to the population. This is one 
of the necessary components of successful terrorism. True, there are other 
means of transmitting the terror, but the free press does it with ease. 
Beyond regime characteristics, we know that several demographic vari­
ables are positively correlated with terrorism; among them are poverty and 
inequality. This finding should not be surprising, as these two correlates 
are also indicators of what causes groups to resort to terror, and of what 
causes individuals to resort to terror. We also know that levels of modern­
ization and of urbanization are positively correlated with terrorism. 
These latter findings seem to conflict with a body of research in the 
literature holding that the well-educated, middle-class members of society 
tend to be the terrorists. Neither body of research is incorrect. T his latter 
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research either refers to the leaders of the terrorist movements (Hudson 
1999) or to specific terrorist groups (Krueger and Maleckova 2003) . Those 
driving and directing the movements do tend to be wealthier and better 
educated than the foot soldiers of the movement. However, the leaders 
must be able to find those members of society willing to risk death in the 
name of "the cause." Those willing often fit the former description prof­
fered above. However, let it be said that these are not empirical rules. 
Exceptions exist. Thus, while relative deprivation may be a force for ter­
rorism in some sectors of the world, the rich and the middle class compose 
majorities in others {Hudson 1999) . 
3 .4 System Level 
Beyond the individual, group, and state levels, there are certain factors at 
the system level that influence terrorism. There are four major forces in 
the world that affect terrorism. These are the new world order, the growing 
North-South economic divide, globalization, and other terrorist events. 
3.4. 1 The New World Order 
The phrase 'new world order' is neither new nor well-defined. New world 
orders were created in 1 7 7 6  ( American Revolution) , 17 89 (French Revolu­
tion) , 1918 (Treaty of Versailles) , 1941 (Neuropa, the Nazi vision of the 
new Europe) , 1945 (World Socialism a la the Soviet Union) , and so forth. 
Every time there is a revolution or a major change in the world, the results 
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are usually termed a new world order. The new world order of most rele­vance to this current discussion is the one caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall - the end of the Cold War. This new world order is characterized by two things: unipolarity on the world scene and a new faith placed in international organizations like the United Nations. 
The Fall of the Soviet Union and the Rise of the Unipolar World. Re­search on the effects of the end of the Cold War on terrorism is not plentiful. Two related factors come into play here. The first is the direct effects of the Soviet Union on world-wide terrorism. The second is the effect of po­larity on terrorism. Conspiracy theorists in the West during the Cold War often placed the blame for outbreaks of terrorism at the feet of the Soviet Union. However, testing that hypothesis directly required data from the Soviet Union that it was obviously unwilling to share with researchers in the West. However, it could be tested indirectly. 
Indirect tests, usually searching f or linkages between Super Power diplo­matic crises during the Cold War and terror events, have actually supported the hypothesis (O'Brien 1996). Furthermore, the decline in terrorist ac­tivities immediately after the end of the Cold War also supported the contention that the Soviet Union was involved in funding terrorists, the current increase in terror activity not withstanding {Enders and Sandler 1999). 
The United Nations. One of the original purposes of the United Nations was to bring the countries of the world together so that communication and cooperation could flourish. While the UN record on both of these hoped­for results has been spotty throughout its history, the constituent states 
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have been able to cooperate on terrorism only after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks (Ward 2003) . What is the reason for this newfound push 
for cooperation? 
Prior to 11 September 2001, international instruments target­
ing specific criminal acts were adopted to deal with terrorism, 
and Security Council counter-terrorism measures, which were 
not mandatory, went unheeded. Post 11 September, the coun­
cil adopted Resolution 1373 (2001) under chapter VII of the 
charter, setting out certain mandatory measures to prevent 
and suppress international terrorism, including reporting to the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee ( CTC) on actions taken to im­
plement the resolution. (Ward 2003: 289) 
In addition to the new mandatory regulations, support organizations were 
created and funds were made available to help the states meet the new 
regulations. Thus, it was a combination of mandatory regulations, institu­
tional support, and available funds (Bantekas 2003; Rosand 2003). 
3.4.2 North-South Divide 
As mentioned earlier, at the state level, income disparities have the ability 
to produce terrorists. The same appears to be true at the system level. The 
poor countries are beginning to feel isolated, frustrated, and 'relatively de­
prived', to use Gurr's term. The 'North-South' divide increases the chance 
that the individuals in these states resort to terror in order to  create a more 
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equitable system {Ehrlich and Liu 2002; Malone and Thakur 2003) . The 
developed North is beginning to recognize this problem, although steps 
taken so far to remedy the situation may be more aggravating to the pro� 
lem than helpful {Rogers 1997) . In fact, there is some evidence that there 
is a second factor currently at work. Because the North-South divide has 
existed for so long, the South has an image of the North as economic en­
emy. In other words, both the divide and the image must be eliminated 
before the divide can be abolished (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). 
3 .4.3 Globalization 
"Globalisation is a political phenomenon characterised by the weakening 
of mediating institutions and the direct confrontation between individuals 
and global forces" (Guehenno 1998: 5) . It is characterized by the increase 
in interactions between su�governmental units between countries. Two 
aspects are important for this study of terrorism: the movement of money 
and the movement of images. 
International Banking System. As stated earlier, terrorism is inexpen­
sive. Bombs cost little when compared to their effects. However, money 
allows organizations to thrive and commit more grandiose schemes. For na­
tionalistic terror organizations, this funding often comes from expatriates. 
Much of the IRA funding came from the Irish in America (Briand 2002). 
One of the main foci of the USA PATRIOT Act was to curtail funding of 
international terrorist organizations. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 
September 1 1 , 2001 attack, the UN passed several resolutions making it 
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more difficult for terrorist organizations to move their funds through the 
international banking system (Rosand 2003) . The ease in which funds flow 
between countries is also a correlate of terrorism ( Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and 
Zanini 1999; Bantekas 2003). 
International News Media. The news media is no longer necessarily 
a local entity. Nor is it solely a state entity. The news media is now 
an international entity. The free international press allows people in one 
country to know about events in another. Thus, the reach of terror is 
greater ( Arquilla, et al. 1999). 
One of the difficulties ethnic groups have seeking independence is that 
they are much smaller and less powerful than their containing state. The 
international news media helps reduce this difference. If that group is able 
to be prominently featured in the press, they are better able to obtain 
international support to encourage their state to accede to their demands. 
Although this has yet to be tested universally, preliminary case studies 
support the conclusion (Burton 1985 ;  Nash 1995) . 
3.4.4 Summary 
The systemic level is the least studied of the four. This is mainly because 
it changes less often, and it is more difficult to consciously alter than the 
other levels. However, we do know some things about the factors at the 
systemic level. First, the period after the Cold War was marked with a 
decrease in terrorist activity, because the major state sponsor, the Soviet 
Union, no longer existed. Second, we do know that the growing wealth 
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disparities between the states are causing a tension in the system that increases terrorist activity. International banking allows funds to move from donors to terror groups. Finally, the international media makes more powerful the activities of the terrorists for the exact reasons that state-level media does; it involves a greater audience in the actual acts of terror, thus increasing the probability that international pressure will be brought to bear on the containing state. 
3 .5  Chapter Summary 




The Pressure Model of 
Terrorism 
All science is either physics or 
stamp collecting. 
Ernest Rutherford, as quoted in 
Birks (1962) 
�ss ( 1993) asserts that there exist three basic categorizations of ter­rorism models: structural, psychological, and rational choice. Structural models focus on the configuration of group-, state-, and system-level forms and entities and how each affects the propensity of a terrorism outbreak (Crenshaw 1981 ;  Ross 1993; Ward 2003; Weinberg 1991). Psychological models focus on the mindsets of the individual and what terrorist actions 
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require of the person (Gurr 1970; Ruby 2002; Stirnimann 2002; Weath­
erston 2003) . Rational choice models assume people, groups, and states 
are single actors who act solely to maximize the utility of their outcomes 
(Bueno de Mesquita 2005b, 2005c; Post 2000; Schmid and Graaf 1982) . 1 
' Of these, the first is best developed in the political science terrorism 
literature, as it allows both for easier observation and for greater prescrip­
tions. However, any attempt to model a higher level of analysis without 
using a lower level will necessarily lead to an incomplete theory. This 
is as true in the hard sciences as it is in the social sciences. With that 
said, however, partial theories do remain helpful. One can use and test 
and prescribe from the theory of evolution without fully understanding the 
biochemistry underlying it. Most subfields of chemistry make sense even 
in the absence of an intimate understanding of atomic and nuclear physics. 
However, chemistry is still better understood as a whole if the physical 
rules for atomic and subatomic motion are known and understood. 
Current theories of terrorism either focus on a single level of analysis or 
append causes from two or more levels without providing a mechanism for 
such an appending. As such, the terrorism model I propose goes beyond a 
simple structural descriptive theory and places its foundation in the actions 
of people, thus providing the mechanics for coalescing the individual-level 
rules to higher-order aggregations. The Pressure Model of Terrorism does 
not necessarily overturn established observations and theories of terrorism, 
1There is a growing literature in which the interaction between the individual ter­
rorist and the other levels is being more fully developed, primarily in a rational choice 
framework. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita {2005b, 2005c) appears to be serving as the 
vanguard of this movement, especially in using formal modeling techniques. 
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rather it shows how the four levels fit together and how the individual level 
affects and is affected by the other levels - it provides a framework for 
understanding how the current theories fit together. As such, it potentially 
allows for a greater level of prediction. 
4. 1 Structural Theories 
As structural models are the best developed theories, it behooves us to 
examine them, for they share a common set of factor types and a common 
set of weaknesses. There is a tendency in the field to categorize the causes 
of terrorism into permissive causes and precipitant causes (Crenshaw 1981; 
Ross 1993).2 Permissive causes (a.k.a. necessary causes) are those that al­
low terrorism to take place. Precipitant causes ( a.k.a. trigger events) are 
those that provide the impetus for terrorism to occur. Permissive causes 
are steady-state or background conditions, while precipitants are sudden 
events. Ross (1993) supplies three permissive causes in his model: geo­
graphical location, type of political system, and level of modernization. 
Crenshaw (1981) emphasizes modernization, urbanization, social facilita­
tion, society's condoning of terrorist actions, lack of political opportunity, 
elite dissatisfaction, passivity of the masses, and the government's inability 
or unwillingness to prevent terrorism as permissive causes of terrorism. 3 
2Ernst Haas (1997} also uses this structure to explain outbreaks of nationalism. 
3Two things missing from this discussion are poverty and education. Neither Cren­
shaw nor Ross suggests that either is linked to terrorism. This is in accord with empirical 
evidence from European left-wing terrorist groups (Russell and Miller 1977) and from 
Palestinian groups (Krueger and Maleckova 2003}. However, as we will see, it is not 
necessarily the poverty level of the state that matters, it is the poverty level of the 
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The second category of causes, precipitant, is the sudden events that 
provide the impetus for a group to initiate the use of terrorism in their cam­
paign. Ross {1993) presents seven categories of precipitant causes: social, 
cultural, and historical facilitation, organizational split and development, 
presence of other forms of unrest, support, counter-terrorist organization 
failure, availability of weapons and explosives, and grievances. Crenshaw 
{1981) concurs that grievances are the most important precipitant cause, 
but lists government use of unexpected extreme force as a close second. 
Looking closely at the precipitant causes shows the first weakness of 
these structural theories - the precipitant causes are not necessarily point 
events. That is, they may also be considered steady-state conditions, es­
pecially if the original event did not immediately trigger an outbreak of 
terrorism. The Irish have received massive levels of support throughout 
the years, and this level of support did allow the IRA to have a terror­
ist campaign, but support was not a single event, it was a background 
condition (Briand 2002) .  
A second weakness of these structural theories is that the grievances 
may also be steady-state conditions. The loss of South Tyrol to Italy at the 
close of World War I did not result in a terrorist campaign at that time. 
South Tyrolean terrorism did not start until 1961, more than 40 years 
after the initial grievance of ethnic separation ( Alcock 1 970; Steininger 
2003). Why did it not immediately result in a terror campaign? Why did 
the South Tyroleans wait until after separation from Austria, until after 
group in relation to the rest of the state. Furthermore, these two studies do not restrict 
themselves to ethnonational groups. 
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the world depression of the 1930s, until after the Fascists took power and 
denationalized them, and until after two failures of an Italian policy of 
autonomy for the South Tyrol before they began their terror campaign? 
Quite clearly, in this case, the initial grievance was not a trigger event, it 
was a background condition. 
This is not to say that sudden events cannot lead to groups initiating 
terrorism. The ETA was relatively calm until Franco began the forced 
Castilianization of Spain, including the Basque homeland in the H egoalde 
(Collins 1990; da Silva 1975 ;  Laitin and Gomez 1992). It is to say, rather, 
that precipitant events may not be as precipitant as the structural mod­
elers suggest. Additionally, much of the evidence suggesting the existence 
of precipitant causes is completely ex post facto ; that is, only after looking 
back at the start of the terror campaign are we able to ascertain the spe­
cific precipitant event. Furthermore, little investigation is made of those 
precipitant events that did not - the dogs that did not bark. The forced 
Castilianization of Spain also affected the Catalans, the Galacians, and 
the Roma, yet none of these other ethnonational groups resorted to terror­
ism. Also, while France was experiencing general unrest during the 1970s, 
their Basques did not begin a terror campaign even though their brethren 
across the Pyrenees were deep in the midst of one. 4 This demonstrates 
a fundamental weakness in the current reliance on precipitant events to 
model terrorism - the unclear difference between precipitant events and 
non-precipitant events. 
4However, the French Basques did support the Spanish Basques by hiding their 
leadership and by providing a base of support (Council on Foreign Relations 2004). 
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The third weakness is that researching precipitant events requires a 
bit of selective analysis. The move of the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA) to terrorism in 1970 illustrates this point well. The Trou­
bles in Northern Ireland began when the Catholic civil rights marches were 
violently rebuffed by the entrenched Protestants - or did they? The Pro­
visional IRA initiated its terror campaign in response to the Official IRA's 
failure to act in the face of increasingly violent attacks on Catholics in 
Derry, or did they? Was the precipitating event the Battle of the Bogside 
or the Burntollet Ambush? Was there even a single precipitating event, or 
did the terror campaign come about as a result of a steady, gradual, step­
wise increase in violence? A read of the history of Ireland during this time 
period supports the contention that the Provisional IRA terror campaign 
was merely the next step in the escalating level of civil violence. ( Coogan 
2002; Feeney 2002) 
Finally, even though Ross ( 1993) decries the absence of a theoretical 
structure for terrorism, he continues the trend by offering only a superfi­
cial model - one that provides surface-level observables without a single 
underlying theory to tie all of the hypothesized factors together. While he 
does offer a series of rationales for the factors he selects, he does not string 
them together in a coherent manner with a general explanation of why 
certain factors are more important than others. While not a weakness of 
the use of precipitant events in a theory, per se, it does underline the need 
to provide a framework from which the different factors can be gleaned a 
priori, rather than after the fact. 
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Clearly, a more general model needs to be created - one that reduces reiiance on precipitant ( or trigger) events as causes. The new model must base itself, first and foremost, on the individual, as the individual is the one committing the terror acts. The model I create below does just this. 
At this point, certain presuppositions need to be explicitly stated. The proposed theory rests on a weak rational actor model -. people act as though they are rationally acting to maximize their benefits. This does not necessarily mean that people consciously calculate the best action with perfect knowledge of all alternatives. It merely holds that they act as though they do. Part of the calculus for maximizing the outcome for any actor is cost-benefit analysis - one action is preferred to a second if the difference between the benefit and the cost f or the first action is greater than for the second. This does not assume that all people place the same value on the same values; salience most assuredly varies from person to person and from time to time (Gurr 1970; Hechter 1986; Walt 1999). 
4.2 The Pressure Model of Terrorism 
The proposed model offers a mechanism for how factors in one level of analysis affect those in another. It also places the locus of action at the individual level. To use a physics analogy, the individuals are the particles and the rules under which they operate are the forces. Forces in physics depend on the particles, just as the movement of the particles depends on the forces involved. This physical science analogy can be clearly seen in both the agent-structure debate in International Relations (Carlesnaes 
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1992; Dessler 1989; Wendt 1987) and in constructivist theory, which asserts that people are a product of their environments just as they alter their environments - one cannot know about one without knowing about the other (Kivimaki 2001; Price 2004). 
In physics, the particle is the actor - everything is defined in terms of the particle and what it can do. If I wish to continue this physics analogy for my model, my theory should be constructed in a similar vein. And that is what I do, starting with the individual actor - the particle. 
4. 2 . 1  Pressure 
Psychology studies the individual ( the particle) and attempts to uncover the rules under which the individual acts (the associated forces). In the psy­chology literature, the fundamental basis of action is the stimulus-response dyad (Freedheim 2003; Gardiner 1974). A neutral actor receives an exter­nal impetus and produces an associated response based on that stimulus. Different stimuli may produce different responses. Identical stimuli, under identical circumstances, produce identical responses for a given actor.5 A single stimulus produces a biological imperative for action, a pressure to act. A greater number of coherent stimuli create a higher action pressure, while incoherent stimuli do not necessarily combine to increase the pressure to act. A greater action pressure increases the probability that an action 
5This forms the basis for rationality of actions in all types of life, not just in humans. 
Plants behave predictably because the rules governing their responses are well known. 
As one increases complexity in the studied organism, one also increases the complexity 
of the behavioral rules. The number of items to be considered in a cost-benefit analysis 
grows as the complexity of the organism grows. 
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is taken. This last statement can be understood in terms of cost-benefit 
analysis. A higher action pressure increases the internal costs of not acting, 
thus increasing the benefit payoff merely for acting. If the pressure to act 
continues to increase, it will eventually increase to the level of overcoming 
the other associated costs - resulting in an action. 
To tie this in to terrorism, the stimuli are the external experiences of the 
person. Each stimulus encourages the person to act in one way or another, 
depending on that single stimulus. As individuals have different sets of 
experiences, the preferred action may differ from person to person, but all 
responses are from the same set of possible responses. Greater coherence 
among the stimuli - the more often the person receives the same stimulus 
or similar stimuli suggesting the same action - increases the likelihood 
that the person will react. Thus, being pulled over once by the police for 
no apparent reason elicits a much smaller motive for action than repeated 
infringements. An economy that enters recession repeatedly increases the 
pressure of the individuals to act against the government with a greater 
probability than an economy that slightly drops into recession rarely. A 
state that passes ethnicity-based exclusionary laws repeatedly increases 
the action pressure of those excluded more than in a state with a long, 
continuous history of strong civil liberties. 
Thus, at the individual level, the amount of action pressure present is 
directly, and positively, related to the probability of the individual acting. 
The probability of action can be reduced by increasing the costs associated 
with a specific action, but eventually action will result if the action pressure 
continues to increase; according to weU-established psychological theory, 
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everyone has a breaking point, just as any balloon will burst if enough air 
is pumped into it (Biderman 1960 ;  Farber, Harlow, and West 1957). 
Regimes that do not allow the pressure to gradually reduce itself in myr­
iad ways increase the likeJihood that the balloon of pressure will violently 
burst. This suggests that established democracies, with well-established 
political processes, have a lower probability of experiencing the bursting 
balloon phenomenon. The pressure to act by the people is kept small in 
comparison to the rupture point of the political system. 
4.2 .2  Force 
The physical concept of force also has an analogy in the Pressure Model of 
Terrorism. According to physicists and chemists, force is more fundamen­
tal than pressure; that is, pressure is usually defined in terms of force -
mean pressure, P, is the amount of force applied per unit of area, as shown 
in Equation 4. 1. This is equivalent to defining force in terms of pressure 
and area. In terrorism terms, if we define force as the total amount of force 
applied to a regime to change, then it is clear that the mean pressure in 
Equation 4.2 refers to the action pressure described above and the area in 
Equation 4.2 refers to the number of people affected by the action pres­
sure. Thus pressure corresponds to the effects of the individual, while force 
-· corres.ponds to the effects of that pressure on the aggregate grouping. 
F p -
A 
(4. 1 )  
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There is no reason to believe that the action pressure will be constant across the population. Thus, the total force on the regime to change is merely the sum of the action pressures felt by the individual persons ruled by that regime (Equation 4.3). Whether or not the regime actually changes depends on its own cost-benefit analysis of the events as to whether an action will net a reduction in oppositional force or not. That is why a populous state has such a high level of inertia; large states have more citizens to consider in their decisional calculi. 
One final note before moving on to examining the consequences of the model - the distribution of action pressures. Areas of higher pressure behave differently than areas of lower pressure. In meteorology, areas of high pressure result in few clouds and relatively extreme temperatures, whereas areas of low pressure result in many clouds and relatively mod­erate temperatures. Determining the average barometric pressure for the entire state helps little in the way of forecasting the weather. Only when the pressure for a smaller geographical region is known can a reasonably accurate forecast be made. The same is true of action pressure. Knowing the average pressure of action for an entire state tells little by way of be­ing able to predict an outcome. However, knowing regional average action pressures allows better forecasting. If all of the action pressure exists in a small area in the state, the chance of regional action is much greater than if that pressure were uniformly distributed. 
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For instance, and without calculation, it is apparent that the United 
Kingdom in the 1970s had a relatively low average pressure of action. The 
Cornish were content. The Welsh were content. The English were content. 
Even the Scots were content. The only area of high action pressure was 
Northern Ireland, specifically the urban centers of Belfast, Derry, and Por­
tadown. If we only looked at the average for the entire state, there would 
be little expectation that a terrorist campaign could have occurred. It is 
only when we increase the resolution of our scrutiny that we can identify 
the areas that would be of higher probability of terrorism - the Northern 
Ireland urban centers. In short, terrorist activity is fundamentally a local 
phenomenon, even though that local phenomenon is affected by broader 
- in a geographic sense - factors at both the state and the system level. 
4.3 Theoretical Consequences 
The above model offers several consequences, most of which are described 
in the literature. However, some of the consequences d9 conflict with some 
areas of the existing literature. The major strength of the theory is that 
it gives a unified, behavioralist explanation for group-, state-, and system­
level factors. 
4.3. 1 Group-level Consequences 
Ethnic Competition. Medrano {1994) provides overviews of the two com­
peting theories of ethnic competition: Ethnic Competition Theory and 
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Ethnic Segregation Theory. The first states that conflict levels will in­
crease if identifiable ethnic groups compete for the same economic and 
political opportunities. The latter holds that ethnic conflict will increase 
when the ethnic groups are kept separate as they will have a greater chance 
of forming a solid identity that they are better able to put at opposition 
to the "other" . They" cannot both be true in every case, as they contradict 
each other to a certain extent. The Ethnic Segregation Theory suggests 
that mixing the competing ethnic groups should reduce the number and 
extent of ethnic conflict, whereas the Ethnic Competition Theory suggests 
the opposite (Hechter 1999; Olzak 1992; Tilly 1991) . The Pressure Model 
of Terrorism agrees with Ethnic Segregation Theory. To see this, let us 
examine the Ethnic Competition Theory in light of the proposed model. 
The key concept in the PMT is action pressure - the pressure an 
individual feels to act in response to a series of external stimuli, especially to 
perceived inequalities. A greater inequality, especially on the more salient 
issues, increases the probability that an action will be taken to correct that 
inequality. These inequalities can be political, economic, or judicial. The 
greater the number of these inequalities felt by an individual, the higher 
the chance that individual will act. Moving from the individual level to 
the group level, a group with a higher average action pressure will have a 
greater probability of acting in response to those accumulated inequities. 
The Ethnic Competition Theory asserts that when groups are mixed 
and competing for the same limited resources violent conflict has a higher 
probability of erupting. The PMT disagrees with this conclusion. When 
ethnic groups compete for the same resources on a local level, mixing of 
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the ethnic groups occurs. That is, they interact with each other to a 
much greater extent than they would were they separate ( Jenkins 1986; 
cf Belanger and Pinard 1991 ). This increased interaction decreases the 
probability that like-minded individuals with higher than average action 
pressures will come together. Thus, while small numbers of individuals may 
have high action pressures in the Ethnic Competition Theory, they are less 
likely to form a group. The actions performed to reduce the pressure to 
act will tend to be individual actions and not group actions. Furthermore, 
increased mixing of ethnic groups dilutes the total pressure of action. With­
out the close aggregation of similar individuals with high action pressures, a 
conflict campaign has a much lower probability of starting. This conclusion 
is in agreement with Galam {2003) and others (Crenshaw 1981; Douglass 
and Zulaika 1990; Funes 1998; Ross 1993) , who demonstrate that terrorist 
groups (or any illicit group, for that matter) require large contiguous areas 
of support to operate. 
This is not to say that neighborhoods are too small to create such 
groups. On the contrary, the evidence is quite clear that neighborhoods 
are of sufficient size to allow clustering to occur. The Troubles of North­
ern Ireland centered on the ethnic neighborhoods - both Protestant and 
Catholic. The parades of the Orange Order and their associated groups 
purposely wended their way through the Catholic neighborhoods of Porta­
down, Londonderry, and Belfast ( Coogan 2002) . 
The Ethnic Segregation Theory holds that separating ethnic groups in­
creases the chance of violent action between them (Friedrichs 1998; Hechter 
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1 978; Medrano 1994) .  The Pressure Model of Terrorism supports this as­
sertion. Concentrating an ethnic group allows any action pressure to be 
common to the entire group. Thus, if one member has a high pressure to 
act as a result of some inequality, there is a much higher likelihood that 
many around him do as well. Thus, the entire region will tend to have a 
higher action pressure. Regions with higher action pressures tend to be 
more conflict-prone. 
Relative Deprivation. Gurr (1970) explains that the primary reason 
men rebel is that they perceive an increasing difference between what they 
have and what they think they deserve.6 This is moderated or exacerbated 
through the salience level of the issue. Issues closer to the core of the 
person have a higher salience than those further away. Thus, incursions 
on a person's religion have a higher salience in much of the world than do 
incursions on driving rights. Support for this comes from the fact that no 
terrorist organization has yet to be founded on a call for driving rights, 
yet there are many who call for religious freedom for themselves ( or a 
crusade against others) .  Furthermore, according to Gurr, this increasing 
difference between expected and actual is all that counts, not what causes 
the difference to increase. Using the terms of the PMT, relative deprivation 
increases action pressure. The difference between the expected levels and 
the real levels directly correspond to the pressure a person feels to act to 
reduce the level. The salience of the issue acts as a multiplier in that highly 
6The theory of relative deprivation did not begin with Gurr, however. Davis {1959} 
and Runciman { 1966} both based their earlier work on Stouffer, et al. {1950} ,  which 
was an in-depth examination of the effects of entering the Army from civilian life. 
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salie�t issues are more effective at increasing the pressure, while less salient 
issues require a much higher relative difference to effect a change. 
4.3 .2 State-Level Consequences 
Democracies. One of the paradoxes about current research is that democ­
racies are supposed to both have lower rates of terrorism than autocracies 
and higher rates of terrorism than autocracies. Democracies are to have 
lower levels of terrorism than autocracies because there are many other 
options for change in society than violent action. The Social Contract and 
the Rule of Law also retard violent actions in a democracy, as does polit­
ical socialization. 7 Democracies are also supposed to have higher levels of 
terrorism than non-democracies because democracies are more open, thus 
allowing for terrorist groups to freely travel through the state, and because 
democracies are less likely to be able to fully suppress a terrorist group 
because of democratic norms and structures in the state (Gurr 1988, 1990; 
Ross 1993). 
The Pressure Model of Terrorism allows for and explains these conflict­
ing tendencies in democracies while keeping the actions tied to the actors. 
The democracy in itself does not increase the level of action pressure. It 
only affects the cost-benefit calculus taken by the individuals. The demo­
cratic judicial structures of the state reduce the cost of action because the 
7Crenshaw (1981} and others (Gurr 1979, 1988, 1990; Ross 1993; Turk 1982} note 
this pacifistic effect of democracies, yet they conclude that democracies should still have 
higher levels of terrorism within its boundaries. 
98 
state follows a set of well-defined procedures resulting in a well-known up­per penalty for the action. The highest penalty in a liberal democracy is the loss of an individual life. Autocracies can inflict much higher levels of punishment, including communal capital punishment. Saddam Hus­sein's chemical action against the Kurds and the Shi'ites demonstrates this clearly as do the bulldozer responses of Israel against the Palestinian sui­cide bombers (Pape 2005).8 Higher costs to action require a higher action pressure before actions seem cost effective. 
The openness of a liberal democracy also allows for those individuals with higher levels of action pressure to find each other more easily, thus possibly creating a localized region of high pressure. Repressive autoc­racies can either keep their citizens from interacting to any great degree, thus directly restricting freedom of association, or they can seed the pop­ulation with government informers, thus indirectly restricting freedom of association through a chilling action. According to the model, freedom of association is a positive correlation to terrorist activity, as found in lib­eral democracies (Bueno de Mesquita 2005a). However, so are inefficient restrictions on it, such as found in anocracies. Strong, highly organized autocratic regimes can effectively keep domestic terror cells from forming. Democracies and anocracies cannot (Crenshaw 1981 ; Galam 2003; Ross 1993). 
8While the example of Israel does seem to contradict the assertion that liberal democ­
racies cannot impose communal punishment, the categorization of Israel as a liberal 
democracy is problematic. While they are a liberal democracy within Israel proper, the 
occupation of the Palestinian territories is not within the tradition of liberal democracies 
(Pape 2005). 
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Any healthy political system has mechanisms in place for interest ag­
gregation (Almond 1 95 8, 1966; Shambaugh 1996) .  The political openness 
of democracies allows for interest groups and political parties to serve this 
function. In fact, in the state with the highest level of terrorism, interest 
groups flourish. 9 How does the PMT explain this paradox? Quite simply 
these interest groups serve to unite those with similar positions in society. 
That is, they allow those feeling high pressure to act to come together, thus 
increasing the regional level of pressure. 10 Higher levels of regional pressure 
lead to higher probabilities of violent conflict. Thus, while it appears that 
interest groups and political parties serve as retardants on violent conflict, 
that is only true for as long as they are able to reduce the action pressure 
on the individuals within the group. Thus, an interest group that fails to 
get any of its most salient problems resolved has a much higher chance of 
resorting to terrorism. 
Furthermore, should the action pressure gradient within the group be­
come great enough, i.e. the differences between two factions within the 
group increase to too great a level, a schism may occur. Such splits result 
in two internally-cohesive groups, one using legal-political means to achieve 
their goals, the other using illicit-extra-political means. This has been ob­
served (Douglass and Zulaika 1 990; Lacquer 1 97 7 ; Ross 1 991 ; Weinberg 
1 991) .  Such a split has been seen in the reactions of Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad in response to Israel's overtures toward the PLO (Bueno de Mesquita 
9That would be the United States. 
10While the term "region" refers to a group of people connected in some manner, the 
geographical definition of region remains the most important factor. However, with the 
increasing importance of the Internet, virtual connections will become more important 
in the future. We are already seeing evidence of this (Galam 2003). 
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2005a) . Such a split also occurred at the start of The Troubles in Northern 
Ireland. The membership of the "Official" ( or "Original" ) IRA felt differ­
ent amounts of pressure to act. When the leadership of the IRA failed to 
act in a manner consistent with the wishes of several members, those mem­
bers split off in 1969 to form their own group - the Provisional IRA. It is 
also evident that the split had more than just a passing influence on the 
latter group's move towards terrorism {Coogan 2002; Feeney 2002; Murray 
and Tonge 2005). 11  
For this reason, the creation of a political party out of a terrorist or­
ganization may actually increase the violence of the terrorist organization, 
rather than decrease it, as the schism removes the more moderate faction 
from the group. 12 A similar result would naturally occur when the state 
uses a conciliation strategy; those more prone to use the political process 
would accept the offer, whereas the more extreme element would reject it 
out of hand, thus creating a political schism and a group more intent on 
using terror {Bueno de Mesquita 2005a). 
Thus, while democracies do not, per se, increase the action pressure on 
a group, the structures in a democracy reduce the cost of the associated 
1 1  Furthermore, two additional splinterings occurred in IRA history. The Continuity 
IRA and the Real IRA both splintered from the Provisional IRA. The Continuity IRA 
formed in 1994 as a response to the Provisional IRA entering into a ceasefire with the 
British. The Real IRA formed in 1998 as a reaction to the Provisional IRA entering 
into the negotiations that resulted in the Good Friday Accords of 1998. Both of these 
two splinter factions were more violent than the Provisional IRA of the time ( Coogan 
2002; Feeney 2002; O'Ballance 1981; Stevenson 1996). 
12For a general exploration of these effects already in the literature, see Weinberg 
(1991). For specific examples, see Coogan (2002) for the Catholics of Northern Ireland, 
Jenkins (1986) for the Jurassiens of Switzerland and Douglass and Zulaika ( 1990) for 
the Basques of Spain. 
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Table 4.1: Cross tabulation of regime type vs. incidence of terrorism in Western Europe, 1945-2000. 
democracy mid-realm autocracy total terrorism that year 78 26 23 127 (4 .5) (1.5) (1.7) no terrorism that year 1656 1720 1343 4719 
(95.5) (98.5) (98.3) total state-years 1734 1746 1366 4846 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent column percents. Democracies are significantly more prone to outbreaks of terrorism than the other two types of regimes (x2 = 37.41; dF = 2; p � 0.001). The regime type data is from Polity IV (v2002), whereas the terrorism data is from Minorities at Risk (vl .03). Regimes are democracies if they score +6 or higher on the POLITY2 variable; autocracies, -6 or lower; and mid-realm, between -5 and 5, inclusive. 
action. It is this reduced cost that explains why democracies have a higher incidence rate of terrorist acts than other regime types (Table 4.1). 
4.3 .3 System-Level Effects 
Globalization. What effects should globalization have on terrorism propen­sity according to the Pressure Model of Terrorism? Where democratic structures and norms only reduced the costs associated with action, glob­alization both raises the action pressure and reduces the associated costs. It increases the pressure to act by increasing apparent economic inequali­ties, employment stresses, and cultural and religious pressures. It reduces costs by increasing the flow of ideas, persons, and money. Why? 
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Globalization is the increase of linkages between sub-state and non­
state actors (Cha 2000).13 It is not an event, but a trend. Some liken it 
to medievalism, in that state sovereignty is no longer an absolute and that 
overlapping domains of dominion and spheres of suzerainty exist (Kobrin 
1998) . The primary effect of globalization is change. People are faced with 
new ideas. They must deal with new employment emphases. They must 
confront new incursions into their core (Kellner 2002). The state is unable 
to fully moderate these incursions as another effect of globalization is the 
flattening of the state system, That is, the number of institutions between 
the individual and the system are effectively reduced, thus the state is 
unable to shield the individual from the vagaries of the world (Farazmand 
1999). 
For economists, globalization is the process by which the goal of a 
completely integrated world market is achieved. It is driven by private 
interests, not state actors (Julius 1997). The effect on the state and its 
citizens vary depending on the costs of integration and the wealth of the 
state. When integration costs are high, that is when the costs of trans­
porting manufactured goods across state borders are high; each state has 
extensive manufacturing and industry to meet domestic needs. A utarky 
is possible in this stage. At a certain critical transportation cost, how­
ever, a core-periphery system forms. Those states at the periphery suffer 
a decline in manufacturing production because they are unable to reduce 
their transportation costs to compete with those states at the core. Core 
states flourish because they are capable of transporting cheaply enough 
13Interdependence, on the other hand, is the increase in linkages between state actors. 
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to overcome their (possibly) higher manufacturing costs to economically compete with periphery states. Reducing the transportation costs further inverts this; extremely low transportation costs allow the poorer states to compete in a more favorable environment, 14 thus resulting in manufactur­ing and employment losses for the core states ( Axford 1995 ; Krugman and Venables 1995). Evidence of this third stage of globalization is clear. The cun:ent trend in outsourcing American jobs to third-world countries is a result of inexpensive transportation costs. Transportation does not neces­sarily refer to physically transporting an item from one place to another. It also refers to the virtual transportation of goods and services. 15  
That is globalization. That also explains why it increases the stress on individuals. During the second phase, the wealth gap between the periphery and the core increases. During the third phase, the core states lose their market share. Thus, in both stages states feel economic pressures. 
What does the PMT say about globalization? If the state feels economic pressure, so too does its citizens. According to the theory, should that pressure be distributed unif ormly across the citizens, not much will happen. The citizens may call for the ouster of the current leadership. They may protest the unequal distribution of wealth in the world. But, as there are no pockets of intense action pressure, terrorism will not occur. 16 
14The periphery states' very low manufacturing costs are primarily due to low ambient 
income levels in the states. 
150utsourcing computer support calls to India is an example of virtual transportation. 
16If, however, the core-periphery income divide becomes too extreme, large pockets of 
high action pressure form in opposition to the state system. As this research concerns 
itself only with ethnic terrorism against states, this is beyond the scope of this work. 
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However, if certain identifiable groups receive the lion's share of the 
pressure, they will likely act. When those identifiable groups are an iden­
tifiable ethnic group, this economic stress will be identified as a "concrete 
grievance" against the state ( Crenshaw 1981) . Such evidence comes from 
Latin America scholars who correlated economic trends with increased 
state instability and political violence (Booth 1991; Jenkins and Bond 
2001; Lindenberg 1990) . However, this finding is not merely a feature of 
Latin American political systems; economic stress, especially when it oc­
curs along ethnic lines, is a major factor in causing terrorism (Krippendorff 
1979) . 
The history of Sardinian independence demonstrates this point well. 
The history of the unification of Italy was the story of the prosperous north 
repressing the impoverished south - Sardinia included (Gooch 2001) . 
Thus, even though the Italian state offered Sardinia industry and man­
ufacturing enterprises upon which to found the economic strength of Italy, 
those industries were environmentally dangerous, those manufacturing jobs 
were always fewer than promised, and the profits from those businesses 
went to continental Italy - not insular Sardinia. The result of this disil­
lusionment with capitalist Italy was the growing connection between the 
Sardinian separatists and the socialist Red Brigades in the 1970s. The 
result was a short-lived campaign of terror in Sardinia during the years 
1977-78 (Krippendorff 1979) .  The Sardinian example demonstrates eco­
nomic differentials between one identifiable group and a second can serve 
as a catalyst for violent action. 
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Thus, the effects of globalization on the individual both increase �he action pressures felt and decrease the costs of acting. The increases come from changes to the economic structure, increases in unemployment, and cultural pressures. The decreases come from open borders allowing funds, weapons, and people to be easily transferred. 
4.4 Chapt�r Summary 
This chapter formulated the Pressure Model of Terrorism and explored some of its consequences vis-a-vis the existing literature. Quite simply, the model is a rational choice model containing a mechanism to explain the actions of the aggregating levels - group, state, and system - in terms of the individual level. In other words, while other researchers have provided rationale as to what affects the probability of terrorism at the different levels, this model ties them all together in a simpler manner, while providing predictions that go beyond what we already have. 
The basis of the model is the pressure of action felt by the individual. A higher action pressure produces a greater cost of not acting, which in­creases the probability of the individual acting. The pressure created in a person depends on the salience of the stimuli and the coherence of multiple stimuli. Stimuli add vectorially ; that is, stimuli pressuring along the same dimension sum. Those acting in opposing directions or in other directions do not. 
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The group is, in many ways, the individual writ large. Group actions 
are due to individual actions. When the average action pressure in a group 
exceeds the costs of acting, the group will act as a whole. This fact, in itself, 
produces two results. First, when a group splits, if there is a correlation 
between individual action pressure ( what rational choice modelers call the 
individual's ideal point) and the group in which that individual ends up 
( what is termed the action point of the group), the result will be one 
moderate group and one extreme group - a higher probability of terrorist 
action. The schism between the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA 
reflect this. 1 7 
The effects of the state' s regime type (state level) and the effects of the 
current trend of globalization (system level) become more apparent when 
examined at the individual level. According to the PMT, democracies 
should have higher levels of terrorist activities than non-democracies for 
two reasons: democracies reduce the cost of action, primarily through their 
devotion to the Rule of Law; and democracies have institutionalized ways 
in which individuals can freely associate, thus allowing a greater ability for 
like-minded individuals to congregate. 
Globalization both increases the pressure on the individual and de­
creases many of the associated costs of acting. Employment, economic, 
and ethnic stress all increase the pressure to act, while open borders allow 
groups and funds to meet each other. 
170ther examples of a similar phenomenon include the partitioning of the Jurassien 
partisans into three different groups (FD, RJ, and FLJ), the 'political to extra-political' 
movements (and back again) of the ETA, and the effects of the creation of the Sendero 
Luminoso on the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). 
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The Pressure Model of Terrorism provides the mechanism for how causes at one level of analysis affect behaviors at another. Specifically, it provides a path of action between the individual level and the aggregate levels. Where this chapter laid out the model, the next chapter proposes several testable hypotheses from this chapter 's discussion and tests those hypotheses. In Chapter Six, I will actually test those propositions created as a result of the Pressure Model of Terrorism. 
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Chapter 5 
Hypotheses , Methods, Data, 
and Statist ical Models 
The effort to  understand the 
universe is one of the very few 
things that lifts human life a 
little above the level of farce, 
and gives it some of the grace of 
tragedy. 
Steven Weinberg 
THE previous chapter presented the Pressure Model of Terrorism as an 
explanation of the linkages between the four levels of analysis, showing 
how the effects at the aggregate levels are due to the factors affecting the 
individual level. The previous chapter also briefly sketched a few scientific 
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( in the Popperian sense) hypotheses. 1 This chapter specifically presents 
those hypotheses with their underlying logic of justification. This model 
relies on previous studies of the individual level explicitly. I assume that 
the previous research is appropriate. Thus, this model bases its hypotheses 
on those previous finding. Hypotheses in each of the other three levels are 
presented in this chapter. 
However,  while the hypotheses are a logical result of the theory, they 
still must be tested. This analysis necessitates gathering data and utiliz­
ing appropriate statistical methods to glean the needed results. The re­
mainder of this chapter deals with the difficulties inherent in this analysis. 
These difficulties categorize themselves into data dilemmas and statistical 
predicaments. The former deal with idiosyncratic problems concerning the 
datasets chosen. These include partial datasets, overlapping measures, and 
proxy variables. The latter deal with determining which statistical model 
is most appropriate in this sphere, and, in the absence of a clearly supe­
rior model, establishing appropriate solutions. At first blush, event history 
analysis would seem the perfect statistical model for this data structure. 
However, there are enough unmet assumptions that another method must 
be used. Using several quasi-appropriate methods produces results that 
are more robust - and that is the fundamental goal of research. 
1 According to Karl Popper, a hypothesis is scientific if it is falsifiable (testable), 
empirical (measurable), and non-specific (Popper 1959). 
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5 . 1 Hypotheses and Rationale 
5. 1 . 1  Group Level 
Ethnic concentration. The two competing theories are Ethnic Concen­
tration and Ethnic Segregation (Medrano 1994) . The Pressure Model of 
Terrorism supports the latter theory. A greater level of compactness cre­
ates a greater feeling of unity within the group. It also allows those with 
similar goals and identities to congregate and become an identity . .  Both of 
these cause a greater chance for the ethnic group to unite to fight for in­
dependence. Nations with a small population density or nations that have 
been diluted by state encouragement for mobility will be less able to pull 
themselves together as a cohesive unit. Nations with a large concentration 
of members will also more easily define themselves as a part of that nation. 
The dichotomous MAR 2 variable GC2 measures whether or not the group 
is spatially contiguous (Davenport 2003).3 
Ha1 : Regionally compact groups will have a higher likelihood of using 
terrorism. 
2For the sake of brevity, all variables taken from the Minorities at Risk dataset 
using MARGene vl .03, are labeled by their Minorities at Risk variable name and the 
abbreviation MAR. 
3Specifically, GC2 measures if "a spatially contiguous region larger than an urban 
area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in 
which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population" is present 
(Davenport 2003: 16). A '1 '  indicates yes, while a '2' indicates no. Recoding this vari­
able to a dichotomous �1 variable measuring compactness {'1' indicates compactness, 
'O' indicates no compactness) made interpretation more intuitive. 
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Relative deprivation. Gurr (1970) hypothesized that men rebel because 
of relative deprivation - the difference between what a person believes 
he or she deserves and what he or she actually receives. For purposes of 
this research, relative deprivation will be measured in terms of economic 
differentials between the ethnic group and the state at large. 
One way of measuring this is to find the actual average incomes for the 
state and for the nation, and then com pare them. However, this is quite 
problematic; such information is rarely available for even the most indus­
trialized countries, and even more rarely for the lesser-developed countries. 
The MAR variable ECDIFXX measures the economic differential between 
the minority group and the state (Davenport 2003). Possible values for 
the ECDIFXX variable range from -2 (a strong economic advantage) to 4 
( an extreme economic disadvantage). According to extant theory, a value 
further from O indicates a greater probability towards using terrorist tac­
tics for two reasons: a greater disparity causes a greater division between 
the nation and the state, and a greater disparity indicates the nation is 
either disadvantaged ( and thus probably feeling repressed) or advantaged 
( and thus feeling as though they are 'carrying' the rest of the state) ( Cren­
shaw 1981). However, even though the literature does not specify that 
economically disadvantaged groups are more likely to use violence than 
economically advantaged groups, the Pressure Model of Terrorism does. 
Groups discriminated against feel the pressure to act to right this wrong. 
Economically advantaged groups will only rise up when their advantages 
are threatened. 
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Ha2 : Groups that are economically disadvantaged will have a higher like­
lihood of resorting to terrorism. 
Ha3 : Groups that lose their economic advantages will have a higher like­
lihood of resorting to terrorism. 
Ethnic definition. One necessary aspect of the group that makes it a 
group are the differences between ' it' and the 'other' (Mellor 1989) . These 
difference do not even have to be real; perceived differences are sufficient 
to create a feeling of 'out-group-ness'. As every group in this study is 
already determined to be  a group, either in reality or merely in perception, 
this may be  superfluous. However, MAR allows a measurement beyond a 
simple dichotomous variable. It measures the distance between the group's 
and the state's customs. A separate set of customs is a strong aspect 
of belonging. Those individuals with a set of common customs tend to 
identify themselves as belonging to a group (Mellor 1989) . The MAR 
variable ETHDIFXX measures both the strength of the ethnic group's 
cultural identity and the degree of difference between it and the state. 
Possible values range from O to 10, with O indicating no difference, and 
10 indicating a significant difference in language, custom, beliefs, and race 
(Davenport 2003) . 
Ha4 : Groups with a culture more separate from the containing state will 
have a higher likelihood of using terrorism. 
Prior use of terror. It seems obvious that a group who had used ter­
rorist tactics in the past would be more highly predisposed to using them 
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in the future. However, how does this fit in the model? Prior use of ter­rorism will either reduce the cost of a new use of terrorism or increase the action pressure. It will reduce the cost if the organizational structure still exists or if the individuals involved had committed the past action. That is, there would be no need to recreate the necessary contacts to get the terrorism materiel. Also, the line between not-killing and killing will have already been breeched by those certain individuals. The Thanatos instinct will already be active and prominent for them (Guggenbiihl-Craig 2002). The way in which previous terrorism use increases action pressure is if the past, and the past's heroes, can be used as paragons. "Michael Collins stood up for the Irish against the British overlords using terrorism," one can hear the Continuity IRA recruiter say ; "It is time for us to follow in his illustrious footsteps." 
Ha5 : Ethnic groups with a history of using terrorism will have a higher likelihood of using it again. 
5 . 1 . 2  State Level 
Level of democracy. While the current literature seems rather contradictory on this aspect, the Pressure Model of Terrorism clarifies the conflicting roles state democracy plays. Succinctly, democracies do not increase the action pressure, they only reduce the action costs. Thus, there is an effect based on both the bare fact that the state is a democracy and the level of structural democracy in the state. 
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Testing both of these statements at once is not as difficult as first ap­
pears. Five variables are used to test these hypotheses. All five come from 
the Polity IV dataset, which provides an aggregate measure of the level 
of system democracy in the state based on three component indicators: 
competitiveness of political participation, openness and competition of ex­
ecutive recruitment, and the constraints on the chief executive (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2002: 13). This is not a measure of democratic norms within 
the state, nor is it a measure of personal liberties. It is a measure of how 
democratic the structures of the state are. The first three variables used 
are dichotomous variables indicating whether the state is democratic ( +6 
or greater on the PO LITY2 variable in the Polity IV dataset), autocratic 
(-6 or less), or other (Hegre 2000; Jaggers and Gurr 1995;  Marshall and 
Jaggers 2002).4 The fourth variable is the level of democratic structures in 
the regime. 
With this formulation, it is expected that the democracy dichotomous 
variable will have a negative coefficient with respect to autocracy (in agree­
ment with Benoit 1996), while the level of democracy should have a positive 
coefficient. This indicates that democracies, ceteris paribus, should have a 
lower level of terrorism simply because they are democracies; however, a 
greater level of democracy within the democratic state - i.e., the greater 
4The normal convention, at least according to the Polity project, is to term those 
states which are neither democratic nor autocratic as anocratic (Marshall and Jaggers 
2002). There is some question as to whether this is appropriate, as anocratic states 
are defined in the literature as having little or no structure, as incoherent regimes 
(Davenport 1999; Eckstein and Gurr 1975; Zanger 2000). Some of these states, however, 
have lasted several decades without appreciable shift. Japan, South Africa, and Liberia 
all remained in this scoring region for seven decades each. I prefer to term them either as 
'other' or as 'middle realm' states. Neither of these terms caries with it any preconceived 
notion about those states other than that they are neither democratic nor autocratic. 
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the number of democratic institutions a state possesses - should produce 
a higher chance of terrorism within the state. That is, while a democratic 
state has a lower chance of spawning a terrorist group, all things being 
equal, once a group starts, the more democratic state is less able to stop 
the terrorism. 
Furthermore, a change in the level of democracy in the state should 
also be a harbinger of increased terrorist activity. Crenshaw (1981) notes 
that when democratic states crack down on the terrorist groups, they are 
exposing themselves as being not as democratic as they purport to be. 
This lowers the legitimacy of the state and may raise the legitimacy of the 
group. 
Hs1 : Groups existing in a democracy will have a lower likelihood of using 
terrorism. 
H82 : Groups existing in a state with a higher level of democracy will have 
a higher likelihood of using terrorism. 
Hs3 : Groups existing in democratic states moving away from democracy 
will have a higher likelihood of using terrorism. 
Economic strength. Poor states have problems controlling their terri­
tories. Wealthier states have a more content population (Gurr 1993) . The 
first suggests that poor states impose lower action costs on their citizens. 
The second suggests that wealthier states tend to have lower action pres­
sure because their citizens are comfortable with their station in life. If we 
measure state wealth using GDP per capita, we can expect states with a 
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lower GDP per capita will have a higher probability of having an ethnic 
group become a terrorist group. Thus, citizens in a state with decreasing 
GDP per capita will have a higher pressure to change this, perhaps by 
becoming terrorist to bring about regime change. 
H84 : Groups existing in states with a decreasing GDP per capita will have 
a higher likelihood of using terrorism. 
Urban level. Cities offer two things that terrorists need: a recruit­
ment base and targets. Large urban centers tend to contain the poor, the 
downtrodden, and the frustrated (Conley 1999; Ehrlich and Liu 2002 ;  Ross 
1993). These people have high pressure to act, thus urbanization should be 
positively correlated with terrorism propensity. Urban centers also contain 
targets: office buildings, national museums, and people (Wilkinson 197 7) .  
For this reason, too, level of urbanity should be positively correlated with 
terrorism. 
H85 : A greater level of urbanization in a state increases the probability 
that a group will resort to terrorism. 
Unemployment and the adolescent: According to the Pressure Model of 
Terrorism, those who .are unemployed suffer from an increased action pres­
sure to right their condition. However, it would not be the unemployment 
rate, per se, that increases the action pressure, it would be the increas­
ing of the unemployment rates. Humans are very adept at adapting to 
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their surroundings, including economic hardships. 5 Furthermore, different states seem to have different 'background' unemployment levels. For ex­ample, the current 10% unemployment level in Spain is definitely tolerable for the Spanish as their average rate over the past decade is slightly above this figure. However, that same unemployment rate in Zambia would be a welcome respite against their current 50% rate, and it would be deves­
tating to the United States, where it would constitute a doubling of the current unemployment rate ( CIA 2005). Thus, it is not the current level of hardships, that really matter. however, when those hardships increase, humans feel the pressure to right the situation (Wiley 1992). 
H86 : Increasing unemployment rates positively correlate with terrorism rates. 
Finally, as explained earlier, the youth, especially young males, are especially prone to violence. This is due to many reasons, including imma­turity, high stress levels, lack of economic equality, and biological pressures. The age group most at risk of these pressures is the 15-24-year-old group (Hagan and Foster 2001). The youth form a pool from which action pres­sure can grow. As such, the youth percentage is the variable of interest, not the change. 
Hs7 : Higher rate of the youth (15-24) in a state positively correlates with higher probabilities of terrorism. 
5Nietzsche posited the existence of two motivating forces in us: a will to power and 
a will to survive. It is this will to survive that allows animals (including humans) to 
adapt to environmental circumstances easily (Norris 1980). 
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5 . 1 .3 System Level 
Globalization. Of all the concepts presented herein, globalization is the most difficult with which to deal. There is no single specific definition to use. There are no long term <:1atasets of which to avail myself. 6 Both of these present prominent obstacles. Thus, I must determine a fair proxy measure for globalization. Such a measure must be increasing. It should also increase at an increasing rate. As my globalization proxy, I chose to use total trade in the state. This proxy is reasonable for two reasons. First, it meets the functional form required above. Second, globalization is first, and foremost, a trade-driven process. Thus, the correlation between trade and globalization should be extremely high (Julius 1997; Krugman and Venables 1995). 
Hn : Higher levels of globalization in the state produce higher probabilities of terrorism. 
5 . 1 .4 Terrorism 
Dependent variable : The final variable in need of operationalization is the dependent variable, terrorism. The Minorities at Risk project variable REB measures the highest level of violent protest in a nation during the specified year, unfortunately it only is coded from 1990 onward. The MAR project also has the variable REBEL, coded back to 1945; unfortunately, it is only coded every five years. However, the value recorded is the highest level of 
6The most promising globalization dataset, A. T. Kearney, only has indicators going 
back to 1995 and full indices going back to 2003. 
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rebellion during those five years. Thus, REBEL values O and 1 indicate 
no terrorism campaign took place during that five-year period (Davenport 
2003). Any other REBEL value indicates a campaign could have taken 
place. Furthermore, as the MAR definition of terrorism is more liberal 
and inclusive than the one I used, relying on the REBEL variable to help 
narrow down the years I had to examine would not introduce error. 7 
For each five-year span with a REBEL value greater than 1, I examined 
newspaper reports, performed Lexis-Nexis searches, explored Keesing's 
Record of World Events, parsed the International Crisis Behavior dataset, 
and culled the necessary information from region-specific history books to 
determine if a terror campaign, as defined in this research, actually did 
occur for each of those five years and, if so, when. 
5 .2  Full Model Equation 
!(Yi) = /Jo 
+ /J1 X TERROR_PRE 
+ /J2 X YOUTHPCT 
+ /33 X GROUPCONC 
+ /34 X ECONEG 
+ /Js X ETHDIFXX 
+ /Js X DEMOC 
7 According to private correspondence with Graduate Assistant Carter Johnson, the 
MAR project defines terrorism as violence that at least partially targets civilians. 
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+ /37 X �DEMOC 
+ f3s X TRADE 
+ /39 X URBANPCT 
+ /310 X �UMEMPRT 
+ /31 1 X �GDPCAP 
+ f 
5 .3  Statistical Concerns 
The following section deals with statistical concerns, including the sources 
of the datasets employed, the problem of different temporal domains for 
the datasets, the merging of two trade datasets, and the statistical models 
utilized in the test. 
5.3. 1 Datasets Used 
The Minorities at Risk dataset (2002) provides information on politically 
active communal groups with populations in excess of 100,000 or in excess 
of 1 % of the state's population. The current number of such groups in 
Western Europe is 13. However, as this research only examines ethnona­
tional groups, the Roma must be excluded from the list. And, as they are 
minority groups in three separate states (France, Spain, and Italy) ; this 
reduces the number of examined groups to 10. 
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The Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) project focuses on the state, 
not the ethnic groups, with the primary focus being the formal structure 
of the government, specifically the numbers and levels of democratic and 
authoritarian structures in the state. While the proponents of the demo­
cratic peace thesis split their emphasis between the importance of demo­
cratic structures and of democratic norms, this research must focus on the 
structures. The Freedom House dataset could have been used to measure 
level of freedom in the individual states, and thus indirectly the demo­
cratic norms in the state; however, it only covers the years 1972 through 
the present time. As such, too many degrees of freedom would have been 
lost. 
The remainder of the dataset uses data from several sources. The World 
Bank (2003) provides the economic data - the GDP in constant 1995 USD 
and the population figures. The United Nations (various years) provided 
the percent of people aged 15-24, and the urban percentage. The OECD 
(1 972, 1993, 2004) provides the unemployment data. Barbieri's Interna­
tional Trade Database ( 1996, 1998) provides the data on trade between 
1945 and 1992, while Eurostat (2005) provides trade figures for 1990-2000. 
It needs to be acknowledged that these data sources are all not primary 
data sources, either. The International Labor Organization (ILO) gave 
the unemployment numbers to the UN, while the ultimate sources of the 
population figures were the individual states. Moreover, the Minorities at 
Risk, Polity IV, and Barbieri 's data come from several sources. That is not 
to say that secondary sources are necessarily inferior to primary sources, 
but it does need to be acknowledged. Confidence in the MAR data and the 
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Polity IV data should generally be high, as they followed strict guidelines 
in creating the datasets specifically for the use of others.8 Barbieri created 
her dataset for her dissertation work at Binghamton University. Thus, the 
Barbieri trade data is slightly more suspect than the other data, but that 
matters little in this research as it is only used as a proxy variable for the 
level of globalization in the state. The ramifications are discussed further 
later. 
5 .3.2 Availability 
Unfortunately, not all of the data was fully available between the years 1945 
and 2000. Unemployment figures only go back to 1959, urban percent to 
1950, and GDP per capita to 1960. To solve this problem, three sets of 
models were run. The first included only those variables available to 1945. 
The second added urban population, thus restricting the temporal domain 
to 1950-2000. The third model added the change in GDP per capita and 
the change in the unemployment rate, resulting in restricting the temporal 
domain even more. Of the three models, even with the reduced time period, 
the last model should produce the best results, both in terms of significance 
and in terms of predictability. This is simply because the first two models 
suffer from specification bias. 
8While this may appear true on the surface, there are some inconsistencies in the 
Minorities at Risk coding, especially for the ethnic differentials index. In some cases, 
the differential for minority A in state B is different from the ethnic differential for 
minority B in state A. India and Pakistan quickly spring to mind. To account for these 
discrepancies, I examined the data closely to ensure that these problems did not exist 
in this subset of states. 
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5.3 .3 Data Interpolation 
Beyond abbreviated temporal domains, not all of the variables were per­
fectly dense. I used linear interpolation when either the time period be­
tween values was three years or less or the underlying variable was not 
expected to change significantly from year to year. Thus, percentage of 
youth was interpolated as was urban percentage. Other acts of interpo­
lation were taken by the individual agencies providing the data. Thus, 
the World Bank used population figures provided by the individual state 
census bureaus and interpolated them using a complex formula that took 
into consideration the actual census figures, the birth and death rates, and 
the migration rates. 
5.3.4 Trade Figures 
Data for total national trade comes from two sources, Barbieri's trade 
database ( 1945-1992) and Eurostat ( 1990-2000). The overlap allows the 
disparate trade measures to be used in conjunction. Calculating the aver­
age ratio between the datasets during the overlapping time period offers 
the most straightforward manner in which to join the datasets (Mallows 
and Vardi 1982). Figure 5.1 shows how Barbieri's trade data and the ratio­
adjusted Eurostat data compare. As the trade variable is solely acting as 
a proxy variable for globalization, it has external validity in this role, as 
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Figure 5.1: Comparison of Barbieri 's trade data with ratio-adjusted Euro­
stat data for the states under consideration. 
Notes : Comparison of mean annual trade in study states supports the 
contention that the ratio-adjusted Eurostat data are comparable. Ratio = 
1.25 8 x 109 ; Standard deviation of the ratio is 3. 60 x 107 (0.29%). 
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5 .3 .5  Statistical Models 
Two basic types of statistical models are often utilized in such research: bi­
nary dependent variable model and event history analysis. The first model 
uses the entire dataset, whereas the second only uses the information until 
the group initiates terrorism. The first uses calendar time, whereas event 
history analysis uses analysis time - the elapsed time between when the 
group became at risk and the current time. Thus, the piece of information 
of utmost importance is the timing of the trigger event. However, accord­
ing to the model, trigger events, while they may exist, are neither unique 
nor predictive. That is, it is impossible to tell before hand if an event is 
an actual trigger event. Thus, event history analysis cannot be fully used. 
Full Binary Dependent Variable Mode ls. Binary dependent variable 
(BDV) models use the entire dataset, including those years after a group 
uses terrorism. To achieve a greater degree of accuracy, I used a population­
averaged panel data generalized estimation equation model. The family 
and link functions for the logit model were the standard binomial and 
logit for the logit model ( the canonical link for the binomial family), bi­
nomial and probit for the probit model, and binomial and complementary 
log-log for the complementary log-log model. The use of GEE over a stan­
dard time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) generalized linear model (GLM) 
logit or probit is that it allows one a freer hand in choosing the corre­
lation structure.9 For all three models, independent, exchangeable, and 
9The generalized estimation equation (GEE) methods also do not make the same 
as.sumptions as do the generalized linear model ( GLM) methods. The GLM assumes 
independence among the records. GLM also assumes no correlation with the panels. 
The sandwich estimators only adjust the standard errors; they do not adjust the biased 
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autoregressive- I correlation structures were examined to determine which 
produced the best fit as determined by model significance. 10 In all three 
cases, the autoregressive-I correlation structure correction was expected 
to produce superior results, a priori, because of the inherent serial correla­
tion in many of the variables and because of the memory of human groups 
(Hardin and Hilbe 2003). 1 1  
Using three different BDV models that supposedly measure the same 
thing allows me to test their suitability as models. As logit and probit 
functions differ only in the thickness of their tails, they should produce 
similar statistical findings vis-a-vis direction and statistical significance ( see 
Figure 5. 2). The coefficients should differ by a factor of approximately 1. 70, 
as well. If not, then the applicability of the two symmetric models is called 
into question (Long and Freese 2003).  There is, however, no statistical test 
to determine how far from 1. 70 is too far. Furthermore, since both are 
symmetrical about ,\ = 0.50, events that rarely occur (such as terrorism) 
estimates of the coefficients. GEEs do not make these assumptions. Correlation within 
the panels and across the panels is easily managed, as it is a part of the estimating 
equation. GEEs are also robust to misspecification of the correlation matrix. Because 
of these reasons, the GEE is a better choice than the GLM (Hardin and Hilbe 2003). 
10 An unstructured correlation structure would have offered the best comparison, but 
the models would not converge under the unstructured structure as there were too many 
parameters to estimate with the size of the dataset. 
1 1  The three correlation structures for the model with all variables ( and years 1960-
2000} produced Wald x2 statistics of 288.268 (independent} ,  no convergence (exchange­
able} , and 2028.43 (ARl} for the logit ; 3907.34 (independent), no convergence (ex­
changeable} , and 6060.77 (ARl} for the probit; and 827.60 (independent), 53,340.83 
(exchangeable} , and 6386.82 (ARI} for the complementary log-log. In no cases did 
the unstructured correlation structure produce estimates due to divergence. Examining 
the correlation structure produced in each statistical model, it was obvious that there 
should be little difference between results using an independent structure and an ARl 
structure, because the first off-diagonal elements in the ARl structure were close to zero 
in all cases (logit: 0.0447; probit: 0.0203; complementary log-log: 0.0917). 
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the logit, probit, and complementary log-log graphs. 
Note: The horizontal scale for the logit curve is diminished by a factor of 1.65 to emphasize the similarities between the two curves. 
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will not be modeled well by either. The complementary log-log function is 
asymmetric; as such, it models rare-event data better than either the logit 
or the probit. As such, the complementary log-log function is the superior 
model for this data. 
Those familiar, even in passing, with ordinary least squares regression 
are also familiar with R 2 as a measure of predictive ability of the model. 
Unfortunately, there is no true R2 for any binary dependent variable mod­
els. In lieu of the R 2 , some authors use prediction accuracy. However, as 
shown by Hosmer and Lemeshow ( 1989), even properly specified models 
can score low on tests of accuracy. They proposed their own test based on 
deciles of risk categories. 
Were I looking to create a scoring index with a score over .,\ =  0.50 in­
dicating the group will use terrorism, this would be an appropriate method 
to assess model fit. There are two problems with this. First, there is no 
a priori reason to believe that the cutpoint, .,\, is 0. 50; the appropriate 
choice of the cutpoint is a function of the costs associated with false pos­
itives and true negatives which can be determined through a calibration 
process (Venkatraman and Begg 1996) . Second, since this model merely fo­
cuses on the effects of certain covariates on the propensity to use terrorism, 
determining the cutoff point is largely irrelevant. As such, a better solution 
is to fit a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (DeLong, DeLong 
and Clarke-Pearson 1988; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989) . The value of the 
area under the ROC curve is the probability that a group using terrorism 
scores higher on the test than a group that does not (Obuchowski 2003) . 
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In other words, the ROC curve shows how well the test reflects the factors 
that increase the probability of groups resorting to terrorism. 
Partial Binary Dependent Variable Models. There is a variant of the 
above statistical model that may also shed some light on the factors con­
tributing to terrorism. The partial model only uses the data prior to a 
group using terrorism. Thus, it better answers the question what caused 
the group to make the leap ( or to slide a bit more) . However, the main 
drawback to using such a model is the loss in degrees of freedom. 
5 .4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter started by laying out the hypotheses to be tested and the 
rationale behind them. Thirteen hypotheses were proposed ( as summarized 
in Table 5. 1). Each was designed to test the Pressure Model of Terrorism 
and its conclusions. After the hypotheses were presented, I provided the 
full model and a brief discussion of the datasets used in this research and 
certain problems encountered while using them. 
Finally, this chapter examined two types of binary dependent variable 
models to handle the data. The full binary dependent variable model is 
a simple logit-type model that uses the entire dataset to calculate the 
estimates of the coefficients. The partial binary dependent variable model 
is similar in form to the full model, but only examines the data until the 
group uses terrorism. In both cases, a logit, a probit, and a complementary 
log-log model will be run. This allows both a better determination of 
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Table 5.1: A schematic summary of the hypotheses proposed in this re­
search enterprise. 
Effect on 
Variable Probability of Terrorism 
Group Level: 
Group Concentration Increase 
Negative Economic Differentials Increase 
Changed Positive Economic Differential Increase 
Previous Use of Terrorism by Group Increase 
Ethnic Differentials Increase 
State Level: 
Democratic State 
Higher Level of Democracy in State 
Autocratization of a Democracy 
Decreasing GDP per capita of the State 
Urban Level 
Increasing Unemployment Rate 
Young Male Percent 
System Level: 










the suitability of the logit and probit, and a better determination of the 




The most exciting phrase to 
hear in science, the one that 
heralds new discoveries, is not 
'Eureka! ' (I found it !) , but 
'That's funny . . .  ' 
Isaac Asimov 
IN the first section of this chapter, I motivate my choice of statistical model. In the second section of this chapter, the initial results for all three models are presented. However, as the complementary log-log model is theoretically better able to model the terrorism events, it is used to explore the data. 
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6 . 1  Motivation 
Before we can delve into the results, two things must first be discussed in 
detail - the use of the complementary log-log link over the more popular 
logit and probit link functions, and the use of population-averaged general­
ized estimating equations (PA-GEE) over the more popular subject-specific 
generalized linear models. Both are issues of appropriateness to the data 
and to the questions at hand. 
The logit is the popular link function of the social sciences. This is 
due to a combination of two factors - relative ease of interpretation and 
tradition. The actual formula for the logit link function is T/ = ln(,B'x / (1 
- ,B'x) ) .  In other words, the logit is just the logarithm of the odds-ratio for 
the probability of an event occurring to the probability of the event not 
occurring. Thus, the exponential of the coefficients estimated by a logit 
regression are interpreted as higher ( or lower) odds that the event will occur 
given an increase in the value if the covariate. Thus, interpretation of the 
coefficients is all but trivial, especially if one speaks of odds ratios or of the 
underlying metric as opposed to probabilities. Furthermore, interpretation 
is made easier when one realizes that the estimated coefficients of the logit 
regression correspond to the effects of the covariates; that is, a positive 
logit coefficient implies that increasing the value of the covariate results in 
an increased probability that the even will occur. 
The probit is the popular link function of the health and natural sci­
ences for about the same two reasons. The equation for the probit link is 
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rJ = 4>- 1 (/3'x), which is just the inverse Gaussian of the linear combina­
tion of the covariates with the coefficients estimated by the optimization 
routine. While the coefficients of a probit regression are not as easily inter­
preted as the logit coefficients, the fundamental interpretation remains the 
same. If the coefficient is positive, then increasing the covariate increases 
the probability that the event will occur. If the probit coefficient is nega­
tive, then the probability decreases as the covariate value increases . Both 
back-of-envelope interpretations are the same as that of the logit. 
These two also share something else in common - shape. Both the logit 
and the probit probability curves are of approximately the same shape 
( see Figure 6. 1) .  In fact, when the independent variable is scaled by a 
factor of 1. 65 for the logit, as was done in the graph (Figure 6. 1), the two 
curves are virtually indistinguishable. 1 Thus, one can, a priori, expect that 
separate logit and probit regressions should produce coefficient estimates 
and standard error estimates that differ by approximately 1. 65, with the 
logit coefficients being larger (Long 1997 ; Long and Freese 2003).2 
The logit and the probit also share one characteristic with many other 
probability distributions - they are point-symmetric. Being point-symmetric 
means many things, not the least of which is that the graph passes through 
the point {O, 0. 50) ; that is, when the linear combination of the covariates 
(/3'x) is zero, then the probability of the event occurring is 50 percent. It 
also means that the probability of a failure at {J'x is equal to the proba­
bility of a success at -/3'x. Furthermore, the rate of change in a success 
1To say that the logit is "fat in the tails," as is often done, is to imply that Paris 
Hilton is also fat in the tail. 
2In experience, this ratio tends to be close� to 1. 70 (Long and Freese 2003). 
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Figure 6. 1 :  Comparison plot of the logit curve vs. the pro bit curve. 
Note: The horizontal scale for the logit curve is diminished by a factor of 1.65 to emphasize the similarities between the two curves. 
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( or a failure) is also symmetric. Thus, when the researcher fits the data 
with a logit or a probit link function, they are assuming that the effects 
of the covariates are symmetric about the .,\ = 0. 50 mark, whether or not 
the data warrant such assumptions. If one wishes to model data in which 
successes or failure are comparatively infrequent, symmetric distributions 
must be avoided. This is as true for the logit and probit as for the Cauchy 
and other symmetric distributions - it is a function of the symmetry, not 
merely the link formula (Long and Freese 2003). 
Several asymmetric distributions exist. 3 To more properly model rare 
( or infrequent) event data, one should employ one of these link functions. 
While many such link functions exist, few are implemented in current sta­
tistical software packages, thus, while many would work, few are accessible 
to the researcher. The most popular distribution, as based on its imple­
mentation level, is the complementary log-log. The complementary log-log 
link function is 'f/ = ln(-ln(l - µ)) ,  where In is the natural logarithm func­
tion and µ is the expected value of the linear combination of the covariates 
- as before, µ = {3'x. 
As one can see from the graph (Figure 6.2) , the complementary log­
log function is asymmetric and does not pass through (0, 0.50) as do the 
logit and probit functions. In fact, the complementary log-log function 
produces a higher probability of success later than does either the logit 
or the probit. As a result, rare and infrequent events are better modeled 
using the complementary log-log function (King 1998; Long 1 997). 




. -·· -- Probit 
•' - - - Looit 
- - - -- - . - , . -· , .  � Complementary Log-Loo 
-10 -s 0 s 
Figure 6.2: Comparison plot of the logit/probit curves vs. the complemen­tary log-log curve. 
Note: The horizontal scale for the logit curve is diminished by a factor of 1 .65 to emphasize the similarities between the two curves. 
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In terms of interpretation, the strains imposed on the researcher using 
this link function are virtually non-existent. The coefficients are as inter­
pretable in a general sense as are those of the logit and the probit. The raw 
coefficients have exactly the same interpretation - a positive coefficient 
implies the probability that the event occurred increases with higher co­
variate values, and decreases with lower covariate values - the same as for 
the logit and probit links. The calculation of the probabilities proceeds as 
before, as well, with only the probability equation changing slightly. Where 
the probability function for the logit is 1r = exp(,B'x) / ( 1  + exp(,B'x)) and 
for the probit is 1r = <I>(,B'x) , the probability function associated with the 
complementary log-log is 1r = 1 - exp(-exp(,B'x)) .  In all cases, 1r = Pr(y 
= 1) as usual (Hardin and Hilbe 2003) .  
6. 1 . 1  Population-Averaged or Subject-Specific? 
The next issue is the use of a population-averaged model over the more cus­
tomary subject-specific models. The two primary types of subject-specific 
models are the fixed effects and the random effects models. The following 
discussion pulls heavily from Hardin and Hilbe { 2003) and Zorn (2001) .  
The fixed effects model comes in two essentially-equivalent forms - the 
conditional and the unconditional. The unconditional fixed effects model 
explicitly models the different intercepts for each of the groups by includ­
ing an indicator variable for each separate panel in the data set. For large 
numbers of panels, this results in a drastic reduction in the usable degrees 
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of freedom. The conditional fixed effects model utilizes a different likeli­
hood equation in the estimation process. The primary advantage is that 
there is no need to include an indicator variable for each panel, thus the 
loss in degrees of freedom is substantially less severe than under an un­
conditional fixed effects model. However, the common drawback to using 
any fixed effects model is its inability to successfully handle time invariant 
and rarely-changing covariates. In the case of time invariant covariates, 
the fixed effects model is unable to provide any coefficient estimates. The 
effects of those covariates are subsumed in the panel indicator variable. 
In the case of rarely-changing variables, the fixed effects model brutally 
inflates the estimated standard errors to the point that the coefficient es­
timates are of little value. As the proposed model has both time invariant 
and rarely-changing variables, the fixed effects model is an entirely inap­
propriate choice. 
The random effects model does not suffer from the same problems as 
do the fixed effects models. Both time-invariant and rarely-changing co­
variates are readily estimated using a random effects model. 4 However, 
the random effects model has two large drawbacks. First, it assumes that 
there is no correlation between the included covariates and the random 
intercept term. Second, as most random effects programs use quadrature 
to estimate the coefficients, the random effect model is especially sensitive 
to the number of quadrature points chosen (Hardin and Hilbe 2003). In 
4It is more appropriate to call this model a random intercept model, as only the 
intercept term is allowed to vary across panels. A full random effects model utilizes 
multi-level modeling (MLM) techniques. The �umptions for MLM are similar to 
those of the random coefficient model. The drawbacks to a full random effects multi­
level model are those of a random coefficient model plus application of those Maumptions 
to the several levels of the model. 
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the PMT model, the assumption of no correlation between the covariates 
�nd the random intercept is questionable. At the very least, it is an un­
necessary restriction to force on the model, as other methods are available. 
Second, the models I estimated using the random effects model were all 
sensitive to the number of quadrature points chosen. As such, it is hard to 
put too much faith in the results. 
The fixed and the random effects models also share one last common 
feature. As subject-specific models, they focus more on the panels than 
on the marginal effects of the covariates.5 In other words, subject-specific 
methods answer: "What is the effect of increasing covariate X in state 
Y on the probability of event T occurring in state Y?'' In other words, it 
compares within the state across years. The population-averaged approach 
examines the effects of the covariates across the panels across years. Thus, 
the question it answers is "What is the effect of increasing covariate X 
on the probability of event T occurring?" It focuses specifically on the 
marginal effects of the covariates (Hardin and Hilbe 2003) .  
Finally, before the statistical results can be discussed, it is necessary 
to discuss separation and quasi-separation. Complete separation occurs 
when the model is able to divide the data into two groups that perfectly 
match with reality. Quasi-complete separation occurs when the line of 
separation passes through data points belonging to two groups. The third 
5There is a further problem using subject-specific models, but only in the way in 
which they are implemented in current statistical packages. They are estimated using 
generalized linear models (GLM) as opposed to the more-general generalized estimating 
equations (GEE) . The former make the assumption that each observation is uncorrelated 
with any other observation in the dataset. The GEE allows for specific modeling of this 
correlation structure. As a result, the coefficients are not biased (Hardin and Hilbe 
2003; Liang and Zeger 1986) . 
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mutually exclusive and exhaustive condition is overlap. Separation, both 
complete and quasi-complete, causes severe problems with the iterative 
routines used to maximize the likelihood functions. As all three statistical 
models use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) routines, separation, if 
it exists in the data, would be a problem. There are two principal causes of 
separation. The first is micronumerosity - small-n datasets. The second 
is the existence of a perfect predictor variable ( or set of variables). The first 
can be solved by increasing the amount of data available for the analysis. 
The second is not a problem, per se, but it does constitute an annoyance 
for estimation (Albert and Anderson 1984;  Santner and Duffy 1986) . 
In this model, and for this data, the group concentration variable ex­
hibited evidence of complete separation. Those groups in this dataset that 
were not regionally concentrated did not resort to terrorism. Whether this 
finding holds in general or was merely an artifact of the current dataset, 
only further studies can determine. However, the fact remains that the 
separation issues must be dealt with. Simply removing the group concen­
tration variable from the model introduces severe specification bias. 6 Keep­
ing it in the model eliminates all chances that the model can be estimated. 
There are two solutions of which I am aware. The first uses a penalized 
likelihood correction to the standard binomial G LM score function instead 
of the traditional likelihood function (Zorn 2005: 157). The second creates 
a taxonometric structure. The drawback to the first is that the correction 
is relatively new and not fully supported either in the literature or in the 
6It is severe simply because that covariate is known to affect the dependent variable. 
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statistical software programs. The drawback to the second is that it pro­
duces a more complex-looking function. In the spirit of do-what-you-can, 
I use the second method. 
Beyond the issue of separation, there is the previously-discussed issue 
of temporally truncated variables. Because of the different time spans 
available in the data, three models had to be run for each link transforma­
tion. The three models corresponded to 1946-2000, when the first seven 
variables could be used; 1950-2000, when percent urban could be added; 
and 1960-2000, when unemployment rate and gross domestic product per 
capita could be added. One interesting point is that, while none of the last 
three variables were significant in any of the models, their inclusion did 
make the models themselves more significant and better predictive. Thus, 
the three variables remained in the final model. 
Contemporaneous correlation, where events in one group affect events 
in a separate group, is often a concern when dealing with cross-sectional 
data. There are two ways in which this could occur in these models. First, 
the correlation may be between kindred ethnic groups; that is, a single 
ethnic group exists as a minority at risk in two neighboring states. In 
this research, because of the small number of ,cross-border kindred ethnic 
groups involved (only the Basques fit into this group) , and because the 
sole kindred group used terror in one state, but not the other, there is no 
reason to test for it. 
The second aspect centers on the state. Is there a correlation between 
the groups within a state? Again, within this limited dataset, the answer 
apparently is no. The only state that had two different ethnic groups use 
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terrorism was France, and there was no reported connection between the two ethnic groups. In fact, there was much more connection between the Spanish Basques and the Provisional IRA, especially in terms of exchang­ing materiel and funds. Because of these two reasons, I concluded that contemporaneous correlation is also not an issue. 
6 .2  The Initial Analysis 
Discussing the results from each of the three statistical models separately would be redundant, as conclusions from each are similar. However, the differences among the tables provide an interesting insight into the data structures themselves. While the three links - logit, probit, and comple­mentary log-log - usually produce similar results, the subtle differences among these functions is sufficient to warrant an in-depth discussion. As such, I discuss each of the models presently. 
6.2 . 1  The Logit Regression Model 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the logit regression. The three models run reflect the results of incomplete data. The first seven variables were available from 1946 until 2000, whereas the other variables had a reduced availability. Specifically, the urban percent was available only from 1950 onward, and the unemployment rate and the GDP per capita were available from 1960. As a rule, this does not seem to have altered the significance of the variables. In other words, with one exception, the added variables seem · 
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Table 6. 1: The results of the logit regression for the three temporal models 
examined here. 
1946-2000 1950-2000 1960-2000 
Previous use of terror 5.439*** 5.509*** 5.909*** 
(1.489) (1.609) (1.115) 
Percent of you th in state 1. 825*** 1. 875*** 2.075*** 
(0. 533) (0. 537) (0.514) 
Negative economic differentials 2.155*** 2.092*** 2. 583*** 
(0.531) {0.507) (0.530) 
Ethnic differences - 1.918*** -1.743* -1. 349** 
(0. 567) (0.750) (0. 494) 
Level of democracy - 1. 400* - 1.205# 1.130*** 
(0. 693) (0.746) (0.293) 
Change in level of democracy 0. 300* 0.270* 0. 411 
(0.134) { 0.127) (0. 285) 
Total trade for state 3.92 2.76 4.43* 
(2.51) (1.91) (2.14) 
Percent urban 0.024 - 0. 016 
(0.081) (0.082) 
Change in unemployment rate -0.126 
(0.246) 
Change in GDP per capita -0. 001 
(0. 001) 
Intercept -16. 447* -21.089 -46.142*** 
(8.370) ( 15.835) (12.444) 
Wald x2 Statistic (G-2) 61.38*** 33.43*** 2028.43*** 
Number of Groups (G) 7 7 10 
Number of Observations (N) 315 301 342 
ROC: Area Under Curve 0.942 0.950 0.983 
Notes : Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that 
the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French 
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all 
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARI correlation structure used in each 
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 1 0- 12 • Standard 
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation: 
# p � 0.10; * p � 0.05; ** p � 0.01; *** p � 0.001 for two-tailed tests. 
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to either be describing a different dimension of risk or they are completely 
uncorrelated with an increased risk. 
Without doubt, previous use of terror is the most important factor 
in predicting future use of terror. For those groups that previously used 
terrorism, they had more than a 230-time increase in the probability of 
using terrorism again. This includes not only a year-to-year use of terror; it 
includes a distant past use of terror, such as in the cases of the Basques and 
the Irish. This finding underscores the importance of stopping terrorism 
before it begins. 
The percent of youth in the state is also highly indicative of the risk of 
the group resorting to terrorism. Increasing the percentage of youth by one 
percentage point increases the risk of terrorism by 600%. In all three time 
periods, this held true. Thus, a state with a base terrorism rate, based on 
the other factors, of 1 % will have a 6% chance of experiencing terrorism if 
there is an increase in adolescent population by just one percent. 
The level of economic differentials between the ethnic group and the 
rest of the state's population is also a strong indicator of increased risk 
of a terrorist attack. Increasing those economic differentials by one level 
increases the risk of a terrorist attack by a factor of more than eight. 
The effects of ethnic differences do not correspond to the hypothesis put 
forth. According to this model, increasing the ethnic differences actually 
reduces the risk of a terrorist attack. This conflicts with common sense. I 
will discuss possible reasons for this when I discuss the complementary log­
log model, but it suffices here to mention that the MAR project constructed 
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this variable as a summary measure of four other variables - language, 
race, customs, and beliefs (religion) . Thus, one would hope that breaking 
this summary measure into its four component measures would more clearly 
show the effects in each of those aspects of ethnicity. 
Both the level and the change in level of democracy in the state behaved 
differently depending on which variables were included in the analysis. For 
the analysis including the fewest number of variables, both were statisti­
cally significant. In the other two time periods, one or the other - but 
not both - were statistically significant.7 In the last two columns of Table 
6. 1, we can see that the p-value for the non-significant level of democ­
racy ( 1950-2000) is 0 .094. The p-value of the change in democracy level 
(1960-2000) is 0. 149. 
The more interesting problem is the change in sign of the change in 
democracy-level variable. In the first two time periods, the sign was nega­
tive - a higher level of democracy in the state produces a lower probability 
of a terrorist attack. In the last time period, the sign was positive - a 
higher level of democracy in the state produces a higher probability of a 
terrorist attack. At this point, I will only draw attention to this finding. 
As with the counter-intuitive effects of ethnic differentials, I will postpone 
further discussion of this result until the complementary log-log model. 
Suffice it to say, this is one of those "That's funny . . . " moments. 
In only the last model ( 1960-2000) is the level of trade, an indicator 
variable for globalization, statistically significant. This is not too surprising 
7The issue of multicollinearity is moot. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) 
for the model was 4.22 - far from worrying. 
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as the level of globalization and its effects were not great until the 1970s (see Figure 5 .1). However, the direction of the relationship does support the hypothesis that globalization does contribute to the level of terrorism in the state. The shape of the function is the key. Replacing the exponential rate of increase with a constant or with a linearly increasing function does not produce a statistically significant result. 
The effects of the remaining three variables, percent urban, change in unemployment rate, and change in GDP per capita are not statistically significant.8 However, later in this research I alter the change in GDP per capita variable to test for the effects of recessions on the probability of a terrorist strike and come to a finding already known in the extant literature - to a point (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2005c). 
The Wald statistics for the three models indicate high levels of signif­icance for the models. But, how good is the model? Using Hosmer and Lemeshow's (2000) criteria for the area under the ROC curve, all three models produce excellent discrimination between terrorist groups and non­terrorist groups. 9 Thus, not only is the model statistically significant, but it describes the data very effectively. 
81 also included the unemployment rate and the GDP per capita in the model, but 
these were not statistically significant either. 
91 later discuss the importance of the area under the ROC curve and its application 
as a measure of model goodness of fit. I postpone this discussion until after each model 
is discussed in detail. 
148 
6 .2 .2  The Probit Regression Model 
The results of the probit model (Table 6 . 2) are extremely similar to those 
of the logit model. This should not surprise us in the least, as there is 
little difference between the logit and the probit graphs under the correct 
transformations ( see Figure 6. 1) .  In fact, the only noticeable difference 
between the logit and the probit models is the statistical significance of 
the globalization indicator variable. This is just a reflection of the general 
inapplicability of these two symmetric regression models in dealing with 
these data and these variables. 
All three models are statistically significant when using probit regres­
sion, as was the case with the logit regression. The areas under the ROC 
curve cannot differentiate between these two regression models either, as 
the differences are well within the associated standard errors. 
6. 2.3 The Complementary Log-Log Regression Model 
The third statistical regression model I use is the complementary log-log 
model. In this case, I prefer the complementary log-log model as it is not 
symmetric; that is, it better describes and models rare events, such as 
terrorism. The results of the complementary log-log regression are similar 
to the other two binary dependent variable regression run. However, there 
are some significant differences that I would like to discuss here. The first 
is the change in the statistical significance of the level of democracy in the 
state. The second is the change in significance in the effects of changing 
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Table 6. 2: The results of the probit regression for the three temporal models 
examined here. 
1 946-2000 1950-2000 1960-2000 
Previous use of terror 2. 464*** 2.470*** 2. 891 *** 
{0.696) {0. 696) {0. 61 1) 
Percent of youth in state 0. 855*** 0. 884*** 1 . 022*** 
{ 0. 242) {0.255) {0. 238) 
Negative economic differentials 0. 998*** 1 . 084*** 1 . 348*** 
{0. 1 82) {0. 229) {0.276) 
Ethnic differences - 0.91 8*** -0.91 4** - 0.685*** 
{0.240) {0. 295) {0. 211 )  
Level of democracy - 0. 601 * -0. 540# 0.645*** 
{0. 265) {0. 306) {0. 1 83) 
Change in level of democracy 0. 1 30** 0. 121 * 0. 187 
{ 0. 050) {0. 049) {0. 122) 
Total trade for state 1 . 60 1 . 26 1 . 99 
{ 1 . 26) { 1 . 00) { 1 . 32) 
Percent urban 0. 001 -0.020 
{0. 029) {0.028) 
Change in unemployment rate -0. 1 10  
{0. 102) 
Change in GDP per capita - 0.0006 
{0. 0004) 
Intercept - 8. 089* -9. 1 45 - 22.606*** 
(3.973) (6.629) (5.002) 
Wald x2 Statistic (G-2) 354.84*** 33.83*** 6060.11··· 
Number of Groups ( G) 7 7 10 
Number of Observations (N) 315 301 342 
ROC: Area Under Curve 0.946 0.947 0. 983 
Notes : Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that 
the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French 
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all 
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARl correlation structure used in each 
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 10- 12 • Standard 
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation: 
# p � 0. 1 0; * p � 0. 05; ** p � 0.01 ; *** p � 0.001 for two-tailed tests. 
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that level of democracy. The third is the effect of globalization on the 
probability of a group using terrorism (Table 6 .3). 
In the previous two statistical models, the effects of the level of democ­
racy changed in statistical significance based on the temporal domain ex­
amined. In the complementary log-log model, such is not the case. In all 
three time periods, increasing the level of democracy in the state increases 
the probability of a terrorist attack. The level of democracy in the state 
follows a pattern similar to the logit and the probit models - the rela­
tionship is negative in the first two time periods, and positive in the last. 
Here, however, the relationship is not statistically significant in the first 
two time periods. This is due mainly to the reduced time period; that is, 
the effect of democracy is strongest in the 1960-2000 period than in the 
longer time periods. The inclusion of the three additional variables alters 
neither the statistical significance nor the directional effect of the level of 
democracy on the probability of a group using terrorism. 
The second interesting point in the complementary log-log models is 
that the effect of changing the level of democracy is more consistent across 
the time periods. In the logit and the probit models, the statistical sig­
nificance depended on the time period examined. In the complementary 
log-log model, the effects changing the level of democracy do not change in 
either significance nor in direction - they are statistically significant and 
are positive. A state with a higher level of democracy will have a higher 
probability of being the home of a terrorist group. Thus, explaining the 
change in significance is no longer needed. While the effects of including 
or not including the French groups may have been seen in the logit and 
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Table 6.3 : The results of the complementary log-log regression for the three 
temporal models examined here. 
Previous use of terror 
Percent of youth in state 
Negative economic differentials 
Ethnic differences 
Level of democracy 
Change in level of democracy 
Total trade for state 
Percent urban 
Change in unemployment rate 
Change in GDP per capita 
Intercept 
Wald x2 Statistic (G-2) 
Number of Groups {G) 
Number of Observations (N) 
ROC: Area Under Curve 
1946-2000 1950-2000 
4.499*** 4.633*** 
{ 1 . 1 13) ( 1 .334) 
1 .480*** 1 .520*** 
(0.363) (0.358) 
1 .790*** 1 .595*** 
(0.383) {0.424) 
- 1 .519*** -1 .292** 
(0.366) (0.472) 
-0. 195 -0.091 
(0.447) (0.453) 
0.094*** 0.097** 
(0.021 ) (0.033) 
3.57* 2.40* 





5524.20··· 72.87* .. 
7 7 
315  301 













(0 .171 ) 
3 .87*** 














Notes : Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that 
the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French 
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all 
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARI correlation structure used in each 
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 10- 12 • Standard 
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation: 
# p � 0. 10 ;  * p � 0.05; ** p � 0.01 ; *** p � 0.001 for two-tailed tests. 
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probit models, there appears to be no difference in the complementary log­
log model. In other words, the three French groups, the Corsicans, the 
Basques, and the Bretons, appear to behave in a manner consistent with 
the other Western European ethnic groups. 
A third interesting change in this set of models is the constancy in 
the statistical significance of the effects of globalization. In both the logit 
and the probit models, either the significance of the effects of globalization 
changed based on the time period examined (logit) or the effects were 
not statistically significant (probit).  In the complementary log-log model, 
globalization is a statistically significant factor in predicting the move to 
terrorism by the group in each of the time periods. In fact, in the 1960-2000 
period, it is highly significant (p � 0. 00 1 ) .  
Table 6 .4 compares the three statistical models with all variables (i.e. 
from 1960-2000). As only the 1960-2000 models include all of the variables, 
it suffers least from model misspecification. Thus, of the three sets, it 
best reflects the underlying processes governing the ethnonational terrorism 
factors. It also allows a comparison across statistical models more easily. 
From this comparison, we can see that the complementary log-log model 
best describes the data. The Wald statistic is higher for the complementary 
log-log model than for the other two. 
In addition, the areas under the ROC curve for the three models are not 
statistically different from one another. Moreover, as an added bonus, more 
of the variables of interest are statistically significant in the complementary 
log-log model than in either of the other two. However, for five of the 
variables, it makes little difference to which statistical model we refer, as 
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Table 6.4: A summary of the results of the logit, probit, and complemen-
tary log-log regression for the 1960-2000 time period examined here. 
Logit Probit Cloglog 
Previous use of terror 5. 909*** 2. 891 *** 4.518*** 
(1. 115) (0. 611) (0. 7 35) 
Percent of youth in state 2.0 75*** 1.022*** 1.526*** 
(0.514) (0. 2 3 8) (0.2 7 7) 
Negative economic differentials 2.5 83*** 1. 348*** 1. 840*** 
(0.530) (0 . 2 7 6) (0. 266)  
Ethnic differences - 1. 349** -0. 6 85*** -0. 934*** 
(0. 494) (0. 211) (0. 294) 
Level of democracy 1. 130*** 0. 654*** 0. 930*** 
(0. 293) (0.183) (0. 1 7 9) 
Change in level of democracy 0. 411 0. 187 0.502** 
(0. 2 85) (0. 122) (0 . 1 71) 
Total trade for state 4. 43* 1. 99 3. 87*** 
(2. 14) { 1. 32) { 1.02) 
Percent urban -0.016 -0.020 0.004 
(0.0 82) (0.02 8) (0.052) 
Change in unemployment rate -0. 126 -0. 110 -0.03 7  
(0. 246) (0. 102) (0. 140) 
Change in GDP per capita -0.001 -0.0006 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
Intercept - 46. 142*** -22.606*** -3 7. 112*** 
(12.444) (5.002) (7.626) 
Wald x2 Statistic (G-2) 2028.43*.. 6060. 7 7••• 6386.82*** 
ROC: Area Under Curve 0. 983 0. 983 0. 981 
Notes : Assuming that the group is geographically concentrated and that 
the state is a democracy. Because of changing political factors, French 
groups were eliminated from the first two and the Spanish groups from all 
temporal periods. Autoregressive ARl correlation structure used in each 
model. Total trade for the state is scaled by a factor of 10- 12 . Standard 
errors are robust, grouped on ethnonational group. Significance notation: 
# p ::; 0. 10; .* p ::; 0.05; ** p ::; 0.01; *** p ::; 0.001 for two-tailed tests. 
154 
they all express the same results. As such, the remainder of this section 
deals exclusively with the complementary log-log model. Specifically, the 
next section more-fully presents the statistical background required to have 
a better understanding of the results. 
6 .3  Statistical Backfill 
There are two aspects to whether or not a model is an appropriate de­
scription of the data - significance and fit. Model significance can be 
measured using the Wald test. The complementary log-log model has a 
Wald test statistic of x2 (10) = 2028.43, which is significant at any rea­
sonable level. Other tests of model significance exist. The Bland and 
Altman limits-of-agreement test the predicted and the actual measures. 
The limits-of-agreement test gives an average difference of -0.000, with a 
standard deviation of 0 .204. As the average difference is not significantly 
different from zero, the model is significant (Bland and Altman 1986).10 
The second aspect to determining the appropriateness of a model is the 
goodness of fit of that model. As with model significance, there are several 
ways to measure goodness of fit. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
10However, another measure of model significance does not agree with these two. 
The Lin concordance correlation coefficient both measures the amount of correlation 
between the predicted and the actual values and the amount of clustering of the data. 
The statistic, Pc , is then compared to 1.00 using a standard z-test. For this model, 
the coefficient is Pc = 0.881 (s.e. = 0.012; p � 0.0005). Thus, as the two values are 
statistically distinct, the model does not fit the data well. However, the value to testing 
of the Lin concordance correlation coefficient measure is muted by the fact that Lin 
proposed it as a comparison of continuous data (Lin 1989). The terrorism variable is 
dichotomous, thus the measure of data clustering is incorrect. AB of now, there is no 
correction for dichotomous data of which I am aware. 
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most appropriate way for the answers this research is trying to determine 
is the receiver operating characteristic curve. 
A graphical representation of an analytic for the suitability of the pro­
posed model is the receiver operating characteristic curve (Figure 6. 3). 
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves graph the relative propor­
tion of true positives (sensitivity) against those of false positives (1 -
specificity). Each point on the curve corresponds to a different cut point 
(..X). As mentioned earlier, accuracy tests tend to select a cut point of A 
= 0. 50, however there is usually no a priori reason for that selection. The 
final choice of a cut point is a function of the relative costs of doing some­
thing when you should not vs. not doing something when you should all 
moderated by the actual prevalence of the event. Equation 6.1 shows the 
formula for calculating the optimal cut point, where d is the prevalence of 
terrorism, and the costs are for false positives (CFP ), true negatives (CTN), 
false negatives (CFN ), and true positives (Crp ) .  The calculation produces 
the slope of the ROC curve at that optimal cut point. In general, the less 
expensive it is to do something and the more expensive it is to have the 
'disease', the greater the optimal slope of the ROC curve and, thus, the 
lower the optimal cut point. 
8ROC 
= 
( 1  - d
) (
CFP - CTN ) 8FPF d CFN - CTP 
(6.1) 
However, even without calculating the optimal cut point, the ROC 
curve provides a convenient measure of fit for the model tested. The area 
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Figure 6.3: Parametric and non-parametric receiver operating characteris­
tic curve for the full complementary log-log model. 
Notes : The parametric curve (solid) assumes binormal distribution of the 
specificity and the sensitivity measures. The non-parametric curve {thick) 
makes no such assumption. 
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will score higher on the model than a group not resorting to terrorism (Obuchowski 2003). Thus, for this model, a terror-using group will have a 98.1% chance of scoring higher than a non-terror-using group. This is an extremely good fit. Hosmer and Lemeshow state that anything above 0.70 is considered acceptable discrimination; above 0.80, excellent; and above 0.90, outstanding. 1 1  Furthermore, anything above 0.90 is likely to suffer from either separation or quasi-separation (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000: 162). Neither is a problem with this model as estimated. 
6 .3 .1  Further Interpretation of Results 
As all three models have similar fits ( all three areas under the ROC curve are not statistically dissimilar), and as the complementary log-log function better models rare event data like this, the following interpretation will rely on the complementary log-log model. 
Beyond doubt, the more important predictor of terrorist events is past terrorist events. Having a past incident of terrorism increases the proba­bility of resorting to terrorism by a factor of approximately 800. 1 2  Thus, it is even more imperative that groups are stopped from using terrorism. An interesting result occurs when the partial model is run. 13 The coefficient 
1 1  Moreover, as a point of reference, if the area under the ROC curve is 0.50, there is 
absolutely no discrimination. In other words, one might as well flip a coin as run the 
test. 
12This is the ratio of the probability a group will use terrorism if it has used it in the 
past (0.2336) to the probability a group will use terrorism if it has not (0.0029), holding 
all other variables at their means. 
13The full models use all data records until 2000, whereas the partial model only uses 
the records until the group initiates terrorism. 
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of the previous use of terror variable for the full model is 4. 518 (see Table 
6 .4), whereas for the partial model it is 5.693 (s.e. = 6.729; p = 0. 398) .  
The coefficient lost statistical significance. Why? Two possible reasons: 
First, the cost reduction attained when terror was used in the distant past 
is not as great as the cost reduction within the same campaign. Thus, the 
increase in action pressure due to a harkening to the past is not statisti­
cally significant at this level. The second reason may simply be the small 
number of groups examined who had a past history of terrorism. Only two 
groups have a history of organized terror campaigns prior to the Second 
World War - the Irish and the Spanish Basques. 
Thus, the importance of the previous use of terrorism variable may be 
due less to the historical factors and more to the ease of continued terror 
campaigns. In other words, the costs of terrorism are significantly lower 
when it was last used a month ago than when it was last used a century 
ago. 
Several other factors correlate quite highly with terrorism use; however, 
not all are in the direction predicted by the hypotheses. A higher percent­
age of youth in the state does correlate with an increase in terror activity. 
Increasing the percentage of youth in a state by 1 % results in an increase 
in terror probability by nearly a factor of five. 14 Thus, the assertion that 
the youth tend to be the source of both the terror impetus and the terror 
population is definitely supported by the data. 
14Holding all other variables at their means, changing the youth percent from 15% to 
16% increases the probability of terror use from 0.0019 to 0.0089. This corresponds to 
a ratio of 4.63. 
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Unemployment, however, is not a satisfactory predictor variable. In 
none of the three statistical models above did an increase in unem ploy­
ment rate correspond to an increase in terrorism probability. It is interest­
ing to note that the unemployment rate, itself, is a statistically significant 
predictor (b = 0. 1 79; p = 0.065). This finding, in conjunction with the 
results concerning the effects of a changing unemployment rate both sup­
port the hypothesis, however only in a weak sense. Unemployment does 
have an effect on terrorism, but this data and these models are unable to 
fully expose that relationship. It appears as though higher unemployment 
rates are correlated with higher levels of terrorism. It also appears that 
increasing unemployment rates reinforce that correlation (albeit weakly). 
It would be interesting to discover if the relationship is strengthened with 
the inclusion of more groups and regions or if it is just an inherently weak 
relationship. 
As cities are sources of economic differences, despair, poverty, recruits, 
and targets, the level of urbanization in the state should also be correlated 
with terrorism activity. According to the models, ceteris paribus, it is not. 
A separate model run showed that increases in urbanization are correlated 
with increased terror probability, but only at the p = 0. 17  level. This 
corresponds to acceptance at the a = 0 . 10 level for a one-tailed test. 15 Why 
did this variable not achieve statistical significance as the model suggests? 
First, the other factors explaining why higher urban rates should produce 
higher levels of terrorism are already present in the model. Second, it 
is important to note that the sign of the coefficient is in the predicted 
15While not customary, such levels of significance are being used in top journals (see, 
for example, Clark and Nordstrom 2005). 
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direction in the complementary log-log model, the coefficient merely failed to achieve significance. Third, the general trend in the world is toward greater levels of urbanization. Thus, the lack of statistical significance may simply be due to high levels of correlation between it and another naturally-increasing variable. In short, this could just simply be a small-n problem (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). 
Moving from individual-level to group-level factors, the hypothesis re­garding economic differentials was strongly supported. A greater level of economic differential between the ethnic group and the state produces a higher chance of that group resorting to terrorism (Figure 6.4). Unfortu­nately, because of the region chosen, I could investigate neither the effects of economic advantages nor the effects of losing economic advantages. Fur­thermore, because none of the states changed the ethnic group in power during the period of this study, I also could not investigate the effects of increasing negative economic differentials on the probability of resorting to terrorism. However, the PMT suggests that positive economic differentials should have a pacifying effect, while both the loss of advantages and the increase of disadvantages should result in a higher probability of a group becoming terrorist. 
Concluding the group-level hypotheses, the data did not support the contention that greater ethnic differences should result in higher chances of terrorism. In fact, the results suggest that greater levels of ethnic dif­ferences result in a reduction in probability by a factor of almost four. 16 
16The coefficient on the ethnic differentials variable corresponds to a probability of 
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Figure 6.4: The results of changing the level of ethnic differentials on terror 
probability. 
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Notes : While race is  a component of the ethnic differentials index, it did 
not vary across the data, thus it had to be dropped from consideration. The 
coefficients are logit coefficients. The standard errors are robust standard 
errors. The correlation structure is autoregressive-I. 
What is it about ethnic separation that produces a retardant effect on 
terrorism? Closer examination of the different components of ethnic sep­
arateness produces some interesting conclusions (Table 6 . 5) .  Only one of 
the components achieved statistical significance - language differences. A 
different language spoken by the ethnic group results in a seven-fold in­
crease in the probability that group will use terror. While the effect of 
religion is obvious in the actions of the IRA, religion is not a significant 
predictor of terrorism activity - at least for ethnonational groups in this 
sample. 
Religion was important in a few of the cases. The '!roubles began 
shortly after the civil rights march of the Roman Catholics was violently 
rebuffed by Protestant civilians who wanted to keep the status quo. Also, it 
is also evident that religion and language both played a role in causing the 
Jurassiens to fight to separate from Canton Berne. The Jurassiens were a 
French-speaking, Roman Catholic group whose home region was annexed 
to Canton Berne, a German-speaking, Protestant canton. However, the 
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problems of religion do not extend to the other groups under consideration. 
The South Tyroleans are of the same religion as Italy, as are the Sardinians. 
The Basques and Catalans are both as Catholic as Spain. Scotland differs 
from Great Britain only in Presbyterian vs. Anglican sects, while Corsica 
and Brittany match France's religion. 
Next, as expected from the theory and from the literature, the level of 
democracy is positively correlated with the probability of a group using 
terrorism. Before the models above were calculated, a preliminary model 
was run which included a variable signifying if the state was democratic. 
The result was that the data did not support the contention that a demo­
cratic state has a lower chance of spawning terror groups (b = -2. 50;  p 
= 0. 194). Furthermore, in the original model, the level of democracy was 
not statistically significant (b = 0. 101 ; p = 0. 54 7), although increasing 
levels were correlated with higher probabilities (b = 0. 3 82 ;  p = 0.007) .17 
In focusing on only the democracies, it became possible to determine if 
the level of democracy was a factor. It was (Figure 6. 5) .  The Polity IV 
democracy scale runs from O to 10. A one unit increase in that scale cor­
responds to a three-fold increase in terrorism probability according to the 
model ( although increases, per se, are only statistically significant in the 
complementary log-log model).  
These conclusions fit well with the PMT and with conclusions made by 
Crenshaw (1981), Ross (1993), and Sederberg { 1989). A democratic state 
may reduce the action pressure, but a more democratic state will also be 
17Results similar to the reported model were found for the remainder of the variables, 
as well, except that percent urban almost attained significance (b = 0.092; p = 0.053). 
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Figure 6.5: The results of different levels of democracy in the state on 
terror probability. 
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unable to quash terrorist groups once they form. It would be interesting to determine if actual increases in democracy are correlated with increased terrorism or if just higher levels are. 18 
Neither gross domestic product per capita nor change in GDP per capita are statistically significant. Furthermore, the selection of neither has a substantive effect on the model results. The difference in GDP per capita was included to examine the effects of personal wealth on terrorism. It apparently has no effect at this point. Poor states and rich states, in­creasing GDP per capita and decreasing GDP per capita have the same effect on terrorism - none. However, if we replace the change in GDP per capita variable with a dichotomous variable measuring whether the GDP per capita dropped, something interesting happens. It is significant (b = 0.906; p � 0.001). In other words, it is more the fact that the GDP per capita is in decline than by how much it is declining that is impor­tant. A declining GDP per capita co�responds to a three-fold increase in the probability of terrorism in the state. 19  Thus there is evidence that a poorly-performing state, at least in the economic realm, does create an impetus for a terrorist response. 
This may also explain the uniform increases in terrorism probability across states. Recessions tend to be contagious, especially in this age of globalism. Thus, a recession in one state will shortly increase the probabil­ity of a terrorist group acting in a different state. This result may explain 
18 Alas, this must await a larger and more heterogeneous dataset for testing. The 
Western European dataset does not include a sufficient number of cases where the level 
of democracy in the state changes. 
19 A similar result holds if a 1 % increase is used as the cutoff, although not for a 2% 
increase. 
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much of Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida's discovery of the '1contagion 
of international terrorism" ( 1980) . 
The final hypothesis dealt with globalism. As no reliable direct mea­
sures of globalism were available, I used total interstate trade as a proxy. 
The coefficient on the total trade variable was statistically significant. Fur­
thermore, it was in the correct direction. Thus, the model literally supports 
the contention that a higher level of trade in the state results in a greater 
probability of a group using terrorism. The exponential shape of the trade 
curve is important in this analysis. Simply using the year or the log of 
the total trade as a proxy, both of which are linear or near linear, would 
not have mimicked the assumed shape of the globalization curve. In fact, 
replacing total trade with either the year or the log of the total trade re­
sulted in a coefficient and a model that was less significant. Thus, while 
total trade may not be an actual measure of globalization, it does have 
the necessary properties. Thus, if we do assume trade is an appropriate 
proxy for globalization, we can conclude that globalization does positively 
( or negatively, depending on your point of view) affect probabilities for 
outbreaks of terrorism. 
Thus, as a whole, the model does appear to have performed quite well 
with this dataset. However, as is always the case, including more groups 
will make the final analysis more accurate and more reflective of reality. 
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6 .4  Event History Models 
Before I move on to investigating the effects of political shifts on terrorist 
groups, I would like to determine if event history analysis would work with 
the data as it now stands. The first thing to do is examine the baseline 
hazard to determine if it fits one of the available distributions. The baseline 
hazard is a function of time and not of the groups. Thus, it is the hazard the 
each group feels as a result of existing. All other hazards that depend on 
group and state factors add to this baseline rate. Using the Nelson-Aalen 
cumulative hazard estimator and smoothing it using the Epanechinikov-
2 smoothing kernel, we see the shape of the underlying hazard function 
from 1960 until 1987 (Figure 6.6) .  Using the Epanechinikov-2 smoothing 
function allowed the curve to better reflect the data, while at the same 
time reducing major inter-year fluctuations ( Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 
2004; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999). 
The smoothed hazard function follows no known distributional form. 
Further work using survival time analysis must re-parameterize the times 
when the group enters risk. That is, simply using the end of World War II 
as an entry point for each of the groups does not produce acceptable results. 
One may suggest that the entry event should be the year the group lost 
independence. This may work for groups losing their independence in the 
last century like the South Tyroleans or the Sardinians, but most of the 
ethnonations in Western Europe lost their independence centuries in the 
past. The Irish lost it in the twelfth century with the violent influx of 
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Figure 6.6: The smoothed hazard function estimate using non-parametric 
means and an Epanechinikov-2 smoothing kernel. 
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crowns. The Basques lost it in the sixteenth century when the Spanish and 
French divided the Euskal Herria, while the Catalans never really lost it; 
it just faded away. The Corsicans lost it in the nineteenth century to the 
Genoese, the British, and the French, while the Bretons lost it centuries 
earlier. Thus, selecting the year the group lost independence would not 
help either. 
One interesting consequence of the baseline hazard function as modeled, 
it does support Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida's (1980) contention that 
international terrorism is contagious - that terror attacks in one state in­
fluence terrorism in others. Were the graph more flat, it would indicate that 
underlying probability of a group using terror did not change throughout 
time. However, as there are definite peaks and valleys, there is evidence of 
a cyclic impetus. In fact, according to the graph, major bouts of terrorism 
transmission happened at approximate nine-year intervals, starting in the 
early 1960s and repeating in the late1960s, mid-1970s and 1980s. The sec­
ond hump in the graph corresponds to the 1 974-1975 European recession 
brought on by the OPEC crisis, thus further supporting the contention 
that regional recessions are also a harbinger of terrorism. 
6 .5  Political Changes 
One avenue of exploration this model affords at this point is an investiga­
tion into whether or not political changes in the state encourage terrorism 
or are encouraged by terrorism. Political changes can be operationalized 
in two ways: a fundamental change in the government, such as through a 
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Table 6. 6: The effects of changes in governmental leadership on terrorism 
propensity. 
Party Orientation Change, Previous Year 
Party Orientation Change, Current Year 





(0. 2 85) 
- 1. 254# 
· (0.662) 
Separate 
- 0. 2 81 
(0.42 7) 
- 0. 6 98* 
(0. 2 83) 
- 1. 170# 
(0.647) 
Notes : Numbers are logit coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. The final column is a summary of the effects of each 
variable added separately to the model. Significance notation: # p � 0. 10; 
* p � 0.05; ** p � 0.01; *** p :::;  0. 001. 
constitutional change or a coup d'etat; or a minor change in government 
leadership, such as a change in the government's political orientation be­
tween left and right or vice-versa. I parsed the electoral records of each 
of the five states under investigation and created indicator variables for 
each of these two events. I then added them to the full model above. As 
the major government changes were too few to be of statistical use in this 
study, I only modeled the political party changes in government.20 
What are the effects on terrorism probability in the presence of a 
changed government? According to the results (Table 6.6), changing the 
government this year has no discernable effect on the probability of a ter­
rorist attack. On average, the effect is to reduce it by a quarter, but the 
results are not statistically significant at the usual levels. When consider­
ing government changes in that year, the effects on terrorism probability 
20 Again, a larger and more diverse dataset would allow this hypothesis to be tested. 
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are significant. A change in political party reduces the probability of a terror attack by approximately half. 
Finally, when considering the effects of changing the party in power on the probability of terrorism in the previous year, the effect is to reduce its probability by a factor of approximately 69%. Unfortunately, the causal arrow for this conclusion points in the wrong direction. As the change in government occurs after the terrorist attack, the conclusion must concern the effects of a terrorist attack on the probability of turning out the cur­rent government. Thus, we can conclude that, in the presence of a terrorist attack, the probability of the government being voted out of office is ap­proximately 31 %. This is incredibly strong evidence for the "rally around the flag" effect (see, for example, Norrander and W ilcox 1993; Oneal and Bryan 1995). 
With this conclusion, it becomes more obvious that the Spanish So­cialist party victory in the election taking place shortly after the al Qaeda attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 occurred in spite of the terrorist attack and not because of it. Jose Mara Aznar and his conservative Partido Popu­
lar were having other difficulties with the electorate, especially supporting the US war in Iraq and their handling of the Madrid terrorist attack ( Chari 2004; Moret 2004; Romero 2004).21 
21Chari (2004) specifically found that it was not the terrorist attack, per se, that 
caused the downfall of the Aznar government, but was rather the perception that he 
manipulated the situation for political gains. 
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6 .6  State Graphs 
Before concluding this chapter, let us look at probability graphs for two 
of the groups under investigation: the Ulster Catholics and the Scots. 
These two were chosen as representative samples of the groups, as the 
Ulster Catholics had a history of terror use throughout the entire time 
period, while the Scots did not. As they share a common containing state, 
comparing them should show some of the strengths of the model. 
6.6 . 1 The Ulster Catholics (United Kingdom) 
The prediction plot (Figure 6. 7) reflects well the underlying propensity 
for the Ulster Catholics to resort to terror, even without utilizing and 
accounting for Irish history. To see this, let us examine a little Northern 
Irish history. 
The first incarnation of the Irish Republican Army was a terrorist or­
ganization fighting for independence from Britain in the early twentieth 
century. Their terror campaign, which started in 1919, succeeded. But 
only partially. Britain partitioned Ireland in 1921, granting independence 
to Catholic southern Ireland, but only allowing home rule in the north. 
That is, southern Ireland gained independence, but those counties in the 
north of Ireland, deemed too Protestant and industrial to join Catholic, 














1 960 1 970 1 980 1 990 2000 
Year of observation 
Figure 6.7: The predicted probability of the Ulster Catholics using terror 
in the United Kingdom, 1960-2000. 
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The Catholics in Northern Ireland were discriminated against in employ­
ment, housing, and political power. That is how it remained until 1967, 
when the civil rights movement began (Feeney 2003). 
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed in 
1967 as a reaction to the continued discrimination against the Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. Liberal use of gerrymandering ensured Protestant super­
majorities in the British Parliament, and liberal use of the Royal Union 
Constabulary ensured the personal protection of the Stormont ( the North­
ern Ireland Assembly) . The fateful decision to hold a civil rights march 
in 1969 brought about a counter-demonstration from the Protestants, who 
did not want to lose their advantages. The marching, both the Catholic 
civil rights marches and the Orangemen counter-marches, quickly culmi­
nated that summer in the Londonderry Catholic neighborhood of Bogside, 
where the demonstrators and the Royal Union Constabulary clashed in 
what became known as the Battle of Bogside. 
At this point, the Irish Republican Army did nothing to assist the 
Catholics in Northern Ireland. Their hesitation could be ascribed to either 
a desire to continue the political process or a desire to allow events to 
unfold naturally to bring about the socialist revolution. Whatever the 
reason, a group within the IRA decided to do something direct to assist 
the Catholics in Northern Ireland. The splinter called itself the Provisional 
IRA, to distance itself from the Original (or Official) IRA. The Provisional 
IRA began its campaign of terror in order to finish expelling the British 
from Ireland and to return all of Ireland to Irish hands. The Irish flag 
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from this time period emphasized the desire for a united Ireland. The tri­
color had colors representing both the Catholic (green} and the Protestant 
(Orange) aspects of what was to be a united Ireland (Feeney 2003) . 
The Provisional IRA terror campaign continued for almost three decades, 
only ending in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreement. Those three decades 
were filled with car bombs, assassinations, non-combatant casualties, cease 
fires, and broken cease fires. The total number of people killed by the Pro­
visional IRA during The Troubles is placed at around 1800 - 700 civilians 
and 1100 British soldiers, RUC officers or unionist terrorists. However, as 
shocking as these statistics are, loyalist paramilitary organizations and the 
British Security forces were responsible for over a thousand civilian deaths 
(Sutton 2002). 
The graph of terror probability closely follows several aspects of the 
above history (Figure 6. 7) . The onset of the terrorism in 196 9 is preceded 
by a sudden increase in terror probability between 1960 and 1965. The 
probability remains level except for a quick increase in 196 8-69. The actual 
onset of terrorism occurs at this point. While the split in the IRA was 
not a part of the model, it was definitely a factor in using terrorism. The 
probability remains high, reaching near-certainty during the 1 980s. During 
the 1 980s, the Provisional IRA began hunger strikes, signed the Anglo­
Irish agreement, suffered the unionist backlash and the associated increase 
in violence, and detonated bombs during a service at the Enniskillen War 
Memorial (1987) and at Herrod's in downtown London (1983) .  
Finally, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 correspond to a low point 
on the graph. The model does seem to have some predictive ability, at least 
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with respect to the Ulster Catholics. The times of high probability on the 
model correspond to times in real life when the Irish were embroiled in a 
terror campaign. The timing of the Good Friday Agreement corresponds 
to a low point in the probability graph. Perhaps the Agreement succeeded 
where others failed simply because the underlying pressure for terrorism 
was low enough at that point, whereas it was much too high to allow the 
1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement to succeed. 
6.6 .2  Scots (United Kingdom) 
The underlying propensity for the Scots to resort to terror is also well­
reflected in the prediction plot (Figure 6. 8) .  To see this, let us examine a 
little Scottish history. 
On March 2 8, 1707, the Scottish Parliament dissolved, and the Treaty 
of Union between Scotland and England went into effect shortly thereafter. 
Almost three centuries passed until the Scots were able to once again en­
joy their own independent Parliament when Queen Elizabeth II officially 
inaugurated it on July 1, 1999. This was the second attempt at granting 
greater levels of autonomy, with a promise of self-rule, to the Scots since 
World War II. The first time was in 197 9. That attempt failed because 
of the political wangling by the Scottish nationalists in Parliament, the 
economic crises of the 1970s, and the resulting loss of popularity in the 
Labour party (Harvie 2004; Pittock 2001) . 
But the failures of the Labour party in the 1970s led to the successes 
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Figure 6.8: The predicted probability of the Scots using terror in the United 
Kingdom, 1960-2000. 
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throughout England and Wales kept the Labour party from regaining 
power until Major lost it in the 1 997 election. However, the prosperity 
of the 1 980s did not immediately reach to the Highlands. With Scotland's 
economic emphases on its traditional industries of coal, steel, and ship­
building, the Scots felt the intense pressure of increased unemployment. 
Consequently, two things resulted: First, the Conservative government in 
Parliament, recognizing the problems inherent in unemployed Scots, began 
offering economic incentives to giant electronics firms like IBM, NEC, and 
JVC to entice them to come and build factories in Scotland.22 Second, it 
showed the Scots, traditional supporters of the Labour party, that they 
could not wait for the rest of Britain to vote Labour; they would have to 
have their own parliament (Pittock 2003; Somerset Fry 1985). 
The economic incentives were a success. The resulting "Silicon Glen" 
reduced unemployment and increased prosperity in Scotland. The creation 
of the Scottish Parliament, however, happened neither as quickly nor as 
easily. By the time the Conservative government allowed the referendum 
in 1997, the question was not if it would pass, but by how much. The 
results showed the British Parliament just how important self-rule was to 
the Scots - 75% of the voting Scots voted in favor of creating the Scottish 
Parliament, and 63% voted in favor of granting it taxing ability {Halliday 
1990; Patterson 1998; Payne 2002) .  However, through all of this, while 
nationalist parties existed in Scotland ( the Scottish Nationalist Party, for 
example), none resorted to terror campaigns to achieve their ends. Their 
actions remained well within the pale. A quick glance at the plot of terror 
22By 1996, the Silicon Glen produced 35% of Europe's PCs and 12% of the world's 
semiconductors (Hargrave 1985). 
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probability over the years for Scotland {Figure 6.8) shows that a significant underlying push for terrorism never existed, simply because the conditions never got bad enough to create an action pressure high enough to overcome the natural aversion towards terrorism. 
6.  7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter started with a look at the statistical models needed to ad­equately test the hypotheses of the previous chapter. As the dependent variable was binary, OLS could not be used without severe violations of its assumptions. As such, three binary dependent variable models pre­sented themselves: the logit, the probit, and the complementary log-log. As all three produced similar results, each could be used to explore the relationship between terrorism and the selected factors. A second aspect of the data implied that an autoregressive-1 correction needed to be used to remedy the serial correlation inherent in some of the variables, most notably the gross domestic product per capita, the level of democracy in the state, and the urban percentage. The current values for each of these variables definitely depends on the previous values. This is what the ARl modification corrects. 
All of the models behaved in' similar manners; that is, the same vari­ables tended to be statistically significant in each. This demonstrates the robustness of the findings. No significant coefficient changed directions, 
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although one non-significant coefficient did. 23 Furthermore, the constant term remained highly significant and highly negative, thus lending evidence to the claim that there is an inherent aversion to the use of terrorism in the world. 
All significant variables were in the predicted direction except for the ethnic differences index. Closer examination of this finding revealed that, of the four components comprising the index, only one of them was significant and in the hypothesized direction: language differences. In other words, groups speaking a different language than the surrounding state are more likely to use terrorism - perhaps this is a reflection of an inability to communication. 
Once again, the evidence supports the finding that a more democratic state is more likely to experience domestic terrorism. While the models were unable to speak to the effects of democracy, per se, they were able to suggest that the act of increasing the level of democracy in a state leads to this conclusion. That is, instead of just finding states with higher levels of democracy are more at risk, the models found that increasing the level within the state also increases the risk. 
So, should we conclude that creating democracies in the world will in­crease the virulence of terror groups? Not necessarily. There is a definite correlation between the level of democracy in the state and other vari­ables in the model, specifically GDP per capita, trade level, and economic differentials. In each of these cases, the effects of increasing the level of 
23The percent urban variable changed direction, however in each model the standard 
error was greater than the coefficient itself. 
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democracy or simply creating a democracy may reduce the total terror 
probability. 
Thus, with the agreement of so many of the variables with the model, 
the model and the theory performed quite well given the small sample size. 
The two vignettes compared the events in real life with the predictions of 
the model. The fit was remarkable. Not only was the onset of terror­
ism in Northern Ireland reflected in the model, but so was the failure of 
the Angl� Irish Accords of 1985 and the later success of the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1997. The action pressure towards terrorism was just too 
high to be overcome by the treaty in 1985. However, by 1997, the pressure 
had dropped to a level that allowed for a successful peace agreement. 
The next, and final, chapter revisits the initial question around which 
this work centered itself. The concluding remarks suggest some policies 
governments may take to reduce the probability of a domestic group re­
sorting to terror in their state. As the model so clearly evidenced, it is 
much easier to stop a group from initially using terror than it is to stop a 




Prediction is very difficult, 
especially about the future. 
Niels Bohr 
WHERE does this leave us? As with most stories, the answers are found in the opening lines. Here, we start, once again, questioning why some ethnonations resort to using terrorism, while others do not. In each case, and at first glance, it appears as though an idiographic approach would be more appropriate, as each group ostensibly starts using terrorism for a different reason. However, the advance of the discipline encourages us to move beyond treating each state and ethnonation as if it were a world unto itself and to find the common causes and factors among them. In short, science encourages a nomothetic approach. Let us begin this chapter with a few vignettes, proceed through the lessons we can apply to public policy, and conclude with a call to arms. 
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7.0. 1 The Jurassiens 
The Congress of Vienna of 1815 formally ended the Napoleonic era for 
France and for Europe. It also settled the frontiers of Switzerland, in­
cluding the internal ones - the Helvetic Republic was one of Napoleon's 
puppet states. Inside Switzerland, the redrawn borders did not necessarily 
conformed to either language distinctions or to religious distinctions. As a 
result, the Jurassiens, formerly of Canton Basie, became members of Can­
ton Berne; that is, the francophone Roman Catholics originally citizens of 
Catholic Basie became citizens of the germanophonic, Protestant Canton 
Berne at the stroke of a Viennese pen (Nicolson 2001; Viault 1990). 
However, it was not until the Bernese legislature rejected the appoint­
ment of a Jurassien to the Bureau of Public Works that the Jurassiens 
formed their first political movement with a goal of achieving either greater 
autonomy or separation from Canton Berne. The movement culminated 
in a popular referendum in 1959 to create a new canton. It barely failed 
to pass, with 52% voting against and 48% voting in favor. However, far 
from stopping the movement, the failure at the polls induced them to con­
tinue agitating for autonomy. The failure of the referendum brought about 
the formation of three political parties: the Rassemblement jurassien (RJ) 
supported separation, the Force democratique (FD) supported continued 
union with Canton Berne, and the Movement for the Unity of the Jura 
{MUF) supported a unified Jura with a greater degree of autonomy within 
Canton Berne. Later, the RJ split into a group dedicated to continuing 
the political process and a group dedicated to achieving their goals by any 
means necessary. The latter group, the Front de liberation jurassien (rLJ), 
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was responsible for attacks on Bernese and Swiss infrastructure ( J. Jenkins 
1986). 
A second referendum was placed before the voters in 1974. In the 
Bernese Jura, the results were very similar to the earlier referendum, 52% 
against and 48% in favor. However, the vote was most assuredly polar­
ized based on geography; those districts in southern Jura tended to vote 
against separation, while those in northern Jura tended to vote in favor 
of it. 1 As a result of this obvious polarization, a series of referenda were 
held to determine which districts would separate from Berne and become 
part of the new Canton Jura. On January 1, 1979, the Swiss legislature 
granted recognition to the newest canton in Switzerland, composed of those 
northern districts supporting separation in the latest poll (J. Jenkins 1986; 
Steinberg 1996). 
However, this did not end the story of Jurassien separatism. The actual 
terror campaign began after the creation of the new canton. The primary 
actors were the same, as were their goals. The only change was in location. 
Now, the separatist activity took place in southern Jura, the section still 
a part of Canton Berne. The RJ still sought to separate the southern 
Jura from Berne. The FD still wished continued connection to Berne. 
The MUF still sought to unite all of Jura under one canton, no matter 
which one. And, even more importantly, the FLJ still violently agitated 
for independence from Canton Berne. While the FLJ had been content to 
merely agitate for separation, which consisted of public demonstrations and 
1 This difference based on geography was not surprising, for the south had more 
contact with the rest of Berne than did the north. As a result, the Bernese culture and 
people had invaded the southern Jura (J. Jenkins 1986). 
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a few riots, in the early 1990s, they initiated a short-lived terror campaign. 
The only result, thus far, of that terrorist campaign was a referendum 
for the village of Vellera to leave Canton Berne and join Canton Jura. 
The referendum passed overwhelmingly. Interestingly enough, at the time, 
Vellera had a population of 70 {Minorities at Risk 2000; Steinberg 1996). 
Switzerland is, and was, an extremely stable democratic state - ar­
guably the most stable in Western Europe. Switzerland also has a large 
level of citizen involvement in legislation, being the only state that has reg­
ular federal-level referenda. And yet, some Jurassiens resorted to a cam­
paign of terrorism to right the wrongs of generations past. When compared 
to what other ethnonations have experienced ( and currently experience) , 
the Jurassiens seem to have little expectation to initiate a terror campaign, 
especially in light of the strong political tradition in Switzerland. And yet, 
they have. Why? 
7.0.2 The Sardinians 
The tale of Sardinian separatism is rooted in the very formation of the 
Italian state. While Victor Immanuel II was nominally king of Sardinia, 
his was a Piedmont monarchy from the north of Italy. And while the two 
lands were politically unified, the prejudice against the south as backward, 
corrupt, and violent kept them from being culturally unified. In fact, the 
entire unification of Italy - the Risorgimento - was a series of battles in 
which the north repressed, suppressed, and oppressed the south. Those in 
Sicily, Naples and the Papal States, were taken by force and placed under 
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the banner of the new Kingdom of Italy. Those in Sardinia, already a part of the original Kingdom, had no option but to accept the solutions the Piedmont monarchy created (Ammendola 2003; Morrogh 2003; Smith and Smith 1980). 
A combination of the historical corruption of the rulers in Rome, the feelings of superiority expressed by the northerners as shown in the maxim "Africa begins south of Rome" , the internal colonization of Sardinia by the prosperous north, and the repression of the Sardinian language all exacerbated the feelings of separateness felt by the insular Sardinians. The Kingdom of Italy, and the later Republic of Italy, have both promised increased economic investment in Sardinia, however the industries given to Sardinia polluted the environment, and the number of jobs never seemed to be as great as what was promised (Krippendorff 1979; Roberts 2003). 
And yet, the Sardinians, existing in one of the least stable democracies in Europe, 2 have yet to resort to a campaign of terrorism to right the wrongs of generations past. Even when the Sardinian separatist party joined the Italian Red Brigades in the 1970s, they did not resort to a terrorist cam­paign. When compared to what other ethnonations have experienced, the Sardinians seem to have every expectation to initiate a terror campaign, and yet they have not. Why? 
2T hat is, least stable in terms of the frequent votes of no confidence and frequent 
government dissolutions in the Italian Parliament. 
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7.0.3 The Spanish Basques 
The Euskal H erria straddles the Pyrenees, divided between Spain and 
France. The seven provinces - four in Spain and three in France -
are still considered by the Basques to be one nation - inseparable. 3 Both 
states instituted centralization campaigns to bring the disparate parts of 
each under firmer control of the central government. Both states discrimi­
nated against the Basques, both in terms of culture and of language. And 
yet, only the southern Basques have resorted to a terror campaign; the 
French Basques have not. Why? 
7.0.4 The Answers? 
In each of the three above cases, the answer may lie in the state itself. 
However, while the French Basques have been quiet, neither the Bretons 
nor the Corsicans can claim this. And, while the Spanish Basques have 
resorted to terrorism, neither the Catalans nor the Galicians have. 4 What 
makes one ethnic group resort to terror, while another does not? This 
question was the raison d'etre of this research. And while the answers to 
this question are far from complete, the mechanism behind group actions 
toward terrorism is better understood. In understanding that mechanism, 
we are able to better predict which groups will resort to terrorism and 
dissuade them from doing so. Considering that it is much less expensive, 
3 A form of separatist graffiti is "4 + 3 = 1" (Kurlansky 1999). 
4This may change in the next few years, as a Galician separatist group detonated 
a car bomb in the central plaza of Santiago de Compostela, Spain on July 23, 2005 
( Goodman 2005). 
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both in terms of resources and lives, to keep terrorism from happening than it is to stop it once it has begun, emphasis should be on prevention. However, the current emphasis is on punishment after the fact.5 
7 . 1  The Mechanism 
We began this journey with several separate descriptive theories of terror­ism. These theories described many mechanisms for what caused groups to engage in terrorism. Each level of analysis had its own set of factors. Cren­shaw {1981) suggested that concrete grievances, modernization, democracy, urbanization, history, elite dissatisfaction, and mass passivity all contribute to increasing the probability that a state will experience terrorism. But why? She provided excellent rationale for why each one would be a pre­condition, but she lacked a fundamental theory tying it all together. 
Similarly, Ross {1993) provided a descriptive theory of terrorism, es­pecially with respect to the structural causes. He cited modernization, geography, urbanization, regime type, grievances, support, weapons avail­ability, and presence of other forms of unrest as factors leading to terrorism. However, he offered nothing to tie all of these factors together. While his explanation as to why these factors affected the propensity towards terror­ism, he offered nothing fundamental to tie everything together. While this performs acceptably in determining some factors that can be affected to 
5This may be slowly changing, as the first Madrid Conference on Terrorism, March 
2005, concluded with a call to reduce the causes of terrorism, not just punishment of 
terrorists. In fact, many of the presenters warned that the War on Terror may create 
more terrorists than it eliminates ( Annan 2005). 
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alter the probability of a terrorist outbreak, it does nothing to explain the 
underlying why. 
This is the primary strength of this research piece. I offered a theory 
of terrorism that was more fundamental than descriptive. The underlying 
mechanism lay exposed. The reasons for terrorist outbreaks I placed at the 
feet of human beings and not at the feet of the intangible 'group', 'state', 
or 'state system'. Those factors at higher levels of analysis we can now 
trace back to the individuals through a process of aggregation - the state 
system consists of states, the states consist of various groups, and those 
groups are composed of individuals. Factors affecting the individual filter 
their way to the top of the pyramid through the associated pressure of the 
group to act in a way that mimics its members. 
At the individual level, the person feels a pressure to act when they 
experience a reality at odds with what they perceive as being just. Using 
the vocabulary of rational choice, the individual feels a pressure to act 
when their ideal point differs too much from the setting in which they 
exist. A greater disparity between these two creates a greater impetus for 
action - or reaction. Thus, Gurr's ( 1970) finding that relative deprivation 
is an excellent indicator of future political violence is supported. Relative 
deprivation is merely the idealized distance between the individual's ideal 
point and their real point - between what they feel they should have and 
what they actually have. 
This aggregates upward to the group level. At the group level, the 
actions of that group are based primarily on the action point of that group. 
This group action point is based on the ideal points of each of the group's 
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members, appropriately weighted to take into consideration the individual's standing within the group. For a group with the majority of the members with ideal points located near the 'political' end of the spectrum, the group will tend to be less likely to resort to terrorism; i.e. the group leadership will feel less pressure to use extra-political means and more pressure to use political means to solve the problems. For a group with an action point located near the 'extra-political' end of the spectrum, the leadership feels a pressure to resort to violence. 
Thus, Crenshaw's assertions that concrete grievances against the state contribute to increased terrorist activity is explained. When an individ­ual has a grievance against the state, his or her ideal point is at greater odds with the real point than in the absence of such a grievance. When individuals aggregate to form the group, this grievance is present in the group members, thus moving the group's ideal point more toward the extra­political end, especially in the presence of state repression or absence of political avenues which the groups can utilize to achieve their goals. 
At the state level, the actions of those in power affect the individual's real point and the costs associated with acting on those felt pressures. Thus, the near-universal finding that democracies are both the creators and the targets of more terrorists than other regime types is neatly explained, even though democracies allow for increased political activity and have lower levels of repression than autocracies. Democracies reduce the cost of action; they are subject to the Rule of Law. Being subject to the Rule of Law reduces the state's ability to eradicate the entire terrorist group. In authoritarian regimes, entire groups can be exterminated. Such is not 
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permissible in a liberal democracy. The ultimate penalty for a terrorist in 
a democracy constrained by the Rule of Law is his or her execution. In 
dictatorial regimes, the ultimate penalty is the execution of the terrorist, 
his or her family, perhaps economic sanctions against the village, perhaps 
bulldozing of the terrorist's family's house, etc. There are no theoretical 
limits to the punishment handed down by strong authoritarian regimes 
against terrorists. There are in democracies. 6 
Moreover, democracies tend to have freedom of association enshrined 
in their traditions and constitutions. This increases the probability that 
like-minded people will come together to form their group. Authoritarian 
regimes tend to reduce the ability of its citizens to come together. If a 
group cannot form, or if the costs are too high to allow its formation, it 
cannot become a terrorist group. 
Ross's finding that failures of counter-terrorism efforts increase the 
probability of a terrorist attack is upheld in this theory. The effect of 
a successful counter-terrorist strategy is to either increase the cost of act­
ing or to reduce the pressure to act. When the strategy fails, the opposite 
obviously occurred. In addition to the indication of decreased action costs 
and increased action pressure, there is the explicit immediate decrease in 
action cost due to the actual collapse of the counter-terrorism structures 
and the resultant vacuum. 
An additional finding, not fully accounted for by Gurr {1970) , Cren­
shaw {1981 ) ,  or Ross {1993) , but alluded to in each, is that states without 
6The exception to this rule seems to be democratic Israel, which had a long-standing 
policy of bulldozing the homes of suicide terrorists. 
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full control over their territory are also at increased risk of creating or ex­periencing terrorism. This can be explained by the associated reduced cost of action. If the state does not control its entire territory, the group can operate with impunity, reducing the cost of existence to almost nothing. This is an important finding because there are several areas of the world not under control of a state. These include the failed state of Somalia and vast stretches of the Sahara Desert. In the latter case, the Bush admin­istration "believes the Sahara desert is a vast ungoverned wasteland and, hence, a haven for terrorists" (Fellows 2005).7 
The system level, especially in terms of globalization, strongly influ­ences the individual . Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida (1980) suggested that terrorism in one state affects the probability of terrorism in a sec­ond state through the processes of diffusion and contagion. While they asserted that it was "difficult to identify indigenous sources of terrorism," they did find that there were connections on the system level between terrorist groups (Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida 1980: 263). While their analysis used only seven years, and while sweeping conclusions based on such a small time span cannot be made with any enormous level of confidence, their conclusion fits nicely in the pressure model. While their findings suggested that the cost of terrorist action is reduced by other groups resorting to terrorism - a conclusion not in opposition to the the­ory - they also suggest that there is some underlying system-level factor 
7In fact, the Bush administration sent 1 ,000 personnel to take part in an anti-terrorist 
training exercise. "The exercise's fictional scenario involved a terrorist group being 
chased across national borders from Mauritania in the west, through to Mali, Niger and 
finally Chad" (Fellows 2005). 
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not accounted for by their theory. In other words, terrorism can be con­
tagious in their sense of the word, or the milieu in which everyone exists 
could be affecting the base probability a group resorts to terrorism. Their 
research supports both interpretations. The pressure model also supports 
both interpretations. Figure 6. 6 demonstrates that the base probability of 
a terrorist event has dramatically fluctuated over the years, reaching a high 
in the late 1960s and a low in the early 1980s. The timing of the peaks, 
however, is less important than the existence of those peaks. 
Beyond the general increase or decrease in base terror probability, the 
system level produces some dynamics that directly affect the individual 
and his or her action pressure. The most important of them are due 
to the effects of globalization. "Globalisation is a political phenomenon 
characterised by the weakening of mediating institutions and the direct 
confrontation between individuals and global forces" {Guehenno 1998: 5) . 
That is, globalization increases the exposure of the individual to system­
level forces and reduces the ability of the state to protect that individual. 
While this is true economically, it is also true culturally. With the in­
crease in a global culture, especially a democratic culture as defined by 
the liberal, democratic West and as spread through the new global media, 
ethnonations may easily feel as though their culture was being sacrificed 
on the altar of economic advancement for the few . .  And, as globalization 
reduces the state's ability to mitigate these issues, globalization increases 
the threat felt by the ethnic groups to their way of life. 
Globalization is also characterized by rapid modernization and eco­
nomic changes. The shift in many advanced industrial states away from 
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expensive industry and toward less expensive service-sector employment may increase the average income in that state, but that increase comes at the expense of industrial workers losing their jobs in well-paid positions. Sometimes, these industrial jobs are traditionally held by one ethnic group, as in the case of the Scots and the Basques. In such cases, the economic dif­ferentials become conflated with the ethnic differentials, with both factors increasing the probability the group will resort to terrorism. 
In each of these three cases, the effects of the system-level factor directly affect the individual level in predictable and explainable ways. There is no need to create a new theory to deal with the system-level and the effects of globalization on terrorism; the effects are already explained in the model proposed. The only theory needed is a theory on the behavior of humans, which we call psychology. Thus, terrorism is the manifestation of psychology - writ large. 
7.2 Future Perfect Tense 
This research, at least from a policy standpoint, is timely. Each significant factor is being affected by current global trends. Globalization continues to increase at an exponential rate. The number of adolescents in the world grows constantly, and they constitute the largest segment of the population in several African states. 8 Population growth rates continue to stress the available resources. US foreign policy explicitly advocates democratization 
8In Djibouti, those under 16 constitute almost half of the population, the median 
age in Nigeria is 19, and over 53% of Africans are under age 19 (CIA 2005; Gibbs 2004). 
195 
(Bush 2005) and there are currently more democracies than autocracies in 
the world (Freedom House 2005).9 
We are currently at a nexus, a critical juncture in history. With all of 
these trends conspiring together, there is little doubt that the prevalence of 
terrorist activity will grow at an ever-increasing rate unless action is taken 
to deal with the underlying causes of terrorism. Repression tends to not 
work (Mason and Krane 1989; Sederberg 1995). And yet, conciliation is 
frowned upon by political leaders even though state leaders have success­
fully used it in the past - most notably in Northern Ireland (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2005c; Sederberg 1995; Stevenson 1996). Charges of 'appease­
ment' and specters of 'Munich' haunt most attempts to try to understand 
the terrorists. The principal result is a knee-jerk reaction to terror strikes. 
The US War on Terror is the quintessential response to a terrorist 
attack - punishment. Even security scholars would tend to agree with 
the response in theory (although not necessarily in practice) . Posen (2003) 
suggests that the appropriate strategy in dealing with terror groups is to 
reduce the groups in terms of both population and support, until only 
"desperate groups of exhausted stragglers, with few resources and little 
hope of success" remain to commit the acts of terror (Posen 2003: 393) . 
However, there is a growing body of research, and a growing number 
of researchers, who hold that such tactics do nothing to stem the tide of 
terrorism. Lesser {1999) , writing for the conservative think-tank RAND, 
concluded his research with four core strategies the United States should 
9For the year 2004, Freedom House had the number of free states at 88 and the 
number of not free states at 49 (Freedom House 2005). 
196 
use to minimize its risk of again being attacked by terrorists. Retaliation is the fourth, and he only suggests its use when the other three fail. W hat was his first core strategy? It is to reduce the systemic causes of terrorism. 
While he spends little time on what these systemic causes may be, this research provides three important ones: globalization, negative economic differentials, and adolescence. The primary negative effect of globalization is rapid change. People are faced with new ideas. They must deal with new employment emphases. They must confront new incursions into their very self {Kellner 2002). With respect to terrorism, globalization results in a greater probability in a group using terrorism. This is due to the individuals in the group experiencing a higher pressure to act. 
The need to act flows from two areas. First, the group may feel a dis­connect from its traditions. While not a result of globalization, the South Tyroleans violently reacted when the Italian government began to elimi­nate their traditions {Alcock 1970; Steininger 2003). The Spanish Basques reacted similarly when Franco instituted his policy of forced Castileaniza­tion (Collins 1990; da Silva 1975; Laitin and Gomez 1992). Globalization has a similar effect on indigenous culture {Cha 2000; Kellner 2002; Krug­man and Venables 1995) . 
Second, the group may feel discriminated against because their tradi­tional industries may need to lay off workers in order to remain profitable. They may even have to close if they cannot compete in the new mar­ketplace. The Scots felt economically discriminated against when their traditional iron, coal, and automotive industries began closing their doors because of economic pressure brought about by the increase in trade among 
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the states. It was only after large tax breaks were given to other industries 
that the unemployment rate in Scotland dropped {Pittock 2003). Similarly, 
the Basques felt discriminated against when economic shifts negatively 
impacted the prosperous heavy industry in the Basque region {Medrano 
1994) . 
To counteract the negative results of globalization, efforts must be made 
by the state to reduce the resultant effects. First, the state must refrain 
from repressing ethnic expression in any way. Repression only accentuates 
the ethnic divisions in the state. In fact, the state may actually wish 
to encourage ethnic expression. While one may feel that expressing the 
difference between ethnic groups in a state will result in higher rates of 
terrorism because of the accentuated differences, this research shows that 
higher levels of ethnic differences do not correspond to higher probabilities 
of terrorist actions. In fact, they correspond to lower probabilities. 
Also, to deal with the employment shifts, the state must encourage 
re-education and retraining in the areas hardest hit by the globalization­
inspired unemployment. Following the example of Britain with Scotland 
may significantly reduce the effects of globalization. In the 1980s, Margaret 
Thatcher, the prime minister of Great Britain, instituted several economic 
reforms and increased the economic aid to areas of Scotland hardest hit by 
unemployment and the 1980s recession (Pittock 2003) . 
One further possible result of globalization is an increase in the eco­
nomic differentials between the ethnonation and the containing state. Whether 
caused by globalization or not, these economic differentials are the second 
powerful indicator of future terrorist activity. A greater level of economic 
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differences between the group and the rest of the state leads to a greater 
level of terrorism in that state perpetrated by that group. Any policy 
which reduces the differences will reduce the probability the groups will 
resort to terrorism. 
There does not need to be any tradeoff between state actions to amelio­
rate the effects of globalization and of economic differentials. In fact, such 
actions tend to complement each other. For an example, see the British 
actions vis-a-vis the Scottish economy. A further example is that of the 
Spanish in the H egoalde. When the Basque traditional heavy industries 
of coal and steel began to encounter economic problems, the Spanish gov­
ernment did nothing. This was over and above the nothing they did to 
counteract the modernization that threatened Basque fueros, rights, and 
traditions (Ben-Ami 1991). The differences between the outcomes are stag­
gering. 
There are other possible actions the state could perform if eliminating 
terrorism is their ultimate goal. As the number of youth in a state is a 
strongly positive correlate of terrorism, state policy to reduce this number 
would also reduce the risk of terrorism. Perhaps the most effective thing 
a state can do to reduce the number of youth in the state is to encourage 
economic development, as economically developed states tend to have lower 
birth rates, and thus a lower adolescent population (Crenshaw, Ameen, and 
Christenson 1997). But this economic development needs to be uniform 
across the ethnonational groups in the state; otherwise the probability of 
terrorism will increase due to the increasing economic differentials. The 
amount of income redistribution necessary would be staggering in many 
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states. The very issue of redistribution of wealth conjures up images of communism. Some may even consider redistribution as just a euphemism for paying off the terrorists. Thus, while the answer to reducing terrorism is apparent, the actual necessary political steps are fraught with political landmines. 
Perhaps the existence of youth need not dramatically increase the prob­ability of terrorism in the state. Perhaps the state can implement long-term policies which ease the transition through this hormonal age. Shepherding the youth, giving them outlets for their evolutionary aggression, and so­cializing them into society and society's duties, rights, and responsibilities better can all work to reduce the effects of adolescents on terrorism. In addition, the state can institute policies for pre-adolescents that will also ultimately reduce their propensity for violence. Such policies may also re­duce other negatives in the state. Studies have shown that health risks, depression, and dropping out of school. Each of these has the immediate effects on that adolescent; however, each also has long-term effects. Not completing school reduces a person's earning potential and employability, thus increasing the economic disparities between that individual and sur­rounding individuals. Increased levels of depression increases feelings of despair and hopelessness, and, thus, may increase violent feelings. (Hagan and Foster 2001 ; Harris 1948}. 
Lastly, a state could also reduce the level of democracy to combat ter­rorism. 10 Both the higher levels of democracy and increasing levels of 
10There seems to be a tendency for states to do just this. In the aftermath of a 
severe terrorist attack, the government feels compelled to reduce civil liberties to make 
capturing and prosecuting terrorist suspects easier. This is not only true of the United 
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democracy are correlates of terrorism. However, as the level of democracy 
is also highly correlated with economic development, the actual results may 
not be as predicted by the model, as democracy apparently affects other 
correlates of terrorism (Arat 1988; Przeworski and Neto 1997) . While Fas­
cist Italy was quite capable of keeping their ethnonations from coalescing 
into effective groups, and while Franco's lessening of his controls resulted in 
an increased level of terrorist activity from the ETA, I am acutely uncom­
fortable suggesting public policy to reduce democracy levels in the state. 
This is especially true because the number of states in the study is small (n 
= 5) . What is it about democracy that produced this result? Democracy's 
adherence to the Rule of Law and its love with freedom of expression and 
association allow terrorism to flourish within its borders. 
Political changes in the government do have a slight calming effect on 
terrorist activity, however not at a statistically significant level. In the year 
following a political orientation change in the state, the average probability 
of a terrorist attack dropped slightly. The change indicates that the terror­
ist attacks are partially in response to policies of political parties. 1 1  Should 
a party be removed from power, the average probability of a terrorist at­
tack drops slightly. However, it is unclear at this juncture if this finding is 
States after September 1 1 ,  2001 (e.g. the USA PATRIOT Act), the United Kingdom 
instituted several policies designed to enable them to capture IRA suspects much easier. 
These policies included arrest and detention without trial of people suspected of being 
members of terrorist groups in Northern Ireland (Coogan 2002). 
11  At this point, there is no evidence that liberal-terconservative changes cause a differ­
ent response from terrorist groups than conservative-to-liberal changes. This, however, 
is an interesting question that must await an enlarged dataset. 
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a statistical artifact due to the small sample size or if its statistical signif­icance will increase with a larger dataset.12 Furthermore, disaggregating the data to something more precise than annual measures may also help ascertain the true relationship between terrorism and political changes in the state. 
7 .3 All Good Things . . .  
So, where does this leave us? A list of policies that states should implement to reduce the probability of domestic terrorism is not the same as states supporting this list. The current War on Terror will likely solve nothing. In fact, many academics feel it will only create more terrorists - much in the same vein as did the shelling of the hills overlooking Beirut by the USS New Jersey.13 But there is hope that this outdated paradigm is shifting to something more capable of returning terrorists to the political realm. 
On March 11, 2004, a group perpetrated a major terrorist attack on Madrid. Initially, the government blamed the ETA; however, it turned out to be the work of al Qaeda. To mark the one-year anniversary of the attack, the Club de Madrid hosted an international summit on the causes and solutions to terrorism. Three days of sessions and speakers crafted the same 
12 Again, recall that there are only five states under scrutiny. 
13 "A few months later, Arab terrorists took over a TWA flight from Athens and 
executed a U.S. Navy seaman on board, as they railed that it was payback time for 
the Beirut bombing. One hijacker kept yelling 'New Jersey! New Jersey!' as terrified 
passengers cowered in their seats. He was talking about the battleship New Jersey, 
which had rained down death and, yes, terror in the form of 2000-pound shells on 
Beirut the previous year" (Raimondo 2003). 
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conclusions. Javier Solana ( 2005), former Secretary-Gerneral of NATO 
and the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union/High 
representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, during one of 
the last plenary sessions perhaps said it best, 
. . .  vivimos en un mundo profundamente injusto y mientras 
sigamos teniendo un mundo tan injusto, seguiremos teniendo 
problemas de esta naturaleza sin ninguna duda. El siglo 21 
tiene que ser un siglo en el que nos enfrentamos con estos prob­
lemas seriamente. Solamente quiero decir que lo que vamos 
viendo en los ultimos aiios es que los paises mas ricos son mas 
ricos cada dia y sus poblaciones son mas viejas cada dia, y los 
paises mas pobres son mas pobres cada dia y sus ciudadanos son 
cada dia mas j6venes. La mitad de la poblaci6n mundial tiene 
menos de 25 aiios. Creo que esta reflexion es la mas importante 
para que nos enfrentemos de verdad con los graves problemas 
que tenemos en estos momentos, unos de los cuales es el terror­
ismo, pero hay muchos otros que conduciran sin duda, si no los 
resolvemos, al veneno que lleva a algunos a utilizar las armas 
de terrorismo. 
Roughly translated, 
. . .  we live in a profoundly unjust world and, while we continue 
having such an unjust world, we will continue having problems 
of this nature, without doubt. The 21st century must be a 
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century in which we confront these problems seriously. I only 
mean that what we are seeing in the last years is that the richest 
countries are richer every day and their populations are older 
every day, and the poorest countries are poorer every day and 
their citizens are younger every day. Half of the world's popu­
lation is younger than twenty-five. I believe that this reflection 
is the most important, for if we do not confront the grave prob­
lems we have at this moment, one of which is terrorism, then 
there are many others that without doubt will lead, if they are 
not resolved, to the venom that makes some resort to using the 
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ETHDIFXX Ethnic Difference Index MAR 33 
Ethnic difference index, "LANG" + "CUSTOM" + "BELIEF" + "RACE" , is constructed as follows: If all "LANG" , "CUSTOM" , "BELIEF" , and "RACE" are not coded, score "ETHDIFXX" =O. If "LANG" is coded 1, "ETHDIFXX" = +3. If "LANG" is coded 2, "ETHDIFXX" = +2. If "LANG" is coded 3, "ETHDIFXX" = + 1 .  If "CUSTOM" is coded 1, "ETHDIFXX" = +2. W hen adding "BELIEF" and "RACE" into the equation for ETHDIFXX, ETHDIFXX increases by the coded values of these two variables. (eg. If "BELIEF" = 2, then ETHDIFXX = +2.) 
Range: 1 - 7 
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-99: Missing Value. 
GC2 Regional Base MAR 38 
A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the 
country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the 
minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population. 
1: Yes 
2: No . 
-99: Missing Value. 
GDPCAPK GDP per capita, Constant USD 
Range: 45 7 1  - 46, 7 7 7  
-99: Missing Value. 
GDPCAPK_D Change in GDP per capita 
GDPCAPK_D = d.GDPCAPK 
Range: - 2610 - 1945 
-99: Missing Value. 
GRPCONC Group Concentration 
GRPCONC = 2 - GC2 





-99: Missing Value. 
LANG Different Language Group 
0: Unknown. 1 :  Group speaks same language. 2 :  Group speaks multiple languages. 3: Linguistic Assimilation w/ Dom. Group. 99: No basis for judgment. -99 : Missing Value. 
POLITY2 Democracy Level 
Range: -7 - 10 -99 : Missing Value. 
RACE Different Physical Appearance 




2:  Different racial stock from the dominant group with substantial inter-mixture. 3 :  Different racial stock, little or no intermixture. 99: No basis for judgment. -99: Missing Value. 
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REBEL Rebellion Index: 1 945-99 
0: None reported. 
1 :  Political banditry, sporadic terrorism. 
2 :  Campaigns of terrorism. 
MAR 424 
3 :  Local rebellions. Armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they 
prove to be the opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla 
or civil war during the year being coded, code the latter rather than 
local rebellion. Code declarations of independence by a minority­
controlled government here. 
4: Small-scale guerrilla activity. All of the following must exist: 1) fewer 
than 1000 armed fighters; 2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six 
reported per year) ; and 3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied 
by the group, or in one or two other locales. 
5 :  Intermediate guerrilla activity. Has one or two of the defining traits of 
large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale 
activity. 
6 :  Large-scale guerrilla activity. All of the following must exist: 1) more 
than 1000 armed fighters; 2)frequent armed attacks (more than 6 per 
year) ; and 3)attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by 
the group. 
7: Protracted civil war. Fought by rebel military units with base areas. 
99: No basis for judgment. 
-99: Missing Value. 
RISKECOO GDP per capita decline 
0: GDP per capita did not drop that year. 
1 :  GDP per capita did drop that year. 
-99: Missing Value. 
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EQN 
RISKECOl GDP per capita growth less than 1 % 
0: GDP per capita grew by more than 1% that year. 
1: GDP per capita did not grow by more than 1% that year. 
-99: Missing Value. 
RISKEC02 GDP per capita growth less than 2% 
0: GDP per capita grew by more than 2% that year. 
1: GDP per capita did not grow by more than 2% that year. 
-99: Missing Value. 
RISKGMIN Party Orientation Change that Year 
0: Government party orientation did not change. 
1: Government orientation changed. 
-99: Missing Value. 
RISKGMIN.L Party Orientation Change, next Year 
0:  Government party orientation did not change the next year. 
1 :  Government orientation changed the next year. 





RISKGMIN _D Party Orientation Change, previous Year EQN 
0: Government party orientation did not change the previous year. 
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1: Government orientation changed the previous year. 
-99: Missing Value. 
TERR_YEAR Use of Terrorism in the Year 
0: No use of terror by the group that year. 
1: Use of terror by the group that year. 
-99: Missing Value. 
TERR_PRE Group Previous Use of Terrorism 
0:  No previous use of terror by the group. 
1: Previous use of terror by the group. 
-99: Missing Value. 
TRADE Total Trade for the State /' Barbieri/Eurostat 
Range: 4. 95 x 108 - 9. 18 x 1011 
-99: Missing Value. 
UNEMP Unemployment Rate 
Range: 0 - 24.2 





UNEMP_D Change in Unemployment Rate 
Range: -3.0 - 4.3 
-99: Missing Value. 
URBANPCT Urban Percent in the State 
Range: 44.3 - 88.9 
-99:  Missing Value. 
YOUTHPCT Percentage of Youth in the State 
Range: 11.5 - 19.2 





Notes on Data Sources 
Barbieri Trade figures for the states under investigation came from two 
sources. Barbieri compiled a trade database for her dissertation. The 
dataset is located on the Correlates of War project's website. The 
address is http : // cow2 . la . psu . edu/. 
EQN This variable was calculated using other data and the provided equa­
tion. For sources on the component variables, see the entries for the 
component variables. 
Eurostat Trade figures for the states under investigation came from two 
sources. Eurostat is the official collector of statistics for the European 
Union. Its website is http : //epp . eurostat . cec . eu . int/. 
MAR ## The Minorities at Risk project provided the majority of the 
base data utilized in this research. In fact, the minorities examined 
were classified as "at risk" by the Minorities at Risk project. All 
MAR-designated variables can be located in their codebook online. 
Their website is http : //www . cidcm . umd . edu/inscr/mar/. 
p4v2002 The Polity IV project resides at the University of Maryland. 
Its dataset can be downloaded from http : //www . cidcm . umd . edu/ 
inscr/poli ty/. 
UN The United Nations collects both primary and secondary data to aid 
in the evaluation of their programs and of their member states. The 
United Nations database used in this research is the Population In- . 
formation Network (POP IN) at http : //www . un . org/popin/. 
World Bank The World Bank produces economic statistics to evaluate 
their programs. The dataset was downloaded from their subscrip­
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